Fiscal Multipliers and Monetary Policy: Reconciling Theory and Evidence

Christian Bredemeier
University of Cologne

Falko Juessen
Bergische Universität Wuppertal

Andreas Schabert†
University of Cologne

This version: November 23, 2018

Abstract

Estimated fiscal multipliers are typically moderate, which should in theory be associated with spending hikes raising real interest rates. However, monetary policy rates actually fall, which should lead to large multipliers. We rationalize these puzzling observations with imperfect substitutability of assets. We document that real rates that matter more for private agents than the policy rate as well as liquidity premia increase after spending hikes. A model with a structural specification of asset liquidity can replicate these findings and predicts that neither a policy rate reduction nor a fixation at the zero lower bound are sufficient for large multipliers.

JEL classification: E32, E42, E63

Keywords: Fiscal multiplier, monetary policy, real interest rates, liquidity premium, zero lower bound

*The authors are grateful to Klaus Adam, Roel Beetsma, Jörg Breitung, Michael Krause, Gernot Müller, Massimo Giuliodori, Almuth Scholl, Roland Straub, Harald Uhlig, and Sweder van Wijnbergen for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SPP 1578) is gratefully acknowledged.

†University of Cologne, Center for Macroeconomic Research, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany. Phone: +49 221 470 2483. Email: schabert@wiso.uni-koeln.de.
1 Introduction

The last decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the stimulative effects of government expenditures. A focal point of the debate is the role of the monetary policy stance during fiscal stimulus programs, exemplified by extraordinary large output multipliers at the zero lower bound (ZLB) found in theoretical studies (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2011). Surprisingly, the literature has hardly recognized a closely connected clear-cut empirical evidence which implies that the impact of monetary policy on the output multiplier is typically overestimated: Standard macroeconomic theories predict that an increase in government spending crowds out private absorption due to an adverse wealth effect and that these responses are accompanied by higher real rates of return to clear markets for commodities (see Barro and King, 1984, Aiyagari et al., 1992, or Woodford, 2011). Yet, data provide a different picture. Empirical studies for the US commonly find a moderate fiscal multiplier, i.e., an output multiplier around and mostly below one (see Hall, 2009, Barro and Redlick, 2011, Ramey, 2011, Caldara and Kamps, 2017, as well as the overview in Ramey, 2016). Simultaneously, the nominal and the real monetary policy rate tend to fall, as documented by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Ramey (2016), among others.1 According to the widespread view – particularly emphasized by the New Keynesian paradigm – that real rates of return essentially follow the real monetary policy rate, this is a clear puzzle, since falling real rates should lead to an unambiguous increase in private absorption and a large output multiplier.

Remarkably, this puzzling empirical pattern, which we document to be robust over different identification schemes and sample periods, has been almost unnoticed by the literature.2 Instead, theoretical studies emphasize that, when the monetary policy rate is held constant, for example at the ZLB, private absorption increases strongly and fiscal multipliers are large, i.e., output multipliers exceed two (see Christiano et al., 2011, Eggertsson, 2011), since the inflationary impact of government spending reduces the real monetary policy rate. In this paper, we reconcile theory and empirical evidence on fiscal policy effects by focussing on assets’ ability to serve for transaction purposes, summarized by the term “liquidity”. We take into account that interest rates on assets that serve as substitutes for money are closely linked to the monetary policy rate, whereas interest

---

1 Other studies documenting an immediate fall in short-term interest rates include Edelberg et al. (1999) and Fisher and Peters (2010). To be precise, Edelberg et al. (1999), Fisher and Peters (2010), and Ramey (2016) consider short-term T-bill rates and Mountfort and Uhlig (2009) the federal funds rate. As for example shown by Simon (1990) and confirmed by our own empirical evidence, the T-bill rate and the federal funds rate behave very similarly at quarterly frequency – a finding that is also consistent with our theoretical model.

2 An exception is Corsetti et al. (2012) who report ambiguous responses of longer-term interest rates, which are "regarded as difficult to reconcile with standard analyses of fiscal expansions" (p. 82).
rates on assets that cannot be classified as near-money assets and that are typically more relevant for private saving and borrowing differ systematically from the former rates. We provide novel evidence that this fact matters for asymmetric interest rate responses to fiscal policy shocks and develop a simple model with imperfect asset substitutability. While the model is able to reproduce the observed fiscal policy effects, it has striking implications regarding the role of monetary policy for the fiscal multiplier: Neither the empirically observed reductions in monetary policy rates nor the policy rate being fixed, for example, at the ZLB, are sufficient for a large fiscal multiplier.

The starting point of our empirical analysis is that the real and nominal monetary policy rate decrease rather than increase in response to expansionary government spending shocks, see, e.g., Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Ramey (2016). Relatedly, the apparent negative (unconditional) association between changes in the federal funds rate and unanticipated changes in government spending shown in Figure 1 suggests that monetary policy tends to be accommodative when government spending is raised in an unforeseen way. Yet, the simultaneous reaction of output seems to constitute a puzzle since estimated fiscal multipliers are moderate. In a first step, we confirm these findings using Ramey’s (2016) identification procedure based on defense spending news. Given that these simultaneous responses of output and short-term interest rates cannot be rationalized by standard theories, we account for possibly divergent responses of other interest rates in a second step. Specifically, we examine the responses of interest rates on money market instruments as well as on less liquid assets like corporate bonds or mortgage debt, where the latter are undeniably more relevant for private sector saving and borrowing decisions than the former. Since limited availability of most interest rate data hinders the application of the previous identification procedure, we follow Ramey’s (2011) suggestion and use professional forecasts to isolate exogenous fiscal policy impulses. As a systematic pattern, we find that the responses of real returns to deviate more from the response of the monetary policy rate the less the underlying asset serves as a substitute for money. For example, the response of the T-bill rate or the rate on certificates of deposits are similar to the federal funds rate response, whereas responses of longer-term treasuries are less pronounced, and mortgage rates and Aaa

---

3In contrast, inflation shows a positive co-movement with the forecast error, indicating that the federal funds rate pattern does not follow from central bank reactions to price changes.
4We also consider a sample period that excludes the recent ZLB episode which we find to have no substantial impact on the results. This is in line with Canova and Pappa (2011), Dupor and Li (2014), and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) who document that output multipliers at constant policy rates are not higher than on average.
5In a previous version of this paper, we find the same pattern for a recursive Blanchard-Perotti (2002) identification, which is subject to the anticipation critique emphasized by Ramey (2011, 2016).
**Figure 1:** Time variation of forecast errors about government spending and of federal funds rate changes.

![Graph showing time variation of forecast errors and changes in the federal funds rate](image)

**Notes:** Figure shows the difference between actual government spending and the spending level implied by one-quarter ahead forecasts (for the respective quarter from the the previous quarter) from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (grey area with solid black line) and the quarter-to-quarter change in the effective federal funds rate (blue line). The sample period is 1983Q1 (end of reserve targeting) to 2008Q3 (before the recent ZLB episode).

corporate bond rates even increase significantly after a government spending hike. Put differently, the latter interest rates do not follow the federal funds rate which is in line with Fama’s (2013) findings regarding the Fed’s "little control" over various important interest rates.\(^6\) We further investigate a set of spreads which have been suggested to be primarily determined by liquidity premia as well as the common factor of these spreads.\(^7\) Our econometric analysis in fact shows that liquidity premia as well as the common liquidity factor significantly increase after a government spending hike.\(^8\)

These observations can be explained in a simple way: Due to an increase in government spending, aggregate demand tends to exceed supply. Excess demand implies that agents are willing to spend more for current relative to future consumption (see Barro and King, 1984). As the willingness to save decreases, prices of assets that private agents use as a store of wealth fall and their real interest rates rise. Crucially, this argument does not equally apply for near-money assets that serve as a close substitute for money

---

\(^6\)Fama (2013) concludes by stating that "in sum, the evidence says that Fed actions with respect to its target rate have little effect on long-term interest rates, and there is substantial uncertainty about the extent of Fed control of short-term rates"

\(^7\)These spreads are suggested by Longstaff (2004), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), and Nagel (2016). Our construction of the common liquidity premium follows Del Negro et al. (2017).

\(^8\)While we acknowledge that other factors might also contribute to the observed differential interest rate responses, we provide evidence that expectations about future short-term interest rates, increases in government debt, and changes in the risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector (see Gilchrist and Zakrjaske, 2012) are not decisive for our findings, see Section 3.3.
and that are primarily held for payment purposes. Given their additional non-pecuniary return (from liquidity services), these assets offer lower interest rates, which are closely linked to the monetary policy rate. Being dominated in rate of return, these assets neither serve as a store of wealth nor can they be issued by households and firms. Hence, higher government spending induces a fall in the demand for less liquid assets relative to the demand for near-money assets, such that the interest rate spread (i.e., the liquidity premium) between these assets tends to widen. Due to this separation, one can therefore observe moderate output increases in response to government spending hikes even when the real monetary policy rate falls.\(^9\)

If, however, one neglects that the monetary policy rate primarily determines the interest rate on near-money assets and that liquidity premia exist, the real monetary policy rate essentially controls agents’ intertemporal choices, like in standard New Keynesian models. As a consequence, the joint response of the nominal policy rate and expected inflation to government spending can dominate the adverse wealth effect in a situation where the real policy rate actually falls. As argued by Christiano et al. (2011) or Eggertsson (2011), the latter scenario would be relevant at the ZLB, where government spending crowds-in private consumption and fiscal multipliers can be much larger than typically found in the data.

To replicate the observed fiscal policy effects, we develop a simple macroeconomic model with an interest rate spread between near-money assets and less liquid assets. While a liquidity premium can in principle be introduced in a straightforward way, one faces two main challenges: Firstly, the interest rate spread has to increase after government spending hikes as observed in the data. Secondly, the separation between the interest rates (associated with small spreads) should explain large differences in the fiscal multiplier compared to the predictions of models without liquidity premia. Consider, for example, the most common specification of a non-pecuniary return (e.g., due to liquidity or safety) of a particular asset, say, a government bond, where it is assumed that this asset directly provides utility (see, e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, Nagel, 2016, or Michaillat and Saez, 2018). The spread between the interest rate on an asset that exclusively provides a pecuniary return and the interest rate on government bonds is then an increasing function of the marginal utility of government bond holdings divided by the marginal utility of consumption. Thus, for the spread to rise, as found in the data, the marginal utility of bonds would have to increase relative

\(^9\)In general, a liquidity premium on near-money assets does not only depend on the opportunity costs of money, i.e., the interest rate on less liquid assets, but also on the supply of near-money assets and/or their interest rate (see, e.g., Nagel, 2016, and our discussion below).
to the marginal utility of consumption. Empirically, government debt typically increases in response to expansionary spending shocks which tends to reduce the marginal utility of bonds while a strong crowding-in of consumption can hardly be observed. Hence, the liquidity premium in a bonds-in-the-utility setup would tend to decrease rather than increase after a government spending hike.

In this paper, we instead apply a more structural approach to account for assets’ imperfect substitutability, which is based on the pledgeability of assets for central bank transactions (see, e.g., Rocheteau et al., 2018). Concretely, we account for the fact that central banks typically supply money to commercial banks only against eligible assets, i.e., treasury bills, in open market operations. Replicating observed spreads requires the monetary policy rate to be set below the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Then, the price of money in terms of eligible assets is lower than the price agents are willing to pay, such that eligible assets are scarce. In contrast to a non-eligible asset, they are valued for their near-moneyness, which is reflected by a liquidity premium. This premium decreases with the monetary policy rate and increases with the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution; the latter being shifted upwards by an increase in government expenditures (which reduces the willingness to save). In line with empirical evidence, the T-bill rate closely follows the policy rate, whereas rates of return on non-eligible assets, e.g., corporate debt, tend to be higher. These illiquid assets therefore serve as store of wealth for private agents, such that their real returns relate to the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution which is separated from the policy rate by the liquidity premium. While this specification generally preserves empirically plausible effects of monetary policy, its predictions regarding fiscal policy effects differ substantially from the predictions of standard models. Precisely, when the real policy rate falls, whether due to monetary accommodation of fiscal policy or because the nominal rate is stuck at the ZLB, standard models predict a large fiscal multiplier, whereas our model generates rising real rates on less liquid assets, an increasing liquidity premium, and a moderate fiscal multiplier in line with empirical evidence.

The main predictions of the model with the endogenous liquidity premium are presented analytically and are compared to a reference version without the liquidity premium, which corresponds to a standard New Keynesian model. To replicate the empirical evidence of Bredemeier et al. (2018), who further provide consistent empirical evidence on changes in liquidity premia after unanticipated monetary policy announcements, and by Linnemann and Schabert (2015), who find that liquidity premia help explaining observed exchange rate responses to monetary policy shocks.

10 Notably, our model with the liquidity premium also implies that an increase in a labor income tax rate at the ZLB leads to contractionary effects, whereas a model without the liquidity premium paradoxically predicts expansionary effects (as in Eggertsson, 2011), see Figure A11 in the online appendix.
findings, we calibrate the liquidity premium model and use it to study fiscal policy effects under two different monetary policy regimes. First, we account quantitatively for the observed fall in the monetary policy rate after a government spending hike. The calibrated model with the liquidity premium generates moderate output multipliers and leads to an increase in the liquidity premium, quantitatively consistent with the data. Second, we study a scenario with the nominal policy rate at the ZLB, where a decline in the real policy rate is induced by the fixation of the nominal policy rate. Here, we obtain the intuitive result that fiscal multipliers at the ZLB are smaller than for the case of falling monetary policy rates. In contrast, the model version without a liquidity premium predicts an extremely large output multiplier, as in Christiano et al. (2011). Thus, our model is able to reproduce – seemingly puzzling – observed responses of policy rates and output to government spending shocks, while implying that neither the empirically observed degree of monetary accommodation nor fixed monetary policy rates are sufficient to generate large fiscal multipliers. The response of the monetary policy rate to government spending shocks in fact alters the size of the fiscal multiplier, but it is much less influential than suggested by standard models that neglect liquidity premia. While we fully acknowledge that the amount of slack in the economy or cyclical financial market conditions might lead to larger multipliers in recessions, as for example found by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), we show that the role of monetary policy for the fiscal multiplier is hugely overestimated when only the responses of monetary policy rates are taken into account and other rates of return are ignored.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our study to the literature. Section 3 provides empirical evidence. Section 4 presents the model. In Section 5 we derive analytical results regarding fiscal policy effects. The section further presents impulse responses for a calibrated version of the model. Section 6 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our paper mainly relates to three strands of the literature. First, the results in Ramey (2016), who provides an overview and a synthesis of the current understanding of the effects of government spending shocks, are central for our analysis. Specifically, the puzzling joint observation of a falling real policy rate in response to a government spending hike and a moderate fiscal multiplier, which she documents for narrative defense news shocks (see Ramey, 2011 and Ramey and Zubairy, 2018) and defense news shocks with medium-run horizon (see Ben-Zeev and Pappa, 2017), serves as the starting point of our empirical analysis. Likewise, Mountford and Uhlig (2009), who apply a sign restriction identification, report that government spending expansions are associated with a falling
nominal policy rate and an impact output multiplier below one. Reductions in the nominal and real federal funds and T-bill rates in response to fiscal expansions are also found by other empirical studies on the effects of fiscal policy. Edelberg et al. (1999) exploit the Ramey-Shapiro (1997) war dates and find initial declines in the nominal and real 3-months and 1-year treasury rates. Fisher and Peters (2010) document a decline in the nominal 3-months T-bill rate in the first year after positive government spending shocks identified through the excess returns of large US military contractors. Ramey (2011) finds the nominal 3-months T-bill rate to fall in response to defense news shocks.\[^{12}\]

Second, our analysis relates to theoretical studies on fiscal policy effects at the ZLB when the real monetary policy rate falls in response to a government spending hike due to a rise in inflation. Most prominently, Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertsson (2011) show that fiscal multipliers at the ZLB in a New Keynesian model become larger than typically observed in empirical studies, which has been confirmed by Woodford (2011) and Fahri and Werning (2016).\[^{13}\] Erceg and Linde (2014) show that the fiscal multiplier depends on the duration of the ZLB episode. It can further be much smaller than one when equilibrium multiplicity is considered, see Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Cochrane (2017). Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) find a multiplier at the ZLB of roughly one half when financing with distortionary taxation and transfers to borrowing-constrained agents are taken into account. Michaillat and Saez (2018) examine a New Keynesian model with government bonds in the utility function. They show that this assumption crucially affects equilibrium determinacy and generates muted effects of forward guidance and fiscal policy.\[^{14}\] In contrast to the latter two studies, who consider an exogenous liquidity premium, we propose a mechanism that builds on endogenous liquidity premia and their response to fiscal policy, for which we provide direct empirical evidence.

Third, our paper is related to several recent studies analyzing endogenous liquidity premia on treasury debt in a macroeconomic context. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show that the supply of treasuries affects spreads, indicating that short-term and long-term treasury debt is characterized by liquidity and safety reflected by interest rate premia. Nagel (2016) provides evidence on a systematic relation between

\[^{12}\]Corsetti et al. (2012) further find that longer-term interest rates tend to fall after expansionary fiscal shocks, which relates to our findings regarding the responses of long-term treasury rates. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017), who identify spending shocks through a maximum forecast error variance approach to defense spending, find the interest rate on 3-months T-Bills to increase in a VAR, which contrasts Ramey’s (2016) findings using identical shocks for local projections.

\[^{13}\]Rendahl (2016) shows that, under labor market frictions, fiscal multipliers can be large at the ZLB even when government spending does not increase future inflation.

\[^{14}\]Similar effects on equilibrium determinacy and fiscal policy effects at the ZLB are found by Diba and Loisel (2017), who consider an extended New Keynesian model where the central bank simultaneously controls two instruments (instead of one).
the level of short-term interest rates and the liquidity premium on T-bills, implying that a central bank can mitigate effects of money demand shocks by targeting the interest rate.\textsuperscript{15} Our empirical analysis further implies short- and long-term treasury debt to provide liquidity services to a different extent, which relates to Greenwood et al. (2015), who analyze optimal government debt maturity. The theoretical foundation of the liquidity premium in our model is similar to Williamson (2016), who applies a model with differential pledgeability of assets to study unconventional monetary policy. We specify collateral requirements as commonly imposed by major central banks, which can be endogenized by information frictions, as shown by Rocheteau et al. (2018). Short-term treasuries then serve as a substitute for money, which relates to Benigno and Nistico’s (2017) specification of liquidity constraints accounting for holdings of money and treasuries. It is noteworthy that our particular specification of liquidity services has also proven to be helpful for solving puzzles related to uncovered interest rate parity and forward guidance, see Linnemann and Schabert (2015) and Bredemeier et al. (2018).

3 Fiscal policy effects in the data

In this section, we scrutinize the role of monetary policy for fiscal multipliers and document several novel empirical facts. The starting point of our empirical analysis is Mountford and Uhlig’s (2009) and Ramey’s (2016) finding that, in postwar US data, the nominal and the real monetary policy rate tend to fall in response to a positive government spending shock, while output effects are moderate, i.e., the fiscal multiplier is around 1. In the first part of the empirical analysis, we replicate and extend these results by estimating responses of fiscal policy shocks for the sample 1948-2015 using Ramey’s (2016) military spending identification and estimation procedure. In the second part, we address these puzzling findings and consider the responses of various interest rates, in particular, rates that are more relevant for private sector transactions than the monetary policy rate. To identify their responses to fiscal policy shocks, we rely on a different identification procedure, given that relevant financial market data are only available for recent sample periods. Using professional forecasts for the identification of fiscal shocks (see also Figure 1), as suggested by Ramey (2011) for these sample periods, we again find falling monetary policy rates and moderate output multipliers as well as that real interest rates that are more relevant for private sector saving and borrowing decisions tend to rise after fiscal expansions, which principally aligns well with moderate output responses. We further consider interest rate spreads that measure liquidity premia

\textsuperscript{15}In contrast to our model, Nagel (2016) assumes that the central bank sets the interest rate on less liquid assets rather than on T-bills.
(shown in Figure A1 in the online appendix) and find that they increase significantly after a government spending hike.

3.1 Monetary policy and the fiscal multiplier

To set the stage for our analysis, we start by replicating and extending Ramey’s (2016) estimation of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on core macroeconomic variables, applying defense news shocks (see Ramey, 2011) and computing impulse responses with local projections (see Jorda, 2005). For this approach, we estimate a set of regressions for each horizon, where we obtain the \( h \)-quarter-ahead impulse response for a specific variable \( z \) by regressing \( z_{t+h} \) on the identified government spending shock in period \( t \) as well as on control variables.\(^{16}\) As in Ramey (2016), the sample period is 1947Q1-2015Q3. In addition to Ramey’s (2016) set of variables, we consider the responses of the nominal T-bill rate and the CPI inflation rate, which is particularly helpful to unveil further details of the transmission mechanism.

Figure 2 presents impulse responses of government spending, output, the nominal T-bill rate, and the CPI inflation rate. The response of government spending and output are expressed in percent while, for interest rates and inflation, we show absolute responses expressed in basis points. The dotted (dashed) lines show 68% (90%) confidence bands. The responses in the first row are identical with the responses in Ramey (2016) and show that output increases with positive spending shocks. The cumulated output multipliers differ with regard to the particular time horizon, as also documented in Ramey (2016), and are 1.37 after four quarters, 1.0 after six quarters, and 0.8 after eight quarters. At the same time, we observe a prolonged fall in the nominal T-bill rate, which is statistically significant in the quarters 1-3 after the shock.\(^{17}\) Within the first three quarters, we further observe a significant and sharp increase in CPI inflation. Consistently, the ex-post real T-bill rate falls unambiguously in response to a fiscal expansion, as in Ramey (2016). The responses of the nominal T-bill rate, which is closely linked to the federal funds rates at quarterly frequency (see Simon, 1990), as well as those of inflation and output indicate an accommodating monetary policy stance towards fiscal policy, which cannot be explained by monetary policy reactions implied by a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule. Notably, falling real interest rates can – in theory – not be squared with a moderate output multiplier, which should instead take extremely large values.

\(^{16}\)The error terms in the local projection regressions will have a moving-average structure of the forecast errors between different horizons. Following Jorda (2005) and Ramey (2016) we correct the standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure.

\(^{17}\)The impact multiplier is negative here, as in Ramey (2016), since output increases, whereas government spending initially falls slightly in response to news shocks.
Figure 2: Responses to government spending shocks identified through defense news.


even under a combination of a constant nominal interest rate (e.g., at the ZLB) and an increased inflation rate (see Christiano et al., 2011, or Eggertsson, 2011).

To address these puzzling observations, the subsequent analysis will focus on a particular implicit assumption made in standard macroeconomic theories, namely, that real interest rates that are relevant for private agents’ intertemporal decisions closely follow the monetary policy rate. In contrast, we will argue that the impact of fiscal shocks on different segments of financial markets can reconcile theory with the evidence described above. To shed further light on this, we rely on further financial market data.
3.2 A closer look at interest rate responses

To investigate the fiscal transmission mechanism further, we include a larger set of interest rates and interest rate spreads in our analysis. This however limits the sample period as most informative financial market variables are not available before the end of the 1970s. Specifically, our baseline analysis considers quarterly data for the sample period 1979Q4 to 2015Q4.

3.2.1 Baseline specification

Ramey (2011, 2016) has shown that identification approaches based on narrative measures or military news perform poorly in identifying government spending shocks in samples – like ours – that start after the Korean war. We therefore follow Ramey (2011) and use forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to capture exogenous and unforeseen variations in government spending and apply a well-established VAR framework to compute impulse responses. We extend Ramey’s (2011) sample to end in 2015Q4, construct forecast errors from the SPF using real-time data, following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), and consider a shock to the forecast error which is ordered first in a recursive orthogonalization. As further variables in the baseline VAR, we include log real total government spending per capita, log real GDP per capita, log real net tax receipts per capita, and the nominal federal funds rate.

As Ramey (2011), we include four lags and account for linear-quadratic trends. We additionally estimate fiscal policy responses for a sample ending in 2008Q3 to rule out effects due to the unconventional conduct of monetary policy, (see Figure A2). We find that the responses for the full sample and for the shorter sample are similar, suggesting a rather negligible role of the recent ZLB period. The impulse responses implied by the VAR are also similar to impulse responses obtained using local projections, which, on the one hand, put fewer restrictions on the impulse responses (see Jorda, 2005, or, Ramey, 2016), while they are, on the other hand, well-known to lead to less precise estimates (see Figure A3).

We follow Burnside et al.’s (2004) strategy and rotate further variables of interest into the baseline VAR. Specifically, we additionally consider interest rates, spreads, and further financial market measures, where we leave out the federal funds rate when interest rates on near-money assets are included. This strategy is consistent with our theoretical model where interest rates on near-money assets are tightly linked to the monetary policy rate. The left column of Figure 3 shows the responses to a 1% positive government

\[\text{impulse responses} = \text{VAR}(\text{fiscal policy responses})\]

\[\text{(1)}\]

Thus, we use a similar set of variables as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), thereby controlling for monetary and tax policy when identifying government spending shocks (as suggested by Ramey, 2011). Details on data sources and variable definitions are provided in A.
Figure 3: Responses to government spending shocks identified through forecast errors.

Notes: Identification based on forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Ramey, 2011). VAR includes forecast error, government spending, real GDP, net tax receipts, and the federal funds rate. Bottom-right panel: real federal funds rate replaces nominal federal funds rate in VAR. Sample period 1979Q4-2015Q4. Responses in percent, nominal and real federal funds rate in basis points. Dotted lines (dashed lines) show 68% (90%) confidence bands. Horizontal axes show quarters.

spending shock in our baseline VAR. In line with Ramey (2011) who considers a sample period similar to ours, output increases on impact, while the expansionary effect of fiscal policy is found to be short-lived.¹⁹ The cumulated output multiplier in our VAR equals 1.29 on impact, 0.39 after four quarters, 0.53 after six quarters, and 0.68 after eight quarters. Like in Ramey (2011), we do not find a significant response of taxes to government spending shocks. As in Figure 2 we find that the nominal federal funds rate decreases substantially and significantly in response to a government spending shock.

We also investigate the behavior of the real federal funds rate, since real rather than nominal interest rates are relevant for intertemporal decisions. Consistent with a forward-looking behavior of financial market participants whose investment decisions are

¹⁹Figure XII in Ramey (2011) shows a very similar output response as documented in our Figure 3.
based on expected inflation, we apply ex-ante real rates using real-time inflation forecasts (not available for the sample underlying Figure 2) rather than ex-post real rates using realized inflation rates, which is particularly appropriate for long-term rates (see Section 3.2.2). We find that the ex-ante real federal funds rate also declines significantly in response to government spending shocks (see lower right panel of Figure 3). It should be noted that real interest rate responses are qualitatively unaffected when we instead use realized inflation rates. We also include realized CPI inflation rates and real-time inflation forecasts into the set of variables and find that neither inflation measure display a significant response to government spending shocks (see Figure A4).

3.2.2 Diverging interest rate responses

To reconcile theory with empirical evidence, we extend the empirical analysis by examining further interest rates that are more relevant for private sector saving and investment decisions than the federal funds rate, which is the interbank market price of central bank money. Recall that theory predicts government spending to induce excess demand for commodities. The reduced willingness to save tends to reduce prices of assets that private agents use as a store of wealth and to increase their real interest rates. However, the federal funds rate is less related to the latter than to interest rates on near money assets (like T-bills), which are typically not held as a store of wealth and can – except for financial institutions – not be issued by private borrowers. Hence, we expect interest rates to respond differently to government spending shocks when the underlying assets differ with regard to their ability to serve as a substitute for money.

We consider several money market rates, i.e., interest rates on assets and liabilities that are relevant for liquidity management as they serve as substitutes for money. Money market instruments, like treasury bills, commercial papers, or certificates of deposits, are used by financial institutions, corporations, the central bank, and the government to have access to transaction balances under non-synchronized payments and receipts. We further examine interest rates, which are relevant for non-financial sector borrowing, like mortgage rates and corporate bond rates. Figure 4 summarizes responses of money market rates that we obtain from VARs in which the respective interest rate replaces the nominal federal funds rate as the fourth variable. The rate on 3 months T-bills, which are commonly viewed as being close substitutes for money, responds to the fiscal shock in a similar way as the federal funds rate. Likewise, the rates on treasury securities with

20 The responses of government spending, output and net taxes are very similar across specifications and are therefore omitted. Due to data availability, the sample periods differ between the different VARs considered in Figure 4 (see the figure notes for details).
Figure 4: Responses of real money-market rates and interest rates on less liquid assets to government spending shocks identified through forecast errors.

a longer maturity (1 year) and the rate on certificates of (time) deposits (CDs), which are used by banks and depository institutions to manage liability positions, also fall in response to positive fiscal shocks. In contrast to the rate on CDs, which are regulated by the Federal Banking agency, the 3-months US LIBOR rate applies to (principally) unregulated bank deposit liabilities, which banks offer to each other. It is commonly viewed as the most important short-term interest rate due its central role as a benchmark in various financial transactions, like syndicated loans or mortgages (see, e.g., Duffie and Stein, 2015). Consistent with our expectation, we find that the 3-months as well as the 12-months US LIBOR tend to increase in response to government spending.

Next, we turn to interest rates on assets and liabilities that serve as a means of borrowing and saving for private sector agents rather than for transaction purposes. These assets and liabilities are typically associated with a longer maturity. We first consider the yields of 5 years and 10-year government bonds. Although they are not primarily held for transactions and payment purposes, these longer-term treasuries are also characterized by liquidity and safety attributes, as stressed by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), though to a lesser extent than short-term treasuries (see Greenwood et al., 2015). Consistent with these properties, the point estimates of real 5-year and 10-year treasury rates tend to fall after an fiscal expansion, while their responses are less pronounced than the responses of short-term treasuries (see Figure 4). As a return on an asset that is less liquid, according to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), we consider Aaa corporate bonds yields. As shown in Figure 4, the response of the latter displays a pattern that differs substantially from the treasury rates responses, as it increases over the first year after a positive fiscal shock. Likewise, MBS yields and rates on flexible rate mortgages, which are obviously more relevant for private sector borrowing than long-term treasury rates, increase as well.21

Overall, we find that the response of an interest rate tends to deviate more from the monetary policy rate response the less the underlying asset serves as a substitute for money.

3.2.3 Assets’ liquidity as a central factor

The assets underlying the above-examined interest rates differ with regard to their ability to serve as a substitute for money. While other factors might principally also play a

21While bank loan rates and Baa corporate rates are also relevant for private sector borrowing, they are not included in our analysis, since they are substantially affected by other factors, like banks’ price setting policy (leading to a stepwise pattern of bank loan rates) or larger credit risk components, which we do not address in our analysis. We find that the responses of these interest rates are typically insignificant (not shown), which is consistent with Ramey’s (2011) result of insignificant Baa responses.
role, the main hypothesis of this paper is that differences in interest rate responses are mainly driven by asymmetric demands for assets with different liquidity characteristics, which are captured by endogenous liquidity premia. Direct evidence supporting this claim is given in Figure 5 which shows responses of interest rate spreads that have been identified to be predominantly determined by liquidity valuations, i.e., interest rate spreads between assets with similar maturity but differences in liquidity.\textsuperscript{22}

We investigate three spreads that measure liquidity premia on short-term assets and two spreads on longer-term assets. The short-term spreads are the spread between the US LIBOR rate and the T-bill rate (also known as the TED spread) and the spread between the rates on commercial papers and T-bills, which are associated with an average maturity of three months. The former spread is widely used as an illiquidity measure (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009), though it arguably contains a credit risk component, while the latter spread is – according to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) – much less affected by default risk. We further examine the spread between the interbank rate on 3-month general collateral (GC) repurchase agreements and the T-bill rate, which has been suggested by Nagel (2016) as a measure for illiquidity, as trading the former asset is – in contrast to the latter – costly. The long-term spreads we consider are the spread between the rates on Aaa corporate bonds and long-term treasury bonds (see also Figure 1), which mainly measures a liquidity premium or “convenience yield” according to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), as well as the spread between 10-year Refcorp bonds and treasury bonds, suggested by Longstaff (2004). Given that Refcorp bonds are guaranteed by the US government and taxed as treasury bonds, the associated spread mainly captures relative illiquidity of Refcorp bonds and is less contaminated by other factors than the Aaa-treasury spread. Corresponding spreads for different maturities, e.g., 5 years, are not shown here, as they display very similar responses.

Figure 5 shows that all five measures of liquidity premia increase significantly in response to the government spending shock. Apparently, this result applies regardless of whether the liquidity premium is measured by short-term or long-term spreads. The maximum increase of the individual spreads is about 20 bps and is thus substantial, given that the mean values for the spreads range between 25 and 135 bps.\textsuperscript{23} We corroborate the

\textsuperscript{22}In the online appendix, we show that the various liquidity spreads have also been positive in the last part of the sample, 2008.IV-2015.IV, indicating a positive valuation of liquidity even during the time of the US Fed’s extended liquidity provision (see Figure A1).

\textsuperscript{23}Note that some interest rates and spreads are not available for the entire sample period such that the reported spread responses do not necessarily reflect the differences between reported responses of the associated interest rates.
**Figure 5:** Responses of liquidity premia to government spending shocks identified through forecast errors.


Effect of fiscal policy on liquidity premia by considering, following Del Negro et al. (2017), a common liquidity factor that extracts the common component of short-term and long-term spreads. The main advantage of the common factor is that, while individual interest rate spreads may include non-liquidity related components, these components are washed out by the common factor analysis which delivers a purified measure of liquidity premia. A further advantage is that the common liquidity factor allows us to estimate the VAR for the full baseline period 1979Q4 to 2015Q4 (thus using the same sample period as in Figure 3). The bottom-left panel of Figure 5 shows that the common liquidity factor increases in response to expansionary fiscal policy shocks.

We further assess alternative explanations for our novel findings on differential in-
terest rate responses, see Figure A4 in the online appendix. To examine if the increase in longer-term rates (like Aaa corporate bonds) are primarily driven by expected future increases of short-term rates, we compute the response of expected future short-term rates. For this, we apply the 5-8 quarter ahead forecast for the 3 months T-bill rate. Given it does not exhibit any tendency to increase after a fiscal expansion, this potential explanation for increasing longer-term rates is not supported by empirical evidence. We further investigate the excess bond premium constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajišek (2012), which according to the authors mainly captures the risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector. We find that this premium reacts only insignificantly and less strongly compared to the measures of liquidity premia (see Figure A4). Given this unsystematic response, a changing risk-taking capacity is unlikely to be a major driving force behind the observed interest rate responses. Next, we look at the supply of debt securities, which might affect prices and yields of treasury securities. In contrast to the total-debt-to-GDP ratio, the ratio of T-bills to GDP does not experience a significant increase in response to government spending shocks. As argued by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012), an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which raises the supply of relatively liquid assets, should however reduce the Aaa-treasury spread. Given that we actually find the latter to respond in the opposite way, this supply effect seems to be clearly dominated by the demand effect described above. A comparison of total-debt-to-GDP ratio and the T-bills-to-GDP ratio further reveals that the supply of T-bills falls relative to total debt, which actually reinforces the demand driven relative scarcity of liquid assets. We re-assess the accommodating stance of monetary policy by including total reserves in the set of variables. Consistent with the decline in the federal funds rate, the latter tends to increase after fiscal expansions, corroborating that the monetary policy stance is accommodative after positive fiscal spending shocks.

Overall, our findings points towards an important role of liquidity attributes of assets in explaining differential interest rate dynamics after fiscal policy shocks. Specifically, fiscal policy affects the relative scarcity of liquidity thereby raising the valuation of near-money assets compared to less liquid assets.

4 A model with an endogenous liquidity premium

In this section, we develop a macroeconomic model for the analysis of fiscal policy effects. The model is sufficiently simple such that its main properties can be derived analytically. In Section 5.2, we calibrate an extended version of the model. Motivated by the

24 As an alternative, one could measure expectations about future federal funds rates exploiting prices on federal funds future contracts which are available from 1988 onwards.
empirical evidence on diverging interest rates, we account for interest rates that might differ from the monetary policy rate by first order. To isolate the main mechanism and to facilitate comparisons with related studies, our model is based on a standard New Keynesian model and features a single non-standard element. We consider differential pledgeability of assets in open market operations, implying different degrees of liquidity, i.e., assets’ ability to serve as a substitute for money.\textsuperscript{25} Specifically, commercial banks demand reserves supplied by the central bank to serve withdrawals of demand deposits by households, who rely on money for goods market transactions. We account for the fact that reserves are only supplied against eligible assets, which were predominantly T-bills before the financial crisis. While the interest rate on T-bills therefore closely follows the monetary policy rate, the interest rates on non-eligible assets exceed the monetary policy rate by a liquidity premium. As non-eligible assets serve as private agents’ store of wealth, their interest rates relate to agents’ marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.

In each period, the timing of events in the economy unfolds as follows: At the beginning of each period, aggregate shocks materialize. Then, banks can acquire reserves from the central bank via open market operations. Subsequently, the labor market opens, goods are produced, and the goods market opens, where money serves as a means of payment. At the end of each period, the asset market opens. Throughout the paper, upper case letters denote nominal variables and lower case letters real variables.

4.1 Financial sector

Banks receive demand deposits from households, supply loans to firms, and hold treasury bills and reserves for liquidity needs. The banking sector is modelled as simple as possible while accounting – arguably in a stylized way – for the way the Fed has implemented monetary policy before 2008Q3: It announces a target for the federal funds rate, i.e., the interest rate at which depository institutions trade reserve balances overnight. Reserves are originally issued by the Fed via open market operations, which determine the overall amount of available federal funds that are further distributed via the federal funds market. Due to federal funds’ unique ability to satisfy reserve requirements, banks rely on federal funds market transactions when their reserves demand within a maintenance period is not directly met by open market transactions. The latter are either carried out as outright transactions or as temporary sales or purchases (repos) of eligible securities, between the central bank and primary dealers. Outright transactions are conducted to

\textsuperscript{25}This specification follows Schabert (2015), who analyses optimal monetary policy in a more stylized model, and closely relates to Williamson’s (2016) assumption of differential pledgeability of assets for private debt issuance.
accommodate trend growth of money, while repos are conducted by the Fed to fine-tune the supply of reserves such that the effective federal funds rate meets its target value.

Since banks have access to reserves via temporary open market transactions or via federal funds market transactions, rates charged for both types of transactions should be similar. Although borrowing from the central bank (via repos) differs from borrowing via the federal funds market, as, e.g., interbank loans are unsecured, the respective rates are in fact almost identical. The data show that the effective federal funds rate and the rate on Fed treasury repurchase agreements for January 2005 (where the availability of data on repo rates starts) to June 2014 differ by slightly less than one basis point on average (see Figure A5), such that the spread is negligible (see also Bech et al., 2012), in particular, compared to the spreads considered above, which are typically more than 20-times larger. To account for this observation in our model, we assume that the federal funds rate is identical to the treasury repo rate in open market operations, while we endogenously derive spreads between these rates on the one hand and interest rates on other assets on the other hand.

We consider an infinite time horizon and a continuum of perfectly competitive banks \( i \in [0, 1] \). A bank \( i \) receives demand deposits \( D_{i,t} \) from households and supplies risk-free loans to firms \( L_{i,t} \). Bank \( i \) further holds short-term government debt (i.e., treasury bills) \( B_{i,t-1} \) and reserves \( M_{i,t-1} \). The central bank supplies reserves via open market operations either outright or temporarily under repurchase agreements; the latter corresponding to a collateralized loan. In both cases, T-bills serve as collateral for central bank money, while the price of reserves in open market operations in terms of T-bills (the repo rate) equals \( R_{mt} \). Specifically, reserves are supplied by the central bank only in exchange for treasuries \( \Delta B_{C_{i,t}} \), while the relative price of money is the repo rate \( R_{mt} ^{\text{m}} \):

\[
I_{i,t} = \Delta B_{C_{i,t}} ^{C} / R_{mt} ^{\text{m}} \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta B_{C_{i,t}} ^{C} \leq B_{i,t-1} \quad (1)
\]

where \( I_{i,t} \) denotes additional money received from the central bank. Hence, (1) describes a central bank money supply constraint, which shows that bank \( i \) can acquire reserves \( I_{i,t} \) in exchange for the discounted value of treasury bills carried over from the previous period \( B_{i,t-1} / R_{mt} ^{\text{m}} \). We abstract from modeling an interbank market for intra-period (overnight) loans in terms of reserves and assume – consistent with US data – that the treasury repo rate and the federal funds rate are identical, and that the central bank sets the repo rate \( R_{mt} ^{\text{m}} \). Reserves are held by bank \( i \) to meet the following constraint

\[
\mu D_{i,t-1} \leq I_{i,t} + M_{i,t-1} \quad (2)
\]
where $D_{i,t-1}$ denotes demand deposits. The constraint (2) implies that a fraction $\mu$ of deposits have to be backed by reserves, which can either be rationalized by settlement of deposit transactions, a minimum reserve requirement, or withdrawals by depositors. To keep the exposition simple, we focus on the latter to motivate positive reserve demand. Banks supply one-period risk-free loans $L_{i,t}$ to firms at a period $t$ price $1/R^L_t$ and a payoff $L_{i,t}$ in period $t+1$. Thus, $R^L_t$ denotes the rate at which firms can borrow and corresponds to the Aaa corporate bond rate in the empirical analysis in Section 3. Banks further hold T-bills issued at the price $1/R^m_t$, from the central bank, under outright sales, and that it repurchases a fraction of T-bills, $B^R_t = R^m_t M^R_t$. Given that bank $i$ transferred T-bills to the central bank under outright sales and that it repurchases a fraction of T-bills, $B^R_t = R^m_t M^R_t$, bank $i$’s holdings of T-bills before it enters the asset market equal $B_{i,t} - B^R_t - \Delta B^C_{i,t}$ and its money holdings equal $M_{i,t} - R^m_t M^R_t + I_{i,t}$. Hence, bank $i$’s profits $P_{t+i,t}$ are given by

$$
P_{t+i,t} = \left(\frac{D_{i,t}}{R^A_t} - D_{i,t-1} - M_{i,t} + M_{i,t-1} - I_{i,t} (R^m_t - 1) \right) - (B_{i,t}/R_t) + B_{i,t-1} - (L_{i,t}/R^L_t) + L_{i,t-1} + (A_{i,t}/R^A_t) - A_{i,t-1},$$

where $P_i$ denote the aggregate price level and $A_{i,t}$ a risk-free one-period interbank deposit liability issued at the price $1/R^A_t$, which cannot be withdrawn before maturity. Thus, $R^A_t$ is the rate at which banks can freely borrow and lend among each other, which relates closely to the US-LIBOR rates investigated in Section 3. Notably, the aggregate stock of reserves only changes with central bank money supply, $\int_0^1 M_{i,t} di = \int_0^1 (M_{i,t-1} + I_{i,t} - R^m_t M^R_t) di$, whereas demand deposits can be created subject to (2).

Banks maximize the sum of discounted profits, $E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_{t+k} \varphi^B_{i,t+k}$, where $p_{t+k}$ denotes a stochastic discount factor, subject to the money supply constraint (1), the liquidity constraint (2), the budget constraint (3), and the borrowing constraints $\lim_{s \to \infty} E_t[p_{t+k} (D_{t,s} + A_{t,s})/P_{t+s}] \geq 0$, $B_{i,t} \geq 0$, and $M_{i,t} \geq 0$. The first order conditions with respect to deposits, T-bills, corporate and interbank loans, money holdings, and reserves can be written as

$$
\frac{1}{R^D_t} = \beta E_t p_{t+1} \frac{1 + \mu \lambda_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}},
$$

$$
\frac{1}{R_t} = \beta E_t p_{t+1} \frac{1 + \eta_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}},
$$

$$
\frac{1}{R^L_t} = \frac{1}{R^A_t} = \beta E_t p_{t+1} \pi_{t+1},
$$

$$
1 = \beta E_t p_{t+1} \frac{1 + \lambda_{t+1}}{\pi_{t+1}},
$$

$$
\lambda_{i,t} + 1 = R^m_t \left(\eta_{i,t} + 1\right),
$$
where \( \pi_{t+1} = P_{t+1}/P_t \), \( E_t \) is the expectation operator conditional on the time \( t \) information set, and \( \kappa_{i,t} \) and \( \eta_{i,t} \) denote the multipliers on the liquidity constraint (2) and the money supply constraint (1), respectively. Apparently, the rates on corporate and interbank loans are identical (see 6), while they exceed the treasury rate \( R_t \) under a binding money supply constraint (1), \( \eta_{i,t} > 0 \) (see 5). This difference will give rise to a liquidity premium.26

### 4.2 Households and firms

There is a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households of mass one. The representative household enters a period \( t \) with holdings of bank deposits \( D_{t-1} \geq 0 \) and shares of firms \( z_{t-1} \in [0,1] \). It maximizes the expected sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous utilities \( E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, n_t) \), where \( u(c_t, n_t) = \left[ c_t^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma) \right] - \theta n_t^{1+\sigma_n}/(1+\sigma_n) \), \( \sigma \geq 1 \), \( \sigma_n \geq 0 \), \( \theta \geq 0 \), \( c_t \) denotes consumption, \( n_t \) working time, and \( \beta \in (0,1) \) is the subjective discount factor. Households can store their wealth in shares of firms \( z_t \in [0,1] \) valued at the price \( V_t \) with the initial stock of shares \( z_{-1} > 0 \). We assume that households rely on money for purchases of consumption goods, whereas in Section 5.2 we also allow for purchases of goods via credit (see Lucas and Stokey, 1987). To purchase goods, households can in principle hold cash, which is dominated by the rate of return of other assets. Instead we assume that they hold demand deposits at banks, which can be converted into cash at any point in time. For simplicity, we consider an exogenous fraction \( \mu \in [0,1] \) of withdrawn deposits such that the goods market constraint, which resembles a standard cash in advance constraint, can be summarized as

\[
P_t c_t \leq \mu D_{t-1}. \tag{9}
\]

The budget constraint of the representative household is \( (D_t/R_t^D) + V_t z_t + P_t c_t + P_t \tau_t \leq D_{t-1} + (V_t + P_t \varrho_t) z_{t-1} + P_t w_t n_t + P_t \varphi_t \), where \( \tau_t \) denotes a lump-sum tax, \( \varrho_t \) dividends from intermediate goods producing firms, \( w_t \) the real wage rate, and \( \varphi_t \) profits from banks and retailers. Maximizing lifetime utility subject to the goods market constraint (9), the budget constraint, and \( D_t \geq 0 \) and \( z_t \geq 0 \) for given initial values leads to the following first order conditions for working time, shares of intermediate goods producing firms, consumption, and real deposits:

\[
-u_{n,t} = w_t \lambda_t, \quad \beta E_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1}^D \pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right] = \lambda_t, \tag{10}
\]

\[
\lambda_t/R_t^D = \beta E_t \left[ (\lambda_{t+1} + \mu \psi_{t+1}) \pi_{t+1}^{-1} \right], \tag{11}
\]

Further, complementary slackness and transversality conditions hold, see Appendix B.2.22
where $u_{n,t} = \partial u_t / \partial n_t$ and $u_{c,t} = \partial u_t / \partial c_t$ denote the marginal (dis-)utilities from labor and consumption, $R_t^E = (V_t + P_t \theta_t) / V_{t-1}$ the nominal rate of return on equity, $\psi_t$ and $\lambda_t$ denote the multipliers on the real versions of the goods market constraint (9) and the budget constraint, respectively. Under a binding goods market constraint (9), $\psi_t > 0$, the deposit rate tends to be lower than the expected return on equity (see 11), as demand deposits provide transaction services. It should be noted that this spread will not be analyzed further in the subsequent sections, given that it does not relate to spreads investigated in our empirical analysis.

There is further a continuum of intermediate goods producing firms, which sell their goods to monopolistically competitive retailers. The latter sell a differentiated good to bundlers who assemble final goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology. Intermediate goods producing firms are identical, perfectly competitive, owned by households, and produce an intermediate good $y_{m}^t$ with labor $n_t$ according to $y_{m}^t = n_t$, and sell the intermediate good to retailers at the price $P_{m}^t$. We neglect retained earnings and assume that firms rely on bank loans to finance wage outlays before goods are sold. Hence, firms’ loan demand satisfies:

$$L_t / R_t^L \geq P_t w_t n_t.$$ (12)

The problem of a representative firm can then be summarized as max $E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_{t+k} \varrho_{t+k}$, where $\varrho_t$ denotes real dividends $\varrho_t = (P_{m}^t / P_t) n_t - w_t n_t - l_t - 1 - \pi_{t+1}$, subject to (12). The first order conditions for labor demand and loan demand are $1 + \gamma_t = R_t^L E_t [p_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}^{-1}]$ and $P_{m}^t / P_t = (1 + \gamma_t) w_t$, where $\gamma_t$ denotes the multiplier on the loan demand constraint (12). Given that we abstract from financial market frictions, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies here. This immediately follows from banks’ loan supply condition (6) and firms’ loan demand condition, implying $\gamma_t = 0$. Hence, the loan demand constraint (12) is slack, such that firms’ labor demand will be undistorted, $P_{m}^t / P_t = w_t$. Monopolistically competitive retailers and their price setting decisions are specified as usual in New Keynesian models and are described in Appendix B.1.

4.3 Public sector

The public sector consists of a government and a central bank. The government purchases goods and issues short-term bonds $B_t^T$. Short-term debt is held by banks, $B_t$, and by the central bank, $B_t^C$, i.e., $B_t^T = B_t + B_t^C$, and corresponds to T-bills (as a period is interpreted as three months). To isolate effects of government spending shocks and to facilitate comparisons with related studies (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2011), we assume that the government can raise or transfer revenues in a non-distortionary way,
Given that, in contrast to total government debt, the supply of T-bills does not significantly respond to changes in government spending (see Figure A4), we assume that the supply of treasury bills is exogenously determined by a constant growth rate \( \Gamma \),

\[
B_t^T = \Gamma B_{t-1}^T, \tag{13}
\]

where \( \Gamma > \beta \). For simplicity, we neither specify longer-term government debt nor total government debt. To appropriately account for the role of long-term treasury debt, which has in particular been purchased by the Fed in their recent large scale asset purchase programmes, they should be specified as partially eligible for central bank operations. It can be shown that the associated yields would then behave like a combination of the T-bill rate and the corporate debt rate, which roughly fits the empirical evidence provided in Section 3. The government budget constraint is thus given by \((B_t^T/R_t) + P_t\tau_t^m = P_tg_t + B_{t-1}^T + P_t\tau_t\), where \(P_t\tau_t^m\) denotes central bank transfers and government expenditures \(g_t\) are stochastic (see below).

The central bank supplies money in exchange for T-bills either outright, \(M_t\), or under repos \(M_t^R\). At the beginning of each period, the central bank’s stock of T-bills equals \(B_{t-1}^C\) and the stock of outstanding money equals \(M_{t-1}\). It then receives an amount \(\Delta B_t^C\) of T-bills in exchange for newly supplied money \(I_t = M_t - M_{t-1} + M_t^R\), and, after repurchase agreements are settled, its holdings of treasuries and the amount of outstanding money reduce by \(B_t^R\) and by \(M_t^R\), respectively. Before the asset market opens, where the central bank can reinvest its payoffs from maturing securities in T-bills \(B_t^C\), it holds an amount equal to \(\Delta B_t^C + B_{t-1}^C - B_t^R\).\(^{27}\) Following central bank practice, we assume that interest earnings are transferred to the government, \(P_t\tau_t^m = B_t^C (1 - 1/R_t) + (R_t^m - 1) (M_t - M_{t-1} + M_t^R)\), such that holdings of treasuries evolve according to \(B_t^C - B_{t-1}^C = M_t - M_{t-1}\). Further restricting initial values to \(B_{-1}^C = M_{-1}\) leads to the central bank balance sheet \(B_t^C = M_t\). We assume that the central bank sets the policy rate \(R_t^m\) following a Taylor-type feedback rule (see below). The target inflation rate \(\pi\) is controlled by the central bank and will be equal to the growth rate of treasuries \(\Gamma\). This assumption is supported by the data (see Section 5.2.1) and is not associated with a loss of generality, as the central bank can implement its inflation targets even if \(\pi \neq \Gamma\), as shown in Schabert (2015). Finally, the central bank fixes the fraction of money supplied under repurchase agreements relative to money supplied outright at \(\Omega \geq 0 : M_t^R = \Omega M_t\). We assume that \(\Omega\) is sufficiently large such that central

\(^{27}\) Its budget constraint is thus given by \((B_t^C/R_t) + P_t\tau_t^m = \Delta B_t^C + B_{t-1}^C - B_t^R + M_t - M_{t-1} - (I_t - M_t^R)\), which after substituting out \(I_t\), \(B_t^R\), and \(\Delta B_t^C\) using \(\Delta B_t^C = R_t^m I_t\), can be simplified to \((B_t^C/R_t) - B_{t-1}^C = R_t^m (M_t - M_{t-1}) + (R_t^m - 1) M_t^R - P_t\tau_t^m\).
bank money injections $I_t$ are non-negative.

### 4.4 Equilibrium properties

Given that households, firms, retailers, and banks behave symmetrically, we can omit the respective indices. A definition of the rational expectations equilibrium can be found in Appendix B.2. As mentioned above, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. Hence, the main difference to a standard New Keynesian model is the money supply constraint (1), which ensures that reserves are fully backed by treasuries. The model in fact reduces to a New Keynesian model with a conventional cash-in-advance constraint if the money supply constraint (1) is slack. The fiscal policy effects of this latter model version, which is summarized in Definition 2 in Appendix B.2, closely relate to the predictions of a standard New Keynesian model without cash (see Proposition 1). By contrast, the results of our model with a binding money supply constraint and therefore with a liquidity premium differ markedly (see Proposition 2).

Rates of return on non-eligible assets (i.e., loans and equity) exceed the policy rate and the T-bill rate by a liquidity premium if (1) is binding. This is the case when the central bank supplies money at a lower price than households are willing to pay, $R_t^m < R_t^{IS}$, where $R_t^{IS}$ denotes the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption

$$R_t^{IS} = u_{c,t}/\beta E_t (u_{c,t+1}/\pi_{t+1}),$$

which measures the marginal valuation of money by the private sector. For $R_t^m < R_t^{IS}$, households thus earn a positive rent and are willing to increase their money holdings. Given that access to money is restricted by holdings of treasury bills, the money supply constraint (1) is then binding. To see this, combine (11) with (4) to get

$$E_t\left[\frac{\lambda_{t+1} + \eta_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \pi_{t+1}^{-1}\right] = E_t\left[\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} (1 + \lambda_{t+1}) \pi_{t+1}^{-1}\right],$$

which holds if the liquidity constraint multipliers satisfy $\lambda_t = \psi_t/\lambda_t$. Hence, the equilibrium versions of the conditions (7) and (8) imply $(\psi_t + \lambda_t)/\lambda_t = R_t^m (\eta_t + 1)$ and $\beta\pi_{t+1}^{-1} (\lambda_{t+1} + \psi_{t+1}) = \lambda_t$, which can – by using the equilibrium version of condition (10) – be combined to

$$\eta_t = \left(\frac{R_t^{IS}}{R_t^m}\right) - 1.$$  

Given that short-term treasuries and money are close substitutes, the T-bill rate $R_t$ relates to the expected future policy rate, which can be seen from combining (5) with (7) and (8).

$$R_t \cdot E_t \varsigma_{1,t+1} = E_t[R_{t+1}^m \cdot \varsigma_{1,t+1}],$$

where $\varsigma_{1,t+1} = \lambda_{t+1} (1 + \eta_{t+1}) /\pi_{t+1}$. Thus,

$$\begin{align*}
28 & \text{Agents are willing to spend $R_t^{IS} - 1$ to transform one unit of an illiquid asset, i.e., an asset that is not accepted as a means of payment today and delivers one unit of money tomorrow, into one unit of money today.}
\end{align*}$$

25
the T-bill rate equals the expected policy rate up to first order,

\[ R_t = E_t R_{t+1}^m + \text{h.o.t.}, \quad (16) \]

where h.o.t. represents higher order terms.\textsuperscript{29} Combining (6) with \[ \beta E_t \pi^{-1}_{t+1} (\lambda_{t+1} + \psi_{t+1}) = \lambda_t \] (see 6) shows that the loan rates \( R_t^L \) and \( R_t^A \) relate to the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution \( (1/R_{t}^{L,A}) \cdot E_t \varsigma_{2,t+1} = E_t[(1/R_{t+1}^{S}) \cdot \varsigma_{2,t+1}] \), where \( \varsigma_{2,t+1} = (\lambda_{t+1} + \psi_{t+1}) / \pi_{t+1} \). Likewise, \[ 11 \] implies that the expected rate of return on equity satisfies \( E_t \varsigma_{2,t+1} = E_t \left[ \left( R_t^S / R_{t+1}^{S,t} \right) \cdot \varsigma_{2,t+1} \right] \). Hence, the corporate and interbank loan rates are equal to the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution up to first order,

\[ R_t^L = R_t^A = E_t R_{t+1}^{IS} + \text{h.o.t.}, \quad (17) \]

while the expected rate of return on equity satisfies, \( E_t R_{t+1}^{IS} = E_t R_{t+1}^{IS} + \text{h.o.t.} \). Thus, the spread between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and the monetary policy rate, \( R_t^{IS} - R_{t+1}^{m} \), summarizes how interest rates in the current model differ from those of a standard model.

It should further be noted that, as long as the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (rather than the policy rate \( R_t^m \)) exceeds one, i.e., \( R_t^{IS} > 1 \), the demand for money is well defined, as the liquidity constraints of households (9) and banks (2) are binding. This can be seen by substituting out the multiplier \( \kappa_t \) in the equilibrium version of (7) with \( \kappa_t = \psi_t / \lambda_t \) and combining with the equilibrium version of (10), which leads to \( \psi_t = u_{c,t} \left( 1 - 1/R_t^{IS} \right) \). This implies that (9) and (2) are binding if \( R_t^{IS} \) is strictly larger than one. Notably, liquidity might be positively valued by households and banks, i.e., \( R_t^{IS} > 1 \), even when the policy rate is at the zero lower bound, \( R_t^m = 1 \); this property being consistent with the observation that liquidity premia have been positive during the recent ZLB episode in the US (see Figure A1).

### 5 Fiscal policy effects predicted by the model

In this section, we examine the models’ predictions regarding the macroeconomic effects of government spending shocks, paying particular attention to the role of monetary policy. In the first part of this section, we analytically derive results on fiscal policy effects. In the second part, we add some model features that are typically applied for quantitative purposes in related studies and present impulse response functions. Throughout this section, we separately analyze two versions of the model. As a reference case, we

\textsuperscript{29}Notably, the relation (16) is in line with the empirical evidence provided by Simon (1990).
consider the case where the monetary policy rate and the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution are identical, as in the standard New Keynesian model. We then examine the case where the monetary policy rate is below the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. This version will be shown to be able to rationalize the empirical effects of government spending shocks.

5.1 Analytical results

To disclose the impact of the main non-standard model feature, we separately analyze the cases where either the money supply constraint (1) is binding, which leads to an endogenous liquidity premium, or where money supply is de-facto unconstrained, implying that the policy rate $R^m_t$ equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $R^{IS}_t$. Technically, this means that we assume that the central bank sets the policy rate in the long run below (equal to) $R^{IS} = \pi/\beta$, where time indices are omitted to indicate steady state values, and that (1) is binding (not binding). For both cases, we examine the local dynamics in the neighborhood of the respective steady state.\(^{30}\) There, the equilibrium sequences are approximated by the solutions to the linearized equilibrium conditions, where $\hat{a}_t$ denotes relative deviations of a generic variable $a_t$ from its steady state value $\hat{a}_t = \log(a_t/a)$. To facilitate the derivation of analytical results, we assume that outright money supply is negligible, $\Omega \to \infty$, which reduces the set of endogenous state variables. We further assume that the central bank targets long-run price stability $\pi = 1$, that the growth rate of T-bills equals the inflation rate $\Gamma = \pi$, in line with the data (see Section 5.2.1),\(^{31}\) and that government spending shocks are i.i.d..

Definition 3: A rational expectations equilibrium for $\Omega \to \infty$ and $\Gamma = \pi = 1$ is a set of convergent sequences $\{\hat{c}_t, \pi_t, \hat{b}_t, \hat{R}^{IS}_t, \hat{R}^m_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying

\begin{align}
\hat{c}_t &= \hat{b}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t - \hat{R}^m_t \text{ if } R^m_t < R^{IS}_t, \\
\text{or } \hat{c}_t &\leq \hat{b}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t - \hat{R}^m_t \text{ if } R^m_t = R^{IS}_t, \\
\sigma \hat{c}_t &= \sigma E_t \hat{c}_{t+1} - \hat{R}^{IS}_t + E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}, \\
\hat{\pi}_t &= \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \chi (\sigma_n c_y + \sigma) \hat{c}_t + \chi \sigma_n g_y \hat{g}_t + \chi \hat{R}^{IS}_t, \\
\hat{b}_t &= \hat{b}_{t-1} - \hat{\pi}_t, 
\end{align}

\(^{30}\) We further assume that shocks are sufficiently small such that the ZLB is never binding. See Section 5.2.3 for an analysis of fiscal policy effects at the ZLB.

\(^{31}\) Notably, the latter assumption is not necessary for the implementation of long-run price stability, since the central bank can in principle adjust the share of short-term treasuries that are eligible for money supply operations to implement the desired inflation target, as shown by Schabert (2015).
where $c_y = \frac{c}{c+y}$, $g_y = \frac{g}{c+y}$, and $\chi = (1-\phi)(1-\beta\phi)/\phi$ for a monetary policy rate satisfying

$$\hat{R}_m^t = \rho_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \rho_g \hat{g}_t,$$

(22)

where $\rho_\pi \geq 0$, government expenditures satisfying $g_t/g = \exp \epsilon_t$, with $g \in (0, c)$ and $E_{t-1} \epsilon_t = 0$, and given $b_{-1} > 0$.

We start by analyzing the reference case where the money supply constraint (1) is not binding, such that the policy rate equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, $R_m^t = R^{IS}_t$, and there is no liquidity premium. Given that condition (18) is then slack, the model reduces to a standard New Keynesian model with a cash-in-advance constraint; the latter being responsible for the nominal interest rate to affect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and working time and therefore to enter the aggregate supply constraint (20). While the effects of fiscal policy shocks under a standard Taylor rule in this model are well established, we focus on the situation where the monetary policy rate falls in response to government expenditures, which is observed empirically (see Section 3) and is induced by a direct monetary policy reaction to government spending, $\rho_g$ (see [22]), as specified in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014).

**Proposition 1** Suppose that the policy rate equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, $R_m^t = R^{IS}_t$, such that there is no liquidity premium. If the real policy rate falls in response to an expansionary government spending shock, private consumption increases and the fiscal multiplier is larger than one in a uniquely determined locally stable equilibrium.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

As shown by Aiyagari et al. (1992) or Baxter and King (1993), government spending leads to a negative wealth effect. Private agents therefore tend to reduce consumption and leisure, which is associated with a decline in the real interest rate and a positive fiscal multiplier. This basic transmission channel of government spending can, however, be dominated under the assumption that the monetary policy rate equals the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal substitution $R^{IS}_t$. If the real policy rate actually falls in response to a government spending shock, private agents increase current consumption relative to future consumption, such that private consumption is crowded in. This mechanism has been made responsible for large multipliers when the nominal policy rate is stuck at the ZLB and the inflationary effect of a government spending shock leads to a fall in real rates (see Christiano et al., 2011). Proposition 1 confirms this prediction of falling real policy rates being associated with a multiplier larger than one. The simultaneous observation of a fiscal multiplier below one and a decline in the real policy rate as found in the data is therefore a puzzle through the lens of a standard model.
Once the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, which closely relates to the
returns on non-eligible and thus illiquid assets (see 17), and the policy rate are separated,
it is possible to explain the empirical facts. We therefore turn to the case where the
policy rate is set below the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, $R_m < R^{IS}$,
which implies that the money supply constraint and therefore (18) are binding,
and that there exists a liquidity premium. Before we analyze the effects of fiscal policy shocks,
we briefly examine equilibrium determinacy conditions, i.e., conditions for the existence
and the uniqueness of locally convergent equilibrium sequences, which are summarized
in the following lemma.

Lemma 1. Suppose that $R_m < R^{IS}$. Then, a rational expectations equilibrium is locally
determined if but not only if

$$\rho_\pi < [(1 + \beta)\chi^{-1} + 1 - \sigma]/\sigma. \quad (23)$$

Proof. See Appendix C.

Condition (23) in Lemma 1 implies that, under a binding money supply constraint
(1), the Taylor principle (i.e., an active monetary policy, $\rho_\pi > 1$) is not relevant for
equilibrium determinacy. The central bank can even peg the policy rate ($\rho_\pi = 0$) without
inducing indeterminacy. This property is mainly due to a bounded supply of money
which provides a nominal anchor for monetary policy (similar to a constant growth
rate of money). Therefore, a passive interest rate policy ($\rho_\pi < 1$) does not per se lead
to multiple equilibria (as in standard New Keynesian models). It should further be
noted that the sufficient condition (23) is far from being restrictive for a broad range of
reasonable parameter values. Consider, for example, the parameter values $\beta = 0.9946$,
$\sigma = 2$ and $\phi = 0.75$ which we use in our numerical model evaluations in Section 5.2.
Then, $\chi = 0.084$ and the upper bound equals 11.233, which is much larger than values
typically estimated for the inflation feedback $\rho_\pi$.

We now analyze fiscal policy effects for the model version with the liquidity premium.
Consider first the case where the policy rate does not directly respond to government
spending, $\rho_g = 0$. Then, an increase in government spending leads to a positive fiscal
multiplier below one and raises the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, regardless
of monetary policy fulfilling the Taylor principle ($\rho_\pi > 1$) or not ($\rho_\pi < 1$). In fact, the
separation of the real policy rate and the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
due to the liquidity premium is responsible for real effects of government spending to
be dominated by the negative wealth effect discussed above. Given that government
expenditures are inflationary, as they tend to increase firms’ real marginal costs, the
real policy rate tends to increase if the inflation feedback satisfies $\rho_\pi > 1$ (see Appendix C). A rise in the policy rate is however not observed in the data (see Section 3). Thus, reproducing the observed negative responses of the nominal and the real policy rate in response to a positive government spending shock requires a negative value for the direct government spending feedback (see Lemma 2 in Appendix C for the exact conditions).

As indicated by the equilibrium conditions in Definition 3, monetary policy is (also) non-neutral when the policy rate and the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution are separated. An expansionary monetary policy, i.e., a lower policy rate $R^m_t$, then tends to stimulate current private consumption by lowering the price of money in terms of eligible assets (see 18), which eases private sector access to money. Thus, a sufficiently large reduction of the policy rate in response to higher government spending can in principle stimulate private consumption, see Lemma 2 in Appendix C. Yet, it can be shown that there exists a non-empty set of values for the interest rate feedback parameter $\rho_g$ for which the fiscal multiplier lies between zero and one, while the policy rate falls and the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution increases, implying an increase in the liquidity premium (see 15), consistent with the empirical facts documented in Section 3.

**Proposition 2** When a liquidity premium exists and (23) is satisfied, an unexpected increase in government spending can simultaneously lead to a fiscal multiplier between zero and one associated with a fall in the nominal and real policy rate as well as with a rise in the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.

**Proof.** See Appendix C.

As summarized in Proposition 2, the model with a liquidity premium can reproduce the – seemingly puzzling – joint observation of a fall in the real policy rate and a moderate fiscal multiplier, i.e., below one. Since the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution rises in this case, i.e., when monetary policy does not react too accommodatively, real rates of return on non-eligible assets (e.g., corporate debt and bank loans) tend to increase in response to a fiscal shock.32 While Proposition 2 establishes the model’s principle ability to rationalize observed fiscal policy effects qualitatively, we further assess if the predictions of a calibrated version of the model accord with the empirical facts also quantitatively.

---

32 It should be noted that even though government spending shocks are i.i.d. in this simple version of the model, the model exhibits history dependence due to a stable eigenvalue associated with short-term public debt, implying that $E_t R^{IS}_{t+1}$ is positively related to $R^{IS}_t$. 
5.2 Effects under two monetary policy scenarios

In this subsection, we first introduce a minimum set of additional model features, which are widely viewed as useful for a quantitative analysis of New Keynesian models, before we describe the model’s calibration. We then examine the impulse responses of the model to government spending shocks under two scenarios for the monetary policy rate. First, we analyze the case where the monetary policy rate responds to the fiscal shock as observed in the data (see Section 3), and show that the model’s main predictions are consistent with the empirical counterparts. Second, we examine the case where the monetary policy rate is fixed at the ZLB. We compare the results of our model with the liquidity premium to the results of a model version without the liquidity premium, where the latter confirms results known from New Keynesian models.

5.2.1 Additional model features and calibration

To analyze the model’s impulse responses to government spending shocks, we introduce additional features to the basic model of Section 4 that are also considered by Christiano et al. (2011) for a quantitative analysis of the fiscal multiplier. These additional features are (external) habit persistence, endogenous capital formation, adjustment costs of capital, an interest rate rule that is more realistic than (22), and serial correlation of government spending. We further introduce credit goods (see Lucas and Stokey, 1987) to account for the fact that the majority of transactions does not involve cash. Specifically, the instantaneous utility function is now given by

\[ u(c_t, \bar{c}_t, n_t) = \left( \frac{c_t - h c_{t-1}}{1 - \sigma} \right)^{1 - \sigma} + \gamma \left( \frac{c_t - h c_{t-1}}{1 - \sigma} \right) - \theta n_t^{1 + \sigma n}/(1 + \sigma n), \]

where \( \gamma \geq 0 \), \( c_t \) denotes consumption of credit goods, \( c_t \) (\( \bar{c}_t \)) denotes the cross sectional average of cash (credit) goods, and \( h \geq 0 \) indicates external habit formation. Intermediate goods are now produced according to

\[ y_m t = n_t^\alpha k_1^{1 - \alpha} - n_t^{1 - \alpha}, \]

while physical capital \( k_t \) satisfies

\[ k_t = (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} + x_t \Lambda_t, \]

where \( \delta \) is the rate of depreciation, \( x_t \) are investment expenditures, and the function \( \Lambda_t \) denotes adjustment costs satisfying

\[ \Lambda(\frac{x_t}{x_{t-1}}) = 1 - \zeta(\frac{x_t}{x_{t-1}} - 1)^2. \]

Further, the interest rate feedback rule allows for inertia and output-gap responses,

\[ R_m t = \max\{1, \left( R_{t-1} \right)^{\rho_R} \left( R_m \right)^{1 - \rho_R} \left( \pi_t / \pi \right)^{\rho_p(1 - \rho_R)} \left( y_t / \bar{y}_t \right)^{\rho_y(1 - \rho_R)} \left( g_t / g \right)^{\rho_g(1 - \rho_R)} \}, \]

where \( \rho_R \geq 0 \), \( \rho_p \geq 0 \), and \( \bar{y}_t \) denotes the efficient level of output. To account for the observed autocorrelation, we assume that government spending is generated by

\[ g_t = \]

In the online appendix, we consider the case where the monetary policy rate counterfactually increases in response to higher government spending, according to a standard Taylor rule.
\[ \rho g_{t-1} + (1 - \rho)g + \varepsilon_{g,t}, \]  where \( \varepsilon_{g,t} \) are mean zero i.i.d. innovations, \( \rho \in (0,1) \), and \( g > 0 \). For the analysis at the ZLB, we follow Christiano et al. (2011) and add an autocorrelated (mean one) discount factor shock \( \xi_t \) to the household objective, which then reads \( E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \xi_t u_t \). The full set of equilibrium conditions for this extended version of the model can be found in Definition 4 in the online appendix.

For the first set of parameters \( \{\sigma, \sigma_n, \alpha, \delta, \epsilon, \theta, \phi, g/y, h, \rho_\pi, \rho_y, \rho_R\} \) we apply values (for an interpretation of a period as a quarter) that are standard in the literature.\(^{34}\) Specifically, we set the inverses of the elasticities of intertemporal substitution to \( \sigma = 2 \) and \( \sigma_n = 2 \), the labor income share to \( \alpha = 2/3 \), and the depreciation rate to \( \delta = 0.025 \). The elasticity of substitution \( \epsilon \) is set to \( \epsilon = 6 \), and the utility parameter \( \theta \) is chosen to lead to a steady state working time of \( n = 1/3 \). For the fraction of non-optimally price adjusting firms \( \phi \) we apply the standard value \( \phi = 0.75 \). The mean government share and the habit formation parameter are set at \( g/y = 0.2 \) and \( h = 0.7 \). The coefficients of the interest rate rule – except for \( \rho_y \) – are set at values typically applied in the literature, \( \rho_\pi = 1.5, \rho_y = 0.05, \) and \( \rho_R = 0.8 \).

The second set of parameters \( \{R^m, \pi, \Gamma, \Omega, \beta, \zeta, \gamma\} \), which relate to the liquidity premium, are set as follows. For the policy rate and inflation, we set average values to the sample means of the federal funds rate and the CPI inflation rate for 1979.IV-2015.IV, \( R^m = 1.0510^{1/4} \) and \( \pi = 1.0315^{1/4} \). Regarding the supply of government liabilities, we apply US data until 2007.III, where the Fed began to massively increase repos in response to the subprime crisis. In the sample 1979.IV-2007.III, the average growth rate of nominal T-bills relative to real GDP was almost identical to the average rate of CPI inflation and, accordingly, we set \( \Gamma = \pi \) (as in the simplified model of Section 5.1). We use information on the mean fraction of Fed repos to total reserves of depository institutions from Jan. 2003 to Aug. 2007 (where the sample period is determined by data availability) implying a ratio of money supplied under repos to outright money holdings \( \Omega \) equal to 1.5. The discount factor \( \beta \) is set to \( \beta = 0.9946 \), which implies that the steady state spread between the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal substitution \( R^{IS} \) and the monetary policy rate \( R^m \) equals 0.0028 for annualized rates, matching the mean spread between the 3-month US-LIBOR and the federal funds rate for 1986.I (when LIBOR was introduced) to 2015.IV. The investment adjustment cost parameter \( \zeta \) is set at 0.065, which corresponds to Groth and Khan’s (2010) estimate based on firm-level data.\(^{35}\)

\(^{34}\)Note that the parameter \( \mu \) in (2) and (9) is only required to determine real deposits and the deposit rate (see Definition 1), which are both not relevant for the subsequent analysis.

\(^{35}\)This value is much lower than values typically applied for models without liquidity premia, where changes in the real policy rate would otherwise lead to extreme changes in investment (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2011).
utility weight of credit goods $\gamma$ is set at a conservative value 35, which replicates the 2012 US share of cash transactions of 14%, taken from Bennett et al. (2014).

Two parameter values that are crucial for the responses of the policy rate and of output, namely, the government spending feedback coefficient in the interest rate rule (see 24) and the autocorrelation of government spending $\{\rho_g, \rho\}$ are chosen in accordance with our empirical analysis. In particular, we set the autocorrelation of government spending to 0.90, to roughly match the path of government spending in the VAR. Finally, the fiscal feedback coefficient of the interest rate rule $\rho_g$ is set at $-0.75$ to approximate the responses of the federal funds rate in the VAR (see Figure 6). For these parameter values, the equilibrium is locally determinate (consistent with Lemma 1) for all versions considered below. To demonstrate the robustness of the main results we present results for alternative values for the parameters $\{\rho_g, \rho, h, \sigma, \Omega, \zeta\}$ in the online appendix.

5.2.2 A falling monetary policy rate

Figure 6 shows impulse responses to an autocorrelated government spending shock amounting to one percent of steady state spending associated with a monetary policy rate that falls due to a negative feedback ($\rho_g = -0.75$). The black solid and the black dashed lines refer to the calibrated version, while the blue dotted line refers to the estimated federal funds rate response presented in Section 3.2.1. As in our empirical analysis, we show relative responses expressed in percent for level variables such as output, government spending, and absolute responses expressed in basis points for interest rates and interest rates spreads. We additionally show impulse responses of consumption and investment (also in percent), which are consistent with evidence from Ramey (2011).

The figure reveals that government spending exerts the well-known wealth effect in our model: an increase in government spending crowds out private consumption. This is associated with an increase in labor supply such that output increases on impact. The impact output multiplier equals 0.84 and the cumulative output multiplier after six quarters is 0.47, which closely relates to its empirical counterpart of 0.53 (see Section 3.2.1). The associated decline in the marginal utility of consumption between the current and the next period implies a higher marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (which is separated from the monetary policy rate by the liquidity premium) and thus a higher real interest rate on non-eligible assets $R^L_t / \pi_{t+1}$, i.e., corporate and interbank loans. Further, the real return on physical capital also increases and investment falls, such that total private absorption declines and the fiscal multiplier is smaller than one. While real rates on non-eligible assets increase (see middle left panel, where values of the real loan rate response are given on the right axis), real rates on eligible assets (T-bills) $R_t$ decrease
Figure 6: Responses to a positive 1% government spending shock for the model version with positive liquidity premium.

\[ R^m_t (-) \text{ and } R_t (-) \]

\[ R^m_t / \pi_{t+1} (-), R^L_t / \pi_{t+1} (-) \]

\[ \hat{c}_t (-) \text{ and } \hat{c}_t (-) \]

\[ \hat{x}_t (-) \text{ and } \hat{k}_t (-) \]

\[ R^L_t - R_t (-), R^IS_t - R^m_t (-) \]

Notes: Relative responses of \( y_t, g_t, c_t, \hat{c}_t, x_t, \text{ and } k_t \) in percent. Absolute responses of \( R^m_t, R^m_t / \pi_{t+1}, R^L_t / \pi_{t+1}, R^L_t - R^m_t, \text{ and } R^IS_t - R^m_t \) in basis points.

due to the central bank’s accommodation of the spending stimulus. Consequently, the spread between the loan rate \( R^L_t \) and the T-bill rate \( R_t \) increases, in accordance with our empirical findings, as well as the spread between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution \( R^IS_t \) and the monetary policy rate \( R^m_t \) (as predicted in Proposition 2). Given that these spreads originate in a liquidity premium in our model, their responses to government spending shocks are in line with our evidence on the responses of empirical liquidity premia from Section 3. The model in fact generates a response of the spread \( R^L_t - R_t \) (10 bps on impact and 36 bps at maximum) that is similar to the response of liquidity premia estimated in the empirical analysis (about 0-20 bps on impact and 20 bps at maximum, see Figure 5).

Figure 6 thus shows that this simple model can quantitatively reproduce the seemingly puzzling responses of the nominal and real policy rate and a moderate fiscal multiplier, as found in the data. Most importantly, a monetary policy that accommodates
the expansionary fiscal policy shock to an extent as found in the data does not suffice to induce a large fiscal multiplier.\footnote{Notably, the model is able to generate a fiscal multiplier exceeding one if monetary policy accommodation were even more pronounced, for example, induced by lower values of the feedback parameter $\rho_g$ (see Lemma 3 in Appendix C).} It should further be noted that, a change of the parameter values, for example, setting $\rho_g = -1.25$ and $\rho = 0.98$, or a change of other parameters to values that are also often used in the literature, i.e., $h = 0.6$, $\sigma = 1$, and $\zeta = 6.5$, or setting the parameter $\Omega$, which is specific to our model, to an extreme value, i.e., $\Omega = 150$ instead of $\Omega = 1.5$, leads to similar results and, in particular, to impact output multipliers around one (see online appendix).

5.2.3 A monetary policy rate at the ZLB

Next, we analyze the fiscal multiplier for the prominent case where the monetary policy rate is initially stuck at the binding ZLB.\footnote{For the analysis of this scenario, we use the dynare supplement “occbin” developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2014). “Occbin” solves dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints using a first-order perturbation approach. It handles occasionally binding constraints as different regimes of the same model to obtain a piecewise linear solution.} For this, we assume that the monetary policy rate is set according to the interest rate rule (see 24) without a fiscal feedback, $\rho_g = 0$, facilitating comparisons to related studies. At the ZLB, the real monetary policy rate tends to fall in response to a fiscal shock due to an increase in inflation. To induce a binding ZLB, we consider the smallest discount factor shock $\xi_t$ that causes the economy to reach the ZLB in the impact period and to remain there for two further periods. It should be noted that the results for the model with the liquidity premium are hardly affected when we consider longer ZLB durations. The preference shock causes output and inflation to fall such that the central bank lowers the policy rate until the ZLB is reached. In order to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy at the ZLB, we examine the responses to a government spending shock that hits the economy in the same period as the preference shock that brings it to the ZLB. This expansionary fiscal policy mitigates the reduction in output and in inflation, which dampens the increase in the real policy rate (see Figure A6).

To focus on the effects of expansionary fiscal policy, Figure 7 presents the net effects of the government spending shock, i.e., the responses to both shocks net of the responses to the preference shock alone. The solid lines in Figure 7 show the net effects for the model with the liquidity premium and the dashed lines show the net effects for the version of the model without the liquidity premium. For the former version, responses to the fiscal impulse are again mainly driven by the negative wealth effect, leading to a moderate impact multiplier of 0.54. Note that the fiscal multiplier is actually smaller...
Figure 7: Net effects of a positive 1% government spending shock at the ZLB for a model version with (solid line) and without liquidity premium (dashed line).

Notes: The preference shock $\xi_t$ that drives the economy to the ZLB follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation 0.8. Relative responses of $y_t$, $c_{t}^{\text{total}}$, and $x_t$ in percent. Absolute responses of $R_{t}^{m}/\pi_{t+1}$, $R_{t}^{L}/\pi_{t+1}$, $R_{t}^{L} - R_{t}^{m}$ in basis points.

in this ZLB scenario than in the off-ZLB scenario (0.84), since the expansionary output effects of fiscal policy are re-enforced through a proactive monetary accommodation. As before, the government spending shock crowds out private absorption and further leads to a rise in the spread $R_{t}^{L} - R_{t}^{m}$. Overall, the impulse responses from the model with the liquidity premium accord with the results shown before. The red dashed lines further reveal that conducting the same experiment without the liquidity premium leads to much more pronounced responses of the inflation rate and the real policy rate. Given that the latter equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in this model, consumption and investment are crowded in, leading to an empirically implausibly large output multiplier of 3.29, which relates to the fiscal multiplier found by Christiano et al., 2011, and Eggertsson, 2011).

For completeness, we also consider the (counterfactual) case where off the ZLB the
monetary policy rate increases due to a standard Taylor rule without a direct feedback from government spending, $\rho_g = 0$ (see Figure A7 in the online appendix). Here, we find that the fiscal multipliers are almost identical in both versions. Comparing impact fiscal multipliers at the ZLB with those under a standard Taylor rule reveals stark differences for the model version without the liquidity premium (3.29 to 0.51) and very similar numbers for the model version with the liquidity premium (0.54 and 0.57). Thus, the monetary policy stance is far less crucial for the size of fiscal multipliers when liquidity premia are considered than in the case where the liquidity premium is neglected.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we reconsider the role of monetary policy for the output effects of government spending. We confirm the empirical finding that a government spending hike tends to reduce the (nominal and real) monetary policy rate and, at the same time, leads to a moderate output multiplier, which constitutes a clear puzzle according to standard macroeconomic theories. Our empirical analysis however also suggests a solution to this puzzle, which relies on the observation that, real interest rates that are more relevant for private sector transactions as well as measures of liquidity premia tend to rise. We show that a standard macroeconomic model that is just augmented by a liquidity premium on near-money assets can rationalize differential interest rate responses and moderate multipliers, as found in the data. It further implies that fiscal multipliers are also not exceptionally large during episodes where the monetary policy rate is fixed at the ZLB, which contrasts predictions based on standard New Keynesian models. According to our analysis, the stance of monetary policy measured by the interest rate controlled by the central bank is therefore much less relevant for fiscal policy effects as suggested by the New Keynesian paradigm.
References


A Appendix to Section 3

A.1 Data sources

For our empirical analysis and the model calibration, we combine data from three main sources: the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), the survey of professional forecasters (SPF), and the Bloomberg financial database (Bloomberg). Original mimeos are given in square brackets.

Data from FRED We use the following series, all at quarterly frequency and aggregated as means where applicable. Gross Government Investment [A782RC1Q027SBEA], Government Consumption Expenditures [A955RC1Q027SBEA], Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator [GDPDEF], Civilian Noninstitutional Population [CNP16OV], Gross Domestic Product [GDP], Government current tax receipts [W054RC1Q027SBEA], Contributions for Government Social Insurance [W782RC1Q027SBEA], Government Current Expenditures: Interest Payments [A180RC1Q027SBEA], Government Current Transfer Payments [A084RC1Q027SBEA], Effective Federal Funds Rate [FEDFUNDS], 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate [TB3MS], 3-Month Certificate of Deposit: Secondary Market Rate [CD3M], 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate based on US Dollar [USD3MTD156N], 12-Month London Interbank Offered Rate based on US Dollar [USD12MD156N], 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate [DGS10], 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate [DGS10], Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield [DAAA], 1-Year Adjustable Rate Mortgage Average in the United States [MORTGAGE1US], TED Spread [TEDRATE], 3-Month AA Nonfinancial Commercial Paper Rate [DCPN3M], 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate [CP3M], Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPI-AUCSL), Federal Debt Held by the Public as Percent of Gross Domestic Product [FYFGDQ188S], and Monthly Total Reserves of Depository Institutions [TOTRESNS]. We further use Monthly Repurchase Agreements [WARAL].

Data from the SPF We use the forecasts for real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment [RFEDGOV] and for real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross investment [RSLGOV]. We combine the mean forecasts with the respective first-release information on these variables provided on the SPF web pages. For Figure[41] we determine the log difference between the actual level of government spending and the level of government spending implied by one-quarter ahead forecasts, both expressed relative to the 1983Q1 value. We construct the actual level of government spending based on first-release information on its quarterly growth rates.
For the VARs, we construct the forecast errors for the growth rate of total spending made by professional forecasters, exactly following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). CPI inflation forecasts are also taken from the SPF (mean forecasts). For the ten-year inflation forecast, we combine the mean SPF forecast (from 1991 on) with the respective forecast from the Blue Chip Indicators (until 1991, data also provided on the SPF web pages). During the time where the Blue Chip Indicators are reported only twice a year, we use linear interpolation. In the following, we refer to the two forecasts as SPFINF1 and SPFINF10. We finally use the mean forecast for the average T-bill rate in the next year (i.e., 5-8 quarters ahead) which we refer to as SPFTBILL.

**Data from Bloomberg** We construct the 3-months, 1-year, and 10-year Refcorp spreads as the differences between the constant maturity 3-months, 1-year, and 10-year points on the Bloomberg fair value curves for Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds [C0793M Index and C0913M Index for 3-months maturity, C0911Y Index and C0791Y Index for 1-year maturity as well as between C09110Y Index and C07910Y Index for 10-year maturity, respectively]. In the following, we denote the quarterly averages as REFCORP3M, REFCORP1 and REFCORP10, respectively. We use the interest rate on 3-months general collateral repurchase agreements (”3 Month GC Govt Repo”). We follow Nagel (2016) in taking the averages between bid and ask prices [USRGCGC ICUS Curncy and USRGCGC ICUS Curncy, respectively]. In the following, we denote the stacked series of quarterly averages as GCREPO. Finally, we use quarterly averages of the rates on 30-year Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities, ”Mtge Current Cpns Fnma 30 Year” [MTGEFNCL].

**Further data sources** We use the time series for the excess bond premium [EBP] that is provided by Simon Gilchrist under http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/Data/data.htm. We extract data on the volume of outstanding T-bills from the “Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States” published in the quarterly Treasury bulletins, Table FD.-2, Column 3 [TBILLVOL], and we use data for the rate on Fed Treasury Repos [DTCC GCF Repo Index] from Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (see http://www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index.aspx#download).

**A.2 Construction of the liquidity factor**

We construct the common liquidity factor \( (clf) \) following Del Negro et al. (2017). We estimate a principal-component model with one component based on different liquidity spreads. Based on the estimated model, we project the observed liquidity spreads on a common liquidity factor, thereby reducing the dimensionality of liquidity premia data to
Table 1: Variables that enter the VARs and their definitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$fe$</td>
<td>professional forecast error for government spending growth</td>
<td>(see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g$</td>
<td>government spending</td>
<td>$\log((A782RC1Q027SBEA + A955RC1Q027SBEA)/(GDPDEF+CNP16OV)) + W782RC1Q027SBEA - A180RC1Q027SBEA - A084RC1Q027SBEA) / (GDPDEF+CNP16OV)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y$</td>
<td>real output</td>
<td>$\log((W054RC1Q027SBEA + W782RC1Q027SBEA + W054RC1Q027SBEA) / (GDPDEF+CNP16OV))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{tax}$</td>
<td>net tax receipts</td>
<td>$\log((W054RC1Q027SBEA + W782RC1Q027SBEA + W054RC1Q027SBEA) / (GDPDEF+CNP16OV))$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^m$</td>
<td>federal funds rate</td>
<td>FEDFUNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^m/\pi$</td>
<td>real federal funds rate</td>
<td>$(1+FEDFUNDS/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{T-bill}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 3-months T-bill rate</td>
<td>$(1+TB3MS/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{T-bill}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 3-months T-bill rate</td>
<td>$(1+CD3M/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{T-note}/\pi$</td>
<td>real return on 5-year gov. bonds</td>
<td>$(1+DGS5/100)/(1+SPFINF10/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{T-bond}/\pi$</td>
<td>real return on 10-year gov. bonds</td>
<td>$(1+DGS10/100)/(1+SPFINF10/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{L-bond}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 3-months LIBOR</td>
<td>$(1+USD3MTD156N/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{L-bill}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 12-months LIBOR</td>
<td>$(1+USD12MD156N/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{Aaa}/\pi$</td>
<td>real return on Aaa corp. bonds</td>
<td>$(1+MTGFINCL/100)/(1+SPFINF10/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{MBS}/\pi$</td>
<td>real MBS rate</td>
<td>$(1+MORTGAGE1US/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{mortality}/\pi$</td>
<td>real mortgage rate</td>
<td>$(1+MORTGAGE1US/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{ Libor}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 3-months T-bill rate</td>
<td>$(1+USD3MTD156N/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{ Libor}/\pi$</td>
<td>real 12-months LIBOR</td>
<td>$(1+USD12MD156N/100)/(1+SPFINF1/100)-1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{refcorp}/\pi$</td>
<td>10-year Refcorp spread</td>
<td>REFCORP10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{Aaa}/\pi$</td>
<td>spread between Aaa corporate bonds and government bonds</td>
<td>DAAA–DGS10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>GC Repo - T-bill spread</td>
<td>GCREPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clf</td>
<td>common liquidity factor</td>
<td>(see Section A.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>CPI inflation</td>
<td>$\Delta log(CPIAUCSL)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi_1$</td>
<td>1-year inflation forecast</td>
<td>SPFINF1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi_{10}$</td>
<td>10-year inflation forecast</td>
<td>SPFINF10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ER^{T-bill}/\pi$</td>
<td>5-8 quarters ahead T-bill rate forecast</td>
<td>SPFTBILL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E_{BP}$</td>
<td>excess bond premium</td>
<td>EBP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d/y$</td>
<td>debt to GDP</td>
<td>FYGFGDQ188S / 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b/y$</td>
<td>T-bills to GDP</td>
<td>TBILLVOL / GDP * 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>total reserves</td>
<td>log(TOTRESNS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

one. Following Del Negro et al. (2017), we use a linear transformation of the principal component which achieves a mean spread of 46 bps and a maximum spread of 342 bps at the height of the financial crisis. The liquidity spreads included in the estimation of the common factor are given by the differences between 1) the 3-months commercial papers
rate and 3-months T-bills rate, 2) the 3-months GC repo rate and the 3-months T-bill rate, 3) the 3-months LIBOR and the 3-months T-bill rate, 4) the 10-year Aaa corporate bonds rate and the 10-year treasury bond rate with 10-year maturity, 5) the 3-months Refcorp rate and 3-months Treasury rate, 6) the 1-year Refcorp rate and 1-year Treasury rate, and 7) the 10-year Refcorp rate and 10-year Treasury rate. In order to increase information on liquidity spreads in the first years of our sample when constructing the common factor, we combine data on non-financial commercial paper rates [DCPN3M] with discontinued information on commercial paper rates [CP3M] which is available before 1997 but no distinction between financial and non-financial commercial papers is possible. The principal-component model can deal with missing data such that we can construct the common factor also when we do not observe all included liquidity spreads. The sample period for the principal-component model starts in 1983Q1 (such that the sample contains at least two liquidity spreads per quarter).

A.3 Description of VARs

All VARs include a constant, a linear-quadratic trend, and four lags of the variables. The following four variables are included in all VARs: 1) the forecast error made by professional forecasters ($fe$), 2) log real government spending per capita ($g$), 3) log real GDP per capita ($y$), and 4) log real government net tax receipts per capita ($tax$). The fifth variable is either the federal funds rate, an interest rate on a near-money asset or or an interest rate spread that contains a money market rate. When we consider further variables such as non-money-market interest rates, we include the respective variable as a sixth variable in the VAR. Details on included variables and sample periods are given in the respective figurenotes.
B Appendix to Section 4

B.1 Appendix to the price setting of retailers

A monopolistically competitive retailer $k \in [0,1]$ buys intermediate goods $y_t^n$ at the price $P_t^n$, relabels the intermediate goods to $y_{k,t}$, and sells the latter at the price $P_{k,t}$ to perfectly competitive bundlers. The latter bundle the goods $y_{k,t}$ to the final consumption good $y_t$ with the technology, $y_t = \int_0^1 y_{k,t} \phi dk$, where $\varepsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution and the cost minimizing demand for $y_{k,t}$ is $y_{k,t} = (P_{k,t}/P_t)^{-\varepsilon} y_t$. A fraction $1 - \phi$ of the retailers set their price in an optimizing way. The remaining fraction $\phi \in (0,1)$ of retailers keep the previous period price, $P_{k,t} = P_{k,t-1}$. The problem of a price adjusting retailer is $\max_{\tilde{P}_{k,t}} E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \phi^s \beta^s \phi_{t,t+s} ((\Pi_{k=1}^n \tilde{P}_{k,t}/P_{t+s}) - m c_{t+s}) y_{k,t+s}$, where $m c_t = P_t^n / P_t$. The first order condition can be written as $\tilde{Z}_t = \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon} Z_t^1 / Z_t^2$, where $\tilde{Z}_t = \tilde{P}_t / P_t$, $Z_t^1 = \xi_t c_t^{-\sigma} y_t m c_t + \phi \beta E_t \pi_t^{-1} Z_t^1$ and $Z_t^2 = \xi_t c_t^{-\sigma} y_t + \phi \beta E_t \pi_t^{-1} Z_t^2$. With perfectly competitive bundlers and the homogenous bundling technology, the price index $P_t$ for the final consumption good satisfies $P_t^{1-\varepsilon} = \int_0^1 P_{k,t}^{1-\varepsilon} dk$. Hence, we obtain $1 = (1 - \phi) \tilde{Z}_t^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi \pi_t^{1-\varepsilon}$. In a symmetric equilibrium, $y_t^n = \int_0^1 y_{k,t} dk$ and $y_t = a_t n_t^{1-\alpha}/s_t$ will hold, where $s_t = \int_0^1 (P_{k,t}/P_t)^{-\varepsilon} dk$ and $s_t = (1 - \phi) \tilde{Z}_t^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi s_{t-1} (\pi_t)\varepsilon$ given $s_{t-1} > 0$.

B.2 Equilibrium definition

Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences $\{c_t, y_t, m_t, w_t, \lambda_t, m_t^R, m_t, b_t, b_t^T, m c_t, Z_{1,t}, Z_{2,t}, Z_t, s_t, \pi_t, R_t^{IS}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying

$$c_t = m_t + m_t^R, \text{ if } R_t^{IS} > 1, \text{ or } c_t \leq m_t + m_t^R, \text{ if } R_t^{IS} = 1, \quad (25)$$

$$b_{t-1}/(R_t^m \pi_t) = m_t - m_{t-1} \pi_t^{-1} + m_t^R, \text{ if } R_t^{IS} > R_t^m, \quad (26)$$

$$or \frac{b_{t-1}}{R_t^m \pi_t} \geq m_t - m_{t-1} \pi_t^{-1} + m_t^R, \text{ if } R_t^{IS} = R_t^m; \quad (27)$$

$$m_t^R = \Omega m_t, \quad (27)$$

$$b_t = b_t^T - m_t, \quad (28)$$

$$b_t^T = \Gamma b_{t-1}^T / \pi_t, \quad (29)$$

$$\theta n_t^{1-n} = u_{c,t} w_t / R_t^{IS}, \quad (30)$$

$$1/R_t^{IS} = \beta E_t [u_{c,t+1}/(u_{c,t+1} \pi_{t+1})], \quad (31)$$

$$w_t = m c_t, \quad (32)$$

$$\lambda_t = \beta E_t [u_{c,t+1}/\pi_{t+1}], \quad (33)$$

$$Z_{1,t} = \lambda_t y_t m c_t + \phi \beta E_t \pi_t^{-1} Z_{1,t+1}, \quad (34)$$

$$Z_{2,t} = \lambda_t y_t + \phi \beta E_t \pi_t^{-1} Z_{2,t+1}, \quad (35)$$

$$Z_t = \left[\varepsilon / (\varepsilon - 1)\right] Z_{1,t}/Z_{2,t}, \quad (36)$$

$$1 = (1 - \phi) Z_t^{1-\varepsilon} + \phi \pi_t^{1-\varepsilon}, \quad (37)$$

45
Given a rational expectations equilibrium as summarized in Definition 1, the equilibrium sequences \( \{ R_t, R_t^D, R_{t+1}, R_t^L \} = (R_t^A)_{t=0}^\infty \) can be determined by

\[
R_t = E_t[u_{c,t+1} \pi^{-1}_{t+1}]/[E_t(R_{t+1}^m)^{-1} u_{c,t+1} \pi^{-1}_{t+1}],
\]
\[
\lambda_t/R_t^D = \beta E_t[(u_{c,t+1} + (1 - \mu)\lambda_{t+1})/\pi_{t+1}],
\]
\[
1 = \beta E_t \left[(R_t^d_{t+1}/\pi_{t+1}) (\lambda_{t+1}/\lambda_t)\right],
\]
\[
1/R_t^L = E_t \left[1/R_t^{IS}\right].
\]

If the money supply constraint (1) is not binding, which is the case if \( R_t^m = R_t^{IS} \) (see 15), the model given in Definition 1 reduces to a standard New Keynesian model with a cash-in-advance constraint, where government liabilities can residually be determined.

**Definition 2** A rational expectations equilibrium under a non-binding money supply constraint (1) is a set of sequences \( \{ c_t, y_t, n_t, w_t, \lambda_t, m_t, Z_{1,t}, Z_{2,t}, Z_t, s_t, \pi_t, R_t^S \}_{t=0}^\infty \) satisfying \( R_t^S = R_t^m, (39)-(40), \) the transversality condition, a monetary policy \( \{ R_t^m \}_{t=0}^\infty \), \( \pi \geq \beta \), and a fiscal policy \( \{ g_t \}_{t=0}^\infty \), for a given initial value \( s_{-1} \geq 1 \).

## C Appendix to Section 5

**Proof of Proposition 1** To establish the claims made in the Proposition, we apply the model given in Definition 3 for \( R_t^m = R_t^{IS} \), i.e., (19), (20), and (22), which can by substituting out \( R_t^{IS} \) be summarized as

\[
\rho_x \hat{\pi}_t + \rho_y \hat{g}_t - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} = \sigma E_t \hat{c}_{t+1} - \sigma \hat{c}_t,
\]
\[
\hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \delta_c \hat{c}_t + \delta_g \hat{g}_t + \chi \rho_x \hat{\pi}_t,
\]

where \( \delta_c = \chi (\sigma_n c_y + \sigma) > 0 \) and \( \delta_g = \chi (\sigma_n g_y - \rho_y) \). The system’s characteristic polynomial is given by \( F(X) = X^2 - \frac{\sigma + \delta_c + \sigma \beta - \sigma \rho_x}{\sigma} X + \frac{\sigma + \rho_x \delta_c - \sigma \chi \rho_x}{\sigma} \), satisfying \( F(0) = \frac{\sigma + \rho_x \chi \sigma_n c_y}{\sigma} > 1 \), \( F(1) = \frac{\delta_g}{\sigma} (\rho_x - 1) \), and \( F(-1) = \frac{2 \sigma + \chi (\sigma_n c_y + \sigma) + 2 \sigma \beta + \rho_x \chi (\sigma_n c_y - \sigma)}{\chi (\sigma - \sigma_n c_y)} \). Sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy are \( 1 < \rho_x < 1 + \frac{\sigma + \chi \sigma_n c_y + \sigma \beta}{\chi (\sigma - \sigma_n c_y)} \) for \( c_y < \sigma/\sigma_n \), or \( 1 < \rho_x \) for \( c_y > \sigma/\sigma_n \), which are assumed to be ensured. Then, the solutions take the following generic form \( \hat{\pi}_t = \gamma_e \hat{g}_t \) and \( \hat{c}_t = \gamma_c \hat{g}_t \). Inserting these solutions in (45)
and (46), leads to the following two conditions in $\gamma_π$ and $\gamma_c$: $\gamma_π ρ_π + ρ_g + σ γ_c = 0$ and $-γ_π (1 - χ ρ_x) + δ_c γ_c + δ_g = 0$, which can be combined to

$$
\gamma_c = -[\chi σ_n g_y + (-2 χ + 1/ρ_x) ρ_g] \Theta \text{ and } γ_π = (Θ/ρ_π) [σ χ_n g_y - χ (2σ + σ_n c_y) ρ_g] .
$$

where $Θ = (χ σ_n c_y + σ/ρ_x)^{-1} > 0$. To assess the policy rate, we use that it satisfies $\hat{R}_t^m - E_t \hat{π}_{t+1} = (ρ_π γ_π + ρ_g) \hat{g}_t$ and thus

$$
\hat{R}_t^m - E_t \hat{π}_{t+1} = \hat{R}_t^m = σ [\chi σ_n g_y + (-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) ρ_g] \Theta \cdot \hat{g}_t .
$$

For $(-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) > 0$, the policy rate falls if $ρ_g < -\frac{X σ_n g_y}{(-2 χ + 1/ρ_π)}$. Using this upper bound, shows that consumption then increases

$$
\gamma_c = -[\chi σ_n g_y + (-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) ρ_g] \Theta \\
> -[\chi σ_n g_y - (-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) χ σ_n g_y/(−2 χ + 1/ρ_π)] \Theta = 0 .
$$

For $(-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) < 0$, the policy rate falls if $ρ_g > \frac{X σ_n g_y}{(-2 χ + 1/ρ_π)}$. Using this lower bound, shows that consumption then again increases

$$
\gamma_c > -[\chi σ_n g_y + (-2 χ + 1/ρ_π) χ σ_n g_y/(2 χ - 1/ρ_π)] \Theta = 0 .
$$

Thus, if the real policy rate declines, consumption increases, implying an output multiplier larger than one. ■

**Proof of Lemma 1.** The model given in Definition 3 for the version with $R_t^m < R_t^{IS}$, i.e., (18)-(22), is further simplified by substituting out $\hat{R}_t^{IS}$ and $\hat{R}_t^m$:

$$
δ_1 E_t \hat{π}_{t+1} + δ_3 \hat{b}_t + δ_2 \hat{c}_t = \hat{π}_t - δ_g \hat{g}_t , \tag{47}
$$

$$
\hat{c}_t = \hat{b}_{t-1} - (1 + ρ_x) \hat{π}_t - ρ_g \hat{g}_t . \tag{48}
$$

and (21), where $δ_1 = (β + χ (1 − σ) − χ σ ρ_x) \geq 0$, $δ_2 = χ σ_n c_y > 0$, $δ_3 = χ σ > 0$, and $δ_g = χ σ_n g_y > 0$. We further simplify the system (21), (47), and (48) by eliminating $\hat{c}_t$ with (48) in (47) and then $\hat{b}_{t-1}$ with (21). Rewriting in matrix form, gives

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
δ_1 δ_3 + δ_2 \\
0 1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
E_t \hat{π}_{t+1} \\
\hat{b}_t
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
1 + δ_2 ρ_π 0 \\
-1 1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{π}_t \\
\hat{b}_{t-1}
\end{pmatrix}
+ \begin{pmatrix}
δ_2 ρ_g - δ_g \\
0 0
\end{pmatrix}
\hat{g}_t .
$$

The characteristic polynomial of

$$
A = \begin{pmatrix}
δ_1 δ_3 + δ_2 \\
0 1
\end{pmatrix}^{-1}
\begin{pmatrix}
1 + δ_2 ρ_π 0 \\
-1 1
\end{pmatrix}
\tag{49}
$$

47
is given by \( F(X) = X^2 - \frac{\delta_1 + \delta_2 + \rho_n \delta_2 + 1}{\delta_1} X + \frac{\rho_n \delta_2 + 1}{\delta_1} \). Given that there is one backward-looking variable and one forward-looking variable, stability and uniqueness require \( F(X) \) to be characterized by one stable and one unstable root. At \( X = 0 \), the sign of \( F(X) \) equals the sign of \( \delta_1 \), \( F(0) = (\rho_n \delta_2 + 1)/\delta_1 \), while \( F(X) \) exhibits the opposite sign at \( X = 1 : F(1) = -\frac{1}{\delta_1} (\delta_2 + \delta_3) \). Consider first the case where \( \delta_1 = \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n > 0 \). Given that \( \sigma \geq 1 \) and \( \beta < 1 \), we know that \( \delta_1 \) is then strictly smaller than one. Hence, \( F(1) < 0 \) and \( F(0) > 1 \), which implies that exactly one root is unstable and the stable root is strictly positive. Now consider the second case where \( \delta_1 = \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n < 0 \iff \rho_n > \frac{\beta + \chi (1 - \sigma)}{\chi \sigma} \), such that \( F(1) > 0 \) and \( F(0) < 0 \). We then know that there is at least one stable root between zero and one. To establish a condition which ensures that there is exactly one stable root, we further use \( F(-1) = [2 (1 + \delta_1) + \delta_3 + (2 \rho_n + 1) \delta_2]/\delta_1 \). Rewriting the numerator with \( \delta_1 = \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n \), \( \delta_2 = \chi \sigma n c_y \) and \( \delta_3 = \chi \sigma \), the condition

\[
2 (1 + \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n) + \chi \sigma + (2 \rho_n + 1) \chi \sigma n c_y > 0 \tag{50}
\]

ensures that \( F(0) \) and \( F(-1) \) exhibit the same sign, implying that there is no stable root between zero and minus one. We now use that (50) holds, if but not only if

\[
\rho_n \leq \frac{1 + \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n}{\chi \sigma} + \frac{1 - \sigma}{\sigma} \tag{51}
\]

where the RHS of (51) is strictly larger than \( \frac{\beta + \chi (1 - \sigma)}{\chi \sigma} \). Hence, (51) is sufficient for local equilibrium determinacy, which establishes the claim made in the lemma. ■

The following lemma presents conditions under which the model predictions regarding government spending effects are qualitatively consistent with the empirical results presented in Section 3. These conditions are expressed in terms of the direct feedback from government spending on the policy rate, measured by the coefficient \( \rho_y \).

**Lemma 3** Suppose that \( R_i^n < R_i^s \) and that \( \text{[23]} \) is satisfied. Then, an unexpected increase in government spending leads on impact to

1. a fall in the nominal and real policy rate if \( \rho_y < \overline{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \) where \( \overline{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \leq 0 \),
2. a fall in private consumption if \( \rho_y > \overline{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \), where \( \overline{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \leq 0 \),
3. a rise in aggregate output if \( \rho_y < 1 \), and
4. a rise in the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution if \( \rho_y > \tilde{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \) for \( \tilde{\rho}_y(\rho_n) < 0 \) or \( \rho_y < \tilde{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \) for \( \tilde{\rho}_y(\rho_n) > 0 \),

where \( \rho_y(\rho_n) \equiv (1 + \rho_n) \chi \sigma n g_y / \Gamma_1 \), \( \overline{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \equiv -\rho_n g_y \chi \sigma n / (\chi \sigma n c_y + \Gamma_1) \), \( \tilde{\rho}_y(\rho_n) \equiv -(\Gamma_2 + \rho_n \chi \sigma n) g_y / (\Gamma_1 + (\chi \sigma n - \Gamma_2) c_y) \), \( \Gamma_1 = [\beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_n] (1 - \gamma_b) + \chi \sigma + 1 > 0 \), \( \Gamma_2 = (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b) \chi \sigma n > 0 \), and \( \gamma_b \in (0, 1) \).
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the set of equilibrium conditions (21), (47), and (48). We aim at identifying the impact responses to fiscal policy shocks. For this, we assume that (51) is satisfied, which ensures existence and uniqueness of a locally stable solution. We then apply the following solution form for the system (21), (47), and (48):

\[
\hat{\pi}_t = \gamma_{\pi b} \hat{b}_{t-1} + \gamma_{\pi g} \hat{g}_t, \tag{52}
\]
\[
\hat{b}_t = \gamma_{b} \hat{b}_{t-1} + \gamma_{bg} \hat{g}_t, \tag{53}
\]
\[
\hat{c}_t = \gamma_{cb} \hat{b}_{t-1} + \gamma_{cg} \hat{g}_t. \tag{54}
\]

Substituting out the endogenous variables in (21), (47), and (48) with the generic solutions in (52)- (54), leads to the following conditions for \(\gamma_{\pi b}, \gamma_{cb}, \gamma_{\pi b}, \gamma_{cg}, \gamma_{\pi g}, \) and \(\gamma_{bg} :\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\gamma_{\pi b} &= \delta_1 \gamma_{\pi b} \gamma_b + \delta_3 \gamma_b + \delta_2 \gamma_{cb}, \quad 1 = (1 + \rho_\pi) \gamma_{\pi b} + \gamma_{cb}, \quad 1 = \gamma_b + \gamma_{nb}, \\
-\delta_2 \gamma_{cg} &= (\delta_1 \gamma_{\pi b} + \delta_3) \gamma_{bg} - \gamma_{\pi g} + \delta_g, \quad -\gamma_{cg} = (1 + \rho_\pi) \gamma_{\pi g} + \rho_g, \quad \gamma_{bg} = -\gamma_{\pi g}. \tag{55}
\end{align*}
\]

Using the three conditions in (55) and substituting out \(\gamma_{\pi b} = 1 - \gamma_b\) gives

\[
0 = (\delta_1 \gamma_b - 1)(1 - \gamma_b) + \delta_3 \gamma_b + \delta_2 \gamma_{cb}, \quad 1 = (1 + \rho_\pi)(1 - \gamma_b) + \gamma_{cb}, \quad \text{and eliminating } \gamma_{cb},
\]
leads to

\[
0 = (\delta_1 \gamma_b - 1)(1 - \gamma_b) + \delta_3 \gamma_b + \delta_2 (1 - (1 + \rho_\pi) (1 - \gamma_b)), \quad \text{which is a quadratic equation in } \gamma_b,
\]

\[
\gamma_b^2 - (\delta_1 + \delta_3 + \delta_2 (\rho_\pi + 1) + 1) \gamma_b \delta_1^{-1} + (\rho_\pi \delta_2 + 1) \delta_1^{-1} = 0. \tag{57}
\]

Note that the polynomial in (57) is the characteristic polynomial of \(A\) (see 49). Hence, under (51) there exists exactly one stable and positive solution (see proof of Lemma 1), which is assigned to \(\gamma_b \in (0, 1)\). We then use \(\gamma_{\pi b} = 1 - \gamma_b \in (0, 1)\) to identify the effects of government expenditure shocks with the three conditions in (56). The latter imply that the impact responses of inflation and consumption are related by

\[
-\gamma_{cg} = (1 + \rho_\pi) \gamma_{\pi g} + \rho_g. \tag{58}
\]

Eliminating \(\gamma_{bg}\) with \(\gamma_{bg} = -\gamma_{\pi g}\) and \(\gamma_{\pi g}\) with

\[
-\delta_2 \gamma_{cg} = - (\delta_1 \gamma_{\pi b} + \delta_3) \gamma_{\pi g} - \gamma_{\pi g} + \delta_g,
\]
gives

\[
\gamma_{cg} = - \frac{(1 + \rho_\pi) \delta_2 (\delta_1 \gamma_{\pi b} + \delta_3 + 1) \rho_g}{(\delta_1 \gamma_{\pi b} + \delta_3 + 1) + \delta_2 (1 + \rho_\pi)}. \tag{58}
\]

Using \(\delta_1 = \beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_\pi, \delta_2 = \chi \sigma n c_g > 0, \delta_3 = \chi \sigma > 0, \) and \(\delta_g = \chi \sigma n g_y,\) the term on the RHS of (58) can be rewritten, such that

\[
\gamma_{cg} = - \frac{(1 + \rho_\pi) \chi \sigma n g_y + \Gamma_1 \rho_g}{\Gamma_1 + \chi \sigma n c_g (1 + \rho_\pi)}, \tag{59}
\]

where \(\Gamma_1 \equiv (\beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_\pi) \gamma_{\pi b} + \chi \sigma + 1 > 0, \) since \(\beta + \chi (1 - \sigma) - \chi \sigma \rho_\pi + 1 > 0\)
(see [51] and $\gamma_{\pi b} \in (0, 1)$. Hence, $\gamma_{cg}$ is negative, implying a crowding out, if

$$\rho_g > \rho_g^c, \text{ where } \rho_g(ho_x) \equiv - (1 + \rho_x) \chi \sigma_n g_y / \Gamma_1 < 0. \quad (60)$$

The solution coefficient [50] further implies that the fiscal multiplier is positive, $\gamma_{cg} > -1$, if $(c_y - g_y) \chi \sigma_n (1 + \rho_n) + \Gamma_1 (1 - \rho_g) > 0$, which is satisfied if but not only if $\rho_g < 1$ given that $c_y > g_y$. Using $\gamma_{\pi x} = - \frac{\gamma_{ca} + \rho_g}{(1 + \rho_n)}$ and [50], the inflation response is given by

$$\gamma_{\pi x} = \frac{(g_y - \rho_g c_y) \chi \sigma_n}{\Gamma_1 + \chi \sigma_n c_y (1 + \rho_n)},$$

implying that $\gamma_{\pi x} > 0$, if $\rho_g < g_y/c_y$. Using (61), the response of the policy rate, which satisfies $\hat{R}_t^m = \rho_x \hat{\pi}_t + \rho_g \hat{y}_t$, to a change in government spending is given by

$$\partial \hat{R}_t^m / \partial \hat{g}_t = \frac{\tau_{\pi y} \chi \sigma_n + \rho_g (\chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1)}{\Gamma_1 + \chi \sigma_n c_y (1 + \rho_n)},$$

and is thus negative if

$$\rho_g < \overline{\rho}_g, \text{ where } \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) \equiv - \frac{\rho_x g_y \chi \sigma_n}{\chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1} \leq 0. \quad (62)$$

To further identify the response of the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, we use the log-linearized form $\hat{R}_t^{IS} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} = \sigma E_t \hat{\epsilon}_{t+1} - \sigma \hat{c}_t$. Applying the solutions [53]-[54], we get

$$\partial (\hat{R}_t^{IS} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}) / \partial \hat{g}_t = \sigma \gamma_{cb} \gamma_{bg} - \sigma \gamma_{cg}.$$}

Further using $\gamma_{cb} = 1 - (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b)$, $\delta_g = \chi \sigma_n g_y$, $\gamma_{bg} = \frac{\gamma_{ca} + \rho_g}{(1 + \rho_n)}$, and [50], leads to

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{R}_t^{IS} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1})}{\partial \hat{g}_t} = \sigma \left( (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b) + \rho_x \right) \chi \sigma_n g_y + \left( (1 - (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b)) \chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 \right) \rho_g,$$

Hence, $\partial (\hat{R}_t^{IS} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}) / \partial \hat{g}_t$ is positive for $(1 - (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b)) \chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 > 0$ if $\rho_g > \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x)$, where

$$\overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) \equiv - \frac{((1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b) + \rho_x) \chi \sigma_n g_y}{(1 - (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b)) \chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1}, \quad (63)$$

and for $(1 - (1 + \rho_n) (1 - \gamma_b)) \chi \sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 < 0$ if $\rho_g < \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x)$. The real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution therefore increases with government spending if

$$\rho_g > \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) \text{ for } \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) < 0 \text{ or } \rho_g < \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) \text{ for } \overline{\rho}_g(\rho_x) > 0, \quad (64)$$

which establishes the claim made in the lemma. \rightline{\phantom{50}}

**Proof of Proposition 2** A comparison of the thresholds $\rho_g$ and $\overline{\rho}_g$, defined in (60).
and (62) in the proof of Lemma 3 shows that $\rho_g < \rho_{\bar{g}}$, since

$$\rho_g < \rho_{\bar{g}} \iff \frac{(1 + \rho_\pi)\chi\sigma_n g_y}{\Gamma_1} \leq -\rho_\pi \frac{g_y \chi\sigma_n}{\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1} \iff (1 + \rho_\pi)\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 > 0,$$

Thus, there exist values for $\rho_g$ satisfying $\rho_g \in (\rho_g, \rho_{\bar{g}})$ for which private consumption and the nominal policy rate simultaneously decline in response to a government spending hike, see (60) and (62). Given that inflation increases for $\rho_g < g_y/c_y$, which is then ensured (as $\rho_g < 0$), the real policy rate then declines as well. To assess the possibility that the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution increases in response to a government spending hike, we distinguish two cases. For $(1 - (1 + \rho_\pi)\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 > 0$ and $\tilde{\rho}_g < 0$ (see 63), a rising real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution requires $\rho_g > \tilde{\rho}_g(\rho_\pi)$ (see 64). This is also feasible, since

$$\tilde{\rho}_g < \rho_{\bar{g}} \iff \frac{(1 + \rho_\pi)\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1}{(1 - (1 + \rho_\pi)(1 - \gamma_b))\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1} > \frac{\rho_\pi}{\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1}
\iff (1 - \gamma_b)(1 + \rho_\pi)(\Gamma_1 + (1 + \rho_\pi)\chi\sigma_n c_y) > 0,$$

For $(1 - (1 + \rho_\pi)(1 - \gamma_b))\chi\sigma_n c_y + \Gamma_1 < 0$ and $\tilde{\rho}_g > 0$, a rising real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution requires $\rho_g < \tilde{\rho}_g(\rho_\pi)$ (see 64), which is ensured for values $\rho_g \in (\rho_g, \rho_{\bar{g}})$, since $\rho_g \leq \tilde{\rho}_g(\rho_\pi)$. We can therefore conclude that there exist values for $\rho_g$, which jointly satisfy (60), (62), and (64), such that a positive government spending shock simultaneously leads to a decline in private consumption, and in the nominal and the real policy rate, as well as to an increase in the real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.  

51