Optimal income taxation with labor supply responses at two margins: When is an Earned Income Tax Credit optimal?

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Abstract

This paper studies optimal non-linear income taxation in an empirically plausible model with labor supply responses at the intensive (hours, effort) and extensive (participation) margins. It shows that an Earned Income Tax Credit with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes at the bottom is optimal if social concerns for redistribution from the poor to the very poor are sufficiently weak. This result is driven by a previously neglected trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins, i.e., between two aspects of efficiency. Numerical simulations suggest that a strong expansion of the EITC for childless workers in the US could be welfare-increasing.

Keywords: Optimal income taxation, Extensive margin, Intensive margin, Earned Income Tax Credit

JEL classification: H21; H23; D82

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1 Introduction

Governments in all developed countries use labor income taxes and income-based transfers to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor. The properties of these tax-transfer schemes differ substantially across countries, though, especially with respect to the treatment of low incomes. In most European countries, public transfers are monotonically decreasing in the market incomes of the recipients. In the US and some other countries, in contrast, transfers to the working poor are higher than those to the unemployed and (sometimes) increasing in earned income. In particular, the *Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)* in the US entails both negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes for low-income earners.\(^1\) On the one hand, there seems to be a growing consensus among political practitioners that the *EITC* is an effective instrument for fighting poverty and should be further expanded.\(^2\) On the other hand, economists have so far struggled to rationalize the use of tax-transfer schemes with these properties.\(^3\) The present paper fills this gap by providing sufficient conditions as well as a novel explanation for the optimality of an *EITC* with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes.

The common approach to determine the optimal income tax involves, first, the definition of a social objective that provides a rationale for redistribution from the rich to the poor, and second, the maximization of this objective over the set of (non-linear) income taxes that satisfy the government’s budget constraint, taking into account the agents’ labor supply responses. A large set of papers show that an *EITC* cannot be optimal if labor supply responds at the intensive (hours, effort) margin only. A smaller set of papers find that negative participation taxes may be optimal if labor supply responds at the extensive (participation) margin only. Both classes of models are inconsistent with the empirical evidence that labor supply responds at the intensive margin *as well as* the extensive margin, however: “the world is obviously a mix of the two models” (Saez 2002: p. 1054). More specifically, empirical studies consistently find that extensive-margin responses are particularly important at the bottom of the income distribution: The participation elasticity of low-income earners is both larger than their elasticity of hours worked, and larger than the participation elasticity of medium-income and high-income earners (see, e.g., Juhn et al. 1991, 2002, Meghir & Phillips 2010).\(^4\)

The present paper investigates optimal income taxation in a framework that is con-

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\(^1\)The participation tax function is commonly defined as the difference between the net taxes to be paid at income levels \(y\) and 0 (for any positive income \(y\)).

\(^2\)Most prominently, both President Obama and Paul Ryan – then Republican Chairman of the House of Representatives Budget Committee – proposed to roughly double the maximum EITC payments for childless workers (see Executive Office 2014, House Budget Committee 2014).

\(^3\)In particular, most previous papers find that negative marginal income taxes cannot be optimal. I comment on the most important exceptions in Section 2 below.

sistent with these empirical patterns. In particular, I study a two-dimensional screening model in which the agents face both marginal costs of providing output as in Mirrlees (1971) and fixed costs of working as in Diamond (1980). The agents are privately informed about their fixed costs of working and their skills, where the latter determine the marginal costs of output provision. To make the model tractable, I assume additive separability between the fixed-cost component and the other components of the utility function, thereby following the random-participation approach by Rochet & Stole (2002). The analysis focuses on the empirically and economically relevant cases in which, first, society has standard concerns for redistribution from higher-income earners to lower-income earners and, second, participation elasticities are decreasing over the skill dimension.

The paper contributes in four ways to the literature on optimal income taxation. First, it derives two novel theoretical results on the optimality of an **EITC**. The first result identifies two properties that the optimal income tax satisfies whenever society has well-behaved redistributive concerns: Optimal participation taxes are strictly negative up to a unique income threshold \( y_k \geq 0 \) and positive above that threshold, and optimal marginal taxes are strictly negative at some income levels below \( y_k \) and positive everywhere else. The paper is hence the first to show that negative marginal taxes can only be optimal (i) at the bottom of the income distribution and (ii) in conjunction with a negative participation tax, i.e., as part of an **EITC**. The second result is given by a sufficient condition for the optimality of such an **EITC**. This condition can either be expressed in terms of the model’s primitives – utility functions and type distributions – or in terms of observable quantities such as labor supply elasticities at both margins, plus the social concerns for redistribution as captured by marginal welfare weights. In particular, I show that optimal marginal taxes and participation taxes are negative at low income levels if society has strong concerns for redistribution from the rich to the poor, but only limited concerns for local redistribution from the poor to the very poor (i.e., sufficiently flat welfare weights at the bottom). Crucially, this result does not depend on whether labor supply responds more strongly at the intensive margin or at the extensive margin; it holds whenever labor supply responds at both margins. I demonstrate that the sufficient condition on redistributive concerns can be satisfied if the social planner maximizes a welfare function with standard properties. I also show that this condition is naturally ensured if the planner’s objective is to reduce the poverty gap, i.e., the average shortfall of available incomes from the poverty line. It has repeatedly been argued that the objective of poverty alleviation appears more descriptive for real-world policy choice than standard welfarist objectives (Besley & Coate 1992, 1995, Kanbur et al. 1994, Saez & Stantcheva).

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5 The same assumption is also used in the closely related paper by Jacquet et al. (2013).

6 If society has strong concerns for redistribution from the poor to the very poor, in contrast, optimal participation and marginal taxes are positive everywhere below the very top, as shown in Appendix B.1 (see also Jacquet et al. 2013).
Surprisingly, only a few previous papers have studied optimal income taxation in a model with labor supply responses at both margins. Most prominently, Saez (2002) demonstrates the differences between both one-margin models and provides preliminary results for a two-margin model. In particular, he shows that marginal taxes for low-income workers should be negative if the optimal participation taxes (and the participation elasticities) of higher-income earners are sufficiently large (Saez 2002, p. 1055). He does not clarify in which cases this condition is met, however.

Nevertheless, the general perception of Saez’ results seems to be that an EITC can be optimal if and only if labor supply responds more strongly at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin (see, e.g., Brewer et al. 2010, Piketty & Saez 2013). More recently, Jacquet et al. (2013) provide a condition that ensures the optimality of positive marginal taxes at all income levels, while participation taxes might still be negative at the bottom. This sufficient condition is expressed in terms of participation elasticities and social welfare weights; it effectively requires the social welfare weights of low-income agents to be decreasing with a sufficiently steep slope. Both papers do not clarify when the optimal tax is given by a US-style EITC with negative marginal and participation taxes, nor whether this can happen at all. These are obviously key questions from an applied perspective. They are also questions of primary theoretical importance, as they challenge the central result of optimal tax theory that the optimal income tax is always positive (Hellwig 2007).

Second, the paper conducts numerical simulations of the optimal tax schedule, which allow to assess the quantitative relevance of its theoretical results. For this purpose, I calibrate the model to the US economy, targeting empirical estimates from the previous literature and recent Current Population Survey (CPS) data. According to the simulation results, optimal marginal taxes for childless singles may be negative for all incomes below $15,000, where a maximal tax credit of approximately $1,700 is reached. Optimal participation taxes may even stay negative up to incomes around $32,000. These numerical results suggest that the optimal tax credit may be more than twice as large as the current EITC for childless singles in the US. In contrast, the simulations by Saez (2002) and Jacquet et al. (2013) suggest that marginal income taxes should be positive.

The recent political debate supports this view: Proponents of an EITC expansion have mainly emphasized its potential to lift many individuals above the poverty line and reduce the depth of poverty for many others (e.g., Executive Office 2014, House Budget Committee 2014). Following Saez & Stantcheva (2016), I formalize the poverty alleviation goal by means of generalized welfare weights.

In the model by Saez (2002), optimal marginal taxes and optimal participation taxes cannot be determined separately, as they jointly depend on the welfare weights and the intensive and extensive elasticities. The same is true in the model studied below.

The present paper contradicts this perception, showing that an EITC can be optimal whenever labor supply responds at both margins.

For childless singles, current EITC payments increase up to an earned income around $6,600, where the peak of $500 is reached (just offsetting payroll taxes in this income range). EITC payments are larger for single and married parents, for which the model is not calibrated.
everywhere (while participation taxes should sometimes be negative at low incomes). It is worth emphasizing that my simulations as well as previous ones concentrate on cases with monotonically decreasing welfare weights.\footnote{The crucial difference is, however, that Saez (2002) and Jacquet et al. (2013) focus on cases where the concerns for redistribution among the poor are particularly strong, while I consider cases with weaker concerns for redistribution among the poor.}

Third, the paper provides a novel intuition for the potential optimality of an EITC. In particular, it shows that the optimality of negative marginal taxes is driven by an inherent trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins, which has not been elucidated in the previous literature.\footnote{While this trade-off is also present in the models by Saez (2002) and Jacquet et al. (2013), the authors do neither discuss the trade-off itself nor its relevance for the optimality of negative marginal taxes. In contrast, Jacquet et al. (2013) start by focusing on the trade-off between equity and extensive-margin distortions in isolation (labeling this reduced problem \textit{first-and-a-half best}), and then show how the optimal tax is affected by adding the intensive margin.}

The following thought experiment helps to understand this trade-off and its implications. Consider an economy populated by agents who differ both in their skills (very low, low, or high) and in their fixed costs of working, so that some agents in each skill group choose to remain unemployed for each tax schedule. Assume that the social planner wants to redistribute some fixed, strictly positive amount of resources $R > 0$ from the rich (high-skilled workers) to the poor (unemployed agents, very-low-skill workers and low-skill workers) in such a way that efficiency is maximized, i.e., the deadweight loss from distortions at both margins is minimized. Hence, he does not care for how the resources are distributed among the poor. The properties of the efficiency-maximizing redistribution scheme can be explained in two steps.

For the first step, assume that the social planner only seeks to minimize the labor supply distortions at the extensive margin (given some fixed amount $R > 0$ of redistribution). If he increases the transfer to the unemployed, some workers in all three skill groups find it attractive to leave the labor market and save the fixed costs of working. If he increases the transfers to both groups of lower-skill workers, some unemployed agents in these skill groups find it attractive to enter the labor market, but none of the high-skill agents has an incentive to leave the labor market. Hence, the second option induces less distortions at the extensive margin. Accordingly, the efficiency-maximizing tax schedule involves higher transfers to both groups of low-skill workers than to the unemployed, i.e., negative participation taxes.\footnote{These arguments are closely related to those in papers on optimal income taxation with labor supply responses at the extensive margin only (see, e.g., Saez 2002 and Christiansen 2015).}

But how should these transfers be divided between both groups of lower-skill workers? To minimize the distortions at the extensive margin, the planner has to apply a version of the classical \textit{inverse elasticity rule}. If the very-low-skill agents respond more elastically at the extensive margin than all higher-skilled agents (in line with the empirical evidence), the planner should pay smaller transfers to the former than to the latter – put differently, the income tax has to be decreasing in the relevant income range. For this purpose, the
planner has to introduce negative marginal taxes.

For the second step, assume that the social planner also seeks to minimize the labor supply distortions at the intensive margin. The lower-skilled workers respond to negative marginal taxes by increasing their output provision, so that labor supply becomes upwards distorted at the intensive margin. Hence, the planner faces a trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins: To reduce the deadweight loss from upward distortions at the extensive margin, he has to increase the upward distortions at the intensive margin and vice versa. Importantly, the validity of this result does not depend on whether labor supply responds more strongly at the intensive or the extensive margin. In Section 6, I provide a rigorous formal derivation of this result and a graphical illustration (see Figures 2a and 2b).

It should also be noted that the optimality of an EITC is not driven by the goal to maximize efficiency per se, but to maximize efficiency conditional on some redistribution towards low-income earners. The crucial role of redistribution can be clarified by considering the alternative problem to minimize the deadweight loss, subject to funding an exogenous public budget $B > 0$. Assume that the planner cannot tax the unemployed due to a non-negativity constraint on consumption. In Appendix B.12, I show that the efficient-funding scheme involves positive participation taxes and positive marginal taxes for all skill groups, in stark contrast to the efficient-redistribution scheme identified above. In this alternative problem, the trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins leads to the optimality of strictly positive marginal taxes in the absence of redistributive concerns.

Fourth, the paper proposes a new strategy to analytically solve multi-dimensional screening models. The major problem in solving these models is that the set of binding incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints is a priori unclear. Jacquet et al. (2013) show that this problem can sometimes be circumvented. In particular, their sufficient condition ensures that all downwards IC constraints along the skill dimension are binding and that optimal marginal taxes are positive everywhere, just as in Mirrlees (1971). An EITC with negative marginal taxes can only be optimal in cases where at least some upwards IC constraints are binding, however. Hence, I have to develop a new approach to identify sufficient conditions for the optimality of an EITC.

The methodological innovation of this paper is to study a hybrid model with a continuous set of fixed cost types and a large but discrete set of skill types in the first step, and to focus on skill sets with sufficiently small distances between adjacent skill types in the second step. The discrete skill set has two advantages: First, the optimal tax problem involves a finite number of distinguishable downwards and upwards IC constraints, which can be added or deleted one by one to study partially relaxed problems. Second, there

\[14\] More specifically, the relative sizes of labor supply responses at both margins only affect the levels of the optimal marginal taxes, but not their signs.
exist allocations in which both local IC constraints are slack for some pairs of adjacent skill types.\footnote{With a continuous skill set, downwards and upwards IC constraints are collapsed into an envelope condition that is satisfied with equality in every implementable allocation.}

The discrete skill set complicates one crucial step of the analysis, however. With a strictly positive distance between adjacent skill types, it is impossible to check whether a potentially optimal allocation satisfies a particular IC constraint unless strong functional form assumptions are imposed. I solve this problem by verifying incentive compatibility when the distance between adjacent skill types converges to zero. This allows me to determine unambiguously which IC constraints are binding whenever the skill set is sufficiently “dense”, i.e., the distance between adjacent skill types is strictly positive but small. Hence, I study the behavior of the model at the transition between a discrete skill set and a continuous skill set, exploiting crucial advantages of both model classes.\footnote{Note that my formal proofs exploit the discreteness of the skill set, and would hence not be valid with a continuous skill set as in \cite{Jacquet2013}. Lemma 26 in Appendix B.6 suggests, however, that the qualitative results of this paper remain unchanged in the limit case where the discrete skill set converges to an interval.}

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model and the optimal tax problem. Section 4 imposes three assumptions on the primitives of the model and clarifies their implications for observable quantities. Section 5 presents the theoretical results. Section 6 explains the economic mechanism underlying these results, focusing on the trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins. Section 7 provides numerical simulations for a version of the model that is calibrated to the US economy. Section 8 concludes. Appendix A contains all formal proofs, and Appendix B provides supplementary results and graphical illustrations.

### 2 Related literature

The paper contributes to the vast literature on optimal non-linear income taxation that aims to determine the signs (in the first step) and the levels (in the second step) of optimal tax rates across the income distribution. Most of this literature focuses on two classes of models that differ in the type of costs agents face and, correspondingly, the margin at which they respond to tax changes.

First, a large number of papers follow \cite{Mirrlees1971} by assuming that the agents face only variable costs of providing effort, which are affected by a single private parameter referred to as skill. In these models, labor supply responds to tax changes at the intensive (hours, effort) margin only. The “central result” \cite{Hellwig2007} of this literature is that the optimal marginal tax is strictly positive almost everywhere.\footnote{The optimal marginal income tax is only zero at the very top and, under certain conditions, at the very bottom of the income distribution.} This result holds whenever the welfare function gives rise to a desire for redistributing resources from...
higher-skilled to lower-skilled agents (see, amongst others, Seade 1977, 1982, Hellwig 2007). Notably, the same results apply whether the skill set is continuous or discrete (see Stiglitz 1982 and Hellwig 2007).\footnote{In this setting, negative marginal taxes can only be optimal if the planner has a non-standard desire to redistribute resources from low-income earners to high-income earners as in Choné & Laroque (2010) and Brett & Weymark (2017), or if the agents fail to maximize their own well-being, e.g., due to a present bias as in Lockwood (2017).}

Second, a smaller set of papers follow Diamond (1980) by studying models in which the agents do not only differ in skills, but also in fixed costs of working. This strand of the literature was revived by Saez (2002) and a series of papers by Laroque (2005) and Choné & Laroque (2005, 2011). In their models, there are no variable costs of providing output. Hence, all agents prefer to either work at full capacity or to be unemployed: labor supply responds to tax changes at the extensive (participation) margin only. The authors find that optimal participation taxes are negative at low income levels if and only if the social planner cares almost as much for the low-skilled workers as for the unemployed (see Diamond 1980, Saez 2002, Choné & Laroque 2011, Christiansen 2015). The authors mostly do not compute optimal marginal taxes because they do not lead to distortions, i.e., they are economically irrelevant. Again, the results do not depend on whether the skill set is continuous as in Choné & Laroque (2011) or discrete as in Christiansen (2015).

Finally, there exist a few papers that study optimal income taxation with labor supply responses at both margins. Saez (2002) strongly advocates the mixed model based on its empirical relevance and discusses how the mechanisms of this model differ from the pure intensive and the pure extensive model. He is also the first to show that negative marginal taxes at low-income levels are compatible with a standard desire for redistribution if both the optimal participation taxes and the participation elasticities of higher-income earners are sufficiently large.\footnote{Note that Saez (2002) refers the difference between the (net) taxes paid by the lowest-skilled workers and the unemployed as the “marginal tax at the bottom”, while the more recent literature labels this tax difference the “participation tax at the bottom” to avoid confusion. In this paper, I adopt the terminology used in the recent literature, including Jacquet et al. (2013).} Unfortunately, this crucial insight does not allow to verify the optimality of an EITC because the optimal participation taxes are endogenous entities that depend on the redistributive concerns, the labor supply elasticities and the optimal marginal taxes themselves. Additionally, Saez (2002) provides numerical simulations of the optimal income tax, finding throughout positive marginal taxes and (sometimes) negative participation taxes at low income levels.

Mostly closely related to my paper, Jacquet et al. (2013) study optimal income taxation in a random participation model with two-dimensional heterogeneity. The main result of Jacquet et al. (2013) is given by a sufficient condition for the optimality of positive marginal taxes. While this condition is expressed in terms of endogenous entities – participation elasticities and marginal social weights – as acknowledged by the authors, they also provide examples for which it is unambiguously satisfied. For example, the con-
dition holds if (a) higher-skilled workers respond more elastically at the extensive margin that lower-skilled workers, in line with the empirical evidence, (b) social welfare weights are decreasing along the income distribution, and (c) the social planner associates welfare weights below the population average even to the lowest-skilled workers, i.e., cares much more for the unemployed than for the working poor. Moreover, they perform numerical simulations, finding that the optimal marginal tax is positive in all considered cases, while the optimal participation tax is sometimes negative (as in Saez 2002).

The main difference between the models in Jacquet et al. (2013) and in this paper is that they consider a type set that is continuous in both dimensions, while I study a hybrid model with a discrete set of skill types and a continuous set of fixed cost types. At first sight, the discreteness of my model might seem to introduce additional complexity. However, it also simplifies the distinction between downward and upward incentive compatibility and, in particular, the derivation of my main results.

Finally, Beaudry et al. (2009) show that an EITC with negative marginal taxes is always optimal in a two-dimensional screening model that deviates in several aspects from the previously discussed literature. First, the agents do not face fixed costs of working, but opportunity costs related to the possibility of generating (higher) income in an informal or black labor market. Hence, the social planner holds a desire to redistribute resources from unemployed agents (the workers in the informal sector) to formally employed agents with identical skills. Second, the planner is able to observe hours worked in the formal sector and, consequently, to condition tax payments on the wages of formally employed agents. Due to these two properties and in contrast to my model, an EITC with negative marginal taxes is always optimal for agents earning wages below some cutoff wage, and the optimal transfers to unemployed agents are always zero.

3 Model

The following subsection presents a two-dimensional screening model in which labor supply responds to tax changes at the intensive margin and the extensive margin. Subsection 3.2 provides formal definitions of the optimal tax problem and of labor supply distortions at both margins. Subsection 3.3 explains how allocations can be decentralized via non-linear income taxes, and Subsection 3.4 discusses the relation between social objective functions and marginal social welfare weights.

20 The present paper clarifies that negative marginal taxes can be optimal if condition (c) is dropped. 21 Lorenz & Sachs (2012) complement these results by providing a condition under which optimal participation taxes are positive everywhere. Lehmann et al. (2014) and Scheuer (2014) use similar random-participation models to study optimal taxation with labor supply responses at the intensive margin and another extensive margin. In particular, the agents can choose to migrate in Lehmann et al. (2014), and change their occupation in Scheuer (2014). Although their models and research questions differ from those in my paper, the mechanisms at work are similar. 22 Besides, their analysis is somewhat more general in allowing for income effects in labor supply.
3.1 The economy

The set of agents is given by a continuum of mass one and denoted by $I$, with typical element $i$. Agent $i$’s consumption is denoted by $c^i$, his contribution to the economy’s output by $y^i$. Agent $i$ derives utility from consumption and suffers from the cost of providing output. This cost can be separated into a variable effort cost and a fixed cost of participating in the labor market. Formally, individual preferences can be represented by the following utility function:

$$u(c^i, y^i; \omega^i, \delta^i) = c^i - h(y^i, \omega^i) - 1_{y^i > 0} \delta^i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

The fixed cost of participating in the labor market is given by an individual parameter $\delta^i \in \Delta$, which I refer to as agent $i$’s fixed cost type. The variable effort cost of providing output is measured by function $h$. It depends on the output level $y^i$ and an individual parameter $\omega^i \in \Omega$, which I refer to as $i$’s skill type. Absolute and marginals cost of providing output are decreasing in this parameter, so that $h(y^i, \omega^i) < 0$ and $h_{y\omega}(y^i, \omega^i) < 0$ for all $y^i > 0$ and $\omega^i \in \Omega$. Moreover, $h$ is strictly increasing and strictly convex in $y^i$, so that $h_y(y^i, \omega^i) > 0$ and $h_{yy}(y^i, \omega^i) > 0$ for all $y^i > 0$ and $\omega^i \in \Omega$. Finally, $h$ is assumed to satisfy $h(0, \omega^i) = 0$, $h_{y\omega}(y^i, \omega) \leq 0$ for all $y^i > 0$ and $\omega^i \in \Omega$ as well as the Inada conditions $\lim_{y \to 0} h_y(y^i, \omega^i) = 0$ and $\lim_{y \to \infty} h_y(y^i, \omega^i) = \infty$ for all $\omega^i \in \Omega$.

Agent $i$ is privately informed about his skill type $\omega^i$ and his fixed cost type $\delta^i$. The skill set $\Omega$ is given by a finite ordered set $\{\omega_1, \omega_2, \ldots, \omega_n\}$ with $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j \geq 1 + \epsilon$ for all $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n - 1\}$ and some $\epsilon > 0$. The set of fixed costs $\Delta$ is given by a closed interval with lower endpoint $\underline{\delta}$ and upper endpoint $\bar{\delta}$, assumed to satisfy

$$\underline{\delta} < \max_{y > 0} y - h(y, \omega_1), \quad \bar{\delta} > \max_{y > 0} y - h(y, \omega_n).$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Under laissez-faire, agents with fixed cost type $\underline{\delta}$ and any skill type $\omega \in \Omega$ would thus provide positive output, while agents with fixed cost type $\bar{\delta}$ and any skill type $\omega \in \Omega$ would provide zero output.\(^{24}\) As will become clear below, the combination of a discrete set of skills and a continuous set of fixed costs helps to explain the interaction between labor supply distortions at both margins.

The joint cross-section distribution of the pair $(\omega^i, \delta^i)$ in the population at large is commonly known and denoted by $K : \Omega \times \Delta \to [0, 1]$. The share of agents with skill type $\omega_j$, which I henceforth refer to as skill group $j$, is given by the number $f_j > 0$ for any $j \in J$. The distribution function of fixed costs types in skill group $j$ is twice continuously differentiable and denoted by $G_j$. The corresponding density function $g_j$ is bounded from below by some number $g_0 > 0$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$ and there exists some closed subset of $\Delta$ on

\(^{23}\)I comment on the implications of the functional form imposed by (1) below.

\(^{24}\)This ensures that tax changes may affect the participation decisions of agents in all skill groups.
which \( g_j \) is weakly decreasing.

### 3.2 The optimal tax problem

I use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal non-linear income tax. Thus, I study the problem to maximize a social objective (to be defined below) over the set of implementable, i.e., feasible and incentive-compatible, allocations. An allocation is given by two functions \( c : \Omega \times \Delta \to \mathbb{R} \) and \( y : \Omega \times \Delta \to \mathbb{R}_+^\ast \) that specify the consumption and output levels for all types in \( \Omega \times \Delta \). It is feasible if overall consumption does not exceed overall output, i.e.,

\[
\int_{\Omega \times \Delta} c(\omega, \delta) dK(\omega, \delta) \leq \int_{\Omega \times \Delta} y(\omega, \delta) dK(\omega, \delta),
\]

and incentive-compatible if

\[
u(c(\omega, \delta), y(\omega, \delta); \omega, \delta) \geq u(c(\omega', \delta'), y(\omega', \delta'); \omega, \delta)\]

for all types \((\omega, \delta)\) and \((\omega', \delta')\) in \( \Omega \times \Delta \).

This maximization problem can be simplified considerably by focusing on the set of allocations that are implementable and (second-best) Pareto efficient. In particular, Lemma 1 shows that any such allocation involves pooling by \( n + 1 \) sets of different types.

**Lemma 1.** Every allocation \((c, y)\) that is implementable and Pareto efficient (in the set of implementable allocations) is characterized by two vectors \((y_j)_{j=1}^n, (c_j)_{j=0}^n\) such that,

- for each \( j \in J = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \), all agents with skill type \( \omega_j \) and fixed cost type \( \delta \leq \delta_j := c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0 \) receive bundle \((c_j, y_j)\), and
- all other agents receive bundle \((c_0, 0)\).

By Lemma 1, any implementable and (second-best) Pareto efficient allocation satisfies two properties. First, all agents with skill type \( \omega_j \in \Omega \) and fixed cost types below the (endogenous) participation threshold \( \delta_j \) provide the same output level \( y_j > 0 \) and receive the same consumption level \( c_j > 0 \). Second, all other agents provide zero output and receive the same consumption level \( c_0 \). Both properties are driven by the additive separability of the fixed cost component \( \delta \) in utility function (1), which follows the random participation approach by Rochet & Stole (2002).

Below, I will investigate the labor supply distortions in the optimal allocation. By Lemma 1, this can be done jointly for all agents in each skill group \( j \in J \). Consider an allocation in which the output level and the participation threshold of skill group \( j \) are

\[\text{For all welfare functions considered below, the welfare-maximizing allocation is ensured to be (second-best) Pareto efficient by standard reasons.}\]
given by \( y_j \) and \( \delta_j \), respectively. The labor supply distortions at both margins can be determined as follows.

First, labor supply in skill group \( j \) is said to be *downwards distorted at the intensive margin* if the marginal rate of substitution, \( h_y(y_j, \omega_j) \), is strictly smaller than 1, the economy’s marginal rate of transformation. Labor supply is said to be *upwards distorted at the intensive margin* if \( h_y(y_j, \omega_j) \) is strictly larger than 1. Intuitively, there is an intensive-margin distortion if the cost of a small increase in the skill-specific output \( y_j \) differs from the gain due to the additional consumption.

Second, labor supply in skill group \( j \) is said to be *distorted downward at the extensive margin* if the skill-specific participation threshold \( \delta_j := \max_{y>0} y - h(y, \omega_j) \), the first-best level of this threshold. Labor supply is said to be *distorted upward at the extensive margin* if \( \delta_j \) is strictly larger than \( y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) \). Intuitively, there is an extensive-margin distortion if the cost of entering the labor market, i.e., of a large increase in output, differs from the gain due to the additional consumption for some agents with fixed-cost types close to the skill-specific threshold \( \delta_j \).

The definition of distortions at the intensive margin is standard in the optimal tax literature. In contrast, the previous literature has not provided a definition of labor supply distortions at the extensive margin. Both definitions provided above follow from the same thought experiment, however, which I explain in detail in Appendix B.7.

Finally, an allocation is said to be efficient if it does not involve labor supply distortions at any margin. Using Lemma 1, the efficiency losses in all other allocations can be evaluated based on the implied *deadweight loss*, defined as

\[
DWL(c, y) := \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta^*(\omega_j)} g_j(\delta) [\delta^*(\omega_j) - \delta] \, d\delta \\
- \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta^*} g_j(\delta) [y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta] \, d\delta,
\]

where \( \delta_j = c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0 \) as derived in Lemma 1.

### 3.3 Decentralization

In Section 5 below, I provide the main results of this paper by characterizing the labor supply distortions in the optimal allocation at both margins. As I demonstrate in the following, these results can straightforwardly be translated into statements about the signs of the optimal marginal tax and the optimal participation tax.

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26For an agent with type \((\omega_j, \delta_j)\), the cost of entering the labor market and providing output \( y \) is given by \( \delta_j + h(y, \omega_j) \), while the associated gain in consumption utility equals \( y \).

27In Appendix B.8, I explain the derivation of (5) and show that the overall deadweight loss can be decomposed in efficiency losses from distortions at both margins.
Consider the class of social choice functions that are decentralized through non-linear income tax schedules, mapping output levels into tax payments. I denote by \((c_T, y_T)\) the social choice function that is decentralized by tax function \(T\). The literature also refers to \(y_T\) as pre-tax income, and to \(c_T\) as post-tax income. Tax function \(T\) is admissible if the tax revenue is non-negative, \(\int_{\Omega \times \Delta} T[y_T(\omega, \delta)] dK(\omega, \delta) \geq 0\).

The problem of an agent with type \((\omega, \delta)\) is to choose income \(y\) in order to maximize \(U(c, y; \omega, \delta)\), subject to the individual budget constraint \(c = y - T(y)\). To simplify the exposition, assume that \(T\) is continuously differentiable and weakly concave. Then, the solution to this program is given by

\[
y_T(\omega, \delta) = \begin{cases} 
y^*_T(\omega) & \text{if } \delta \leq \delta_T(\omega) \\
0 & \text{if } \delta > \delta_T(\omega),
\end{cases}
\]  

(6)

where \(y^*_T(\omega)\) is implicitly defined by

\[
1 - T'[y^*_T(\omega)] = h_y(y^*_T(\omega), \omega),
\]  

(7)

and \(\delta_T(\omega) := y^*_T(\omega) - h(y^*_T(\omega), \omega) - [T(y^*_T(\omega)) - T(0)]\).

The case distinction again results due to the additive separability imposed by \(1\). Conditional on working, the agent’s optimal income \(y^*_T(\omega)\) is defined by the first-order condition \(7\), which involves only his skill type \(\omega\) and the marginal tax \(T'\)\(^{28}\). Consequently, participating in the labor market can increase the agent’s utility at most by \(\delta_T(\omega)\), the net gain from increased consumption and increased effort costs. If and only if his fixed cost \(\delta\) is lower than \(\delta_T(\omega)\), the agent is better off providing the conditionally optimal output \(y^*_T(\omega)\) than zero output.

By the taxation principle, any implementable and Pareto-efficient allocation allocation can be decentralized by a non-linear tax schedule \(T\) so that \((c_T, y_T) = (c, y)\). The required properties of tax \(T\) depend on the labor supply distortions in allocation \((c, y)\). First, as usual, if labor supply in skill group \(j\) is downwards (upwards) distorted at the intensive margin, the marginal tax at income level \(y^*_T(\omega_j) = y_j\) must be strictly positive (negative). Second, if labor supply in skill group \(j\) is downwards distorted at the extensive margin, \(\delta_j < \delta^*(\omega_j)\), the participation tax \(T(y) - T(0)\) must be strictly positive at the income level that maximizes \(y - h(y, \omega_j)\)\(^{29}\). Correspondingly, if labor supply in skill group \(j\) is upwards distorted at the extensive margin, the participation tax at income level \(y^*_T(\omega_j) = y_j\) must be strictly negative. Intuitively, a positive (negative) participation tax is required to ensure that the agent chooses to inefficiently stay out of the labor market (to inefficiently work).

\(^{28}\)For the sake of clarity, this paragraph abstracts from the complications that may arise if \(T\) is not continuously differentiable or strictly convex.

\(^{29}\)As shown above, an agent self-selects zero income if his fixed cost type \(\delta\) exceeds \(y - h(y, \omega) - [T(y) - T(0)]\), the utility gain of participation, for all positive income levels.
3.4 The social objective

In optimal tax theory, the social objective is usually given by a welfare function that is taken to be an increasing function of individual utilities that gives rise to a “desire for redistribution” (Hellwig 2007). A standard assumption is that the welfare function can be expressed as

$$\int_{\Omega \times \Delta} \gamma(\omega, \delta) \Psi \left( c(\omega, \delta) - h(y(\omega, \delta), \omega) - \mathbb{1}_{y(\omega, \delta) > 0} \delta \right) dK(\omega, \delta),$$

where the transformation $\Psi : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing and weakly concave, and the weighting function $\gamma : \Omega \times \Delta \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is weakly decreasing in $\omega$ and weakly increasing in $\delta$. The desire for redistribution is either introduced through transformation $\Psi$ or through type-dependent weights $\gamma$; with quasi-linear preferences, it would not be present if welfare were given by the unweighted sum of individual utilities.

As common in the literature, I express the social concerns for redistribution by means of marginal welfare weights. By Lemma 1, the government can only redistribute resources between the $n + 1$ groups of agents who provide different output levels: the group of unemployed agents and the groups of workers with each skill type $\omega_j \in \Omega$. Hence, I focus on the average welfare weights associated to these groups, evaluated at the welfare-maximizing allocation. I define the welfare weight $\bar{\alpha}_j$ of the workers in skill group $j \in J$ as the marginal welfare effect of increasing the skill-specific consumption level $c_j$,

$$\bar{\alpha}_j := E_{\delta} \left[ \gamma(\omega_j, \delta) \Psi'(c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta) \right]_{\delta \leq \delta_j}.$$  
(9)

Correspondingly, I define the welfare weight $\bar{\alpha}_0$ of unemployed agents as the marginal welfare effect of increasing $c_0$, the consumption level of all unemployed agents,

$$\bar{\alpha}_0 := E_{\omega_j, \delta} \left[ \gamma(\omega_j, \delta) \Psi'(c_0) \right]_{\delta < \delta_j, j \in J}.$$  
(10)

The average weight across the population is given by

$$\bar{\alpha}_M := \int_{\Omega \times \Delta} \left[ (\bar{\alpha}_j - \bar{\alpha}_0) \mathbb{1}_{y(\omega, \delta) > 0} + \bar{\alpha}_0 \right] dK(\omega, \delta).$$  
(11)

In an economy with heterogeneity in skills only, the concavity of $\Psi$ and the monotonicity of $\gamma$ ensure that the sequence of welfare weights is monotonically decreasing over the skill distribution, i.e., that society has a standard concern for redistribution from higher-income earners to lower-income earners. In the economy with two-dimensional heterogeneity considered here, the same assumptions fail to ensure monotonic welfare weights. For example, the welfare weight of skill group $j$ may be larger than the welfare weight of a lower-skilled group $j - 1$ if the agents in the former group face on average
higher fixed costs of working. More generally, the slope of the welfare weights depends on the properties of $\Psi$ (and $\gamma$) as well as the joint type distribution $K$ [30].

Following Saez & Stantcheva (2016), the concept of marginal welfare weights can be generalized to capture redistributive preferences implied by non-welfarist objectives. Indeed, the recent public debate about expanding the EITC for childless workers did not refer to social welfare considerations. Instead, proponents of an EITC expansion – including President Obama and Paul Ryan, then Chairman of the House of Representatives Budget Committee – have primarily argued that the proposed reform would lift a substantial number of childless workers above the poverty line and reduce the depth of poverty for many more workers (Executive Office 2014, House Budget Committee 2014). In line with these observations, a number of previous papers suggest to consider the goal of alleviating poverty – as measured by the available income instead of individual utility – as a way to provide better insights into the real-world design of redistributive policies (Besley & Coate 1992, 1995, Kanbur et al. 1994, Saez & Stantcheva 2016).

In particular, Saez & Stantcheva (2016) suggest to formalize the goal of poverty gap reduction by setting generalized welfare weights equal to a constant $\alpha_p > 1$ for all agents with consumption below an exogenous poverty threshold $\bar{c} > 0$, and equal to some constant $\alpha_{np} \in [0, 1)$ for all agents with $c > \bar{c}$. In Appendix B.13 I consider a slightly generalized formalization that eliminates the discontinuity at the poverty threshold $\bar{c}$, while maintaining the basic pattern of piecewise constant, monotonically decreasing welfare weights [31].

In the remainder of this paper, I restrict my attention to social objectives that give rise to monotonically decreasing weight sequences, which seems to be the most natural and economically most relevant case. This restriction also simplifies the comparison of my results with those in the standard Mirrlees (1971) framework: With intensive-margin responses only, monotonic welfare weights ensure the positivity of the optimal marginal tax. If the optimal income tax turns out to have non-standard properties in my model, they must hence be driven by the interaction of labor supply responses at the intensive and extensive margins.

To simplify the exposition, I henceforth treat the group-specific welfare weights as if they were exogenous objects and denote them by $\alpha = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$. Without loss of generality, I focus on weight sequences that are normalized to have an average weight of 1. I denote the set of decreasing, normalized weight sequences by $A$.

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In Appendix B.9 I provide conditions on $\Psi$, $\gamma$ and $K$ that jointly ensure a monotonically decreasing sequence of social weights $\bar{\alpha}$. Additionally, I provide an example in which $\bar{\alpha}$ is locally increasing although $\Psi$ is strictly concave.

This generalization allows to capture the idea that the social planner may be concerned about pushing non-poor agents close to the poverty line. I discuss the relation of these formalizations to other poverty measures in Appendix B.13.
4 Assumptions

In Subsection 4.1, I impose a set of assumptions on the joint type distribution and the effort cost function, i.e., the primitives of the model. Subsection 4.2 clarifies the implications of these assumptions for labor supply elasticities. The relevance of each assumption for the results of this paper is discussed in the subsequent sections.

4.1 Assumptions on primitives

The first two conditions impose restrictions on the joint type distributions, expressed in terms of the hazard rates of fixed costs distributions. Fix a skill type $\omega_j$. Recall that $G_j$ denotes the cdf of the distribution of fixed cost types in the group of agents with this skill type. The hazard rate of this cdf is given by $A_j(\delta) := \frac{g_j(\delta)}{G_j(\delta)}$.

**Condition 1.** The joint type distribution has the following properties:

(i) For each $j \in J$, $A_j(\delta)$ is strictly decreasing in $\delta$.

(ii) For each $j \in J_{-n} := J \setminus \{n\}$ and $\delta \in \Delta$, $A_j(\delta) \geq A_{j+1}(\delta)$.

Condition 1 requires the hazard rates of $G_j$ to be decreasing along both type dimensions. Part (i) is a standard monotone hazard rate condition that is satisfied whenever the conditional fixed-cost distributions are log-concave. Part (ii) rules out a specific type of positive joint variation between skill types and fixed cost types. For some distribution functions, it is identical to the assumption that $G_j$ weakly dominates $G_{j+1}$ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.

The second condition compares the previously defined cdf hazard rate $A_j(\delta)$ with the hazard rate of the corresponding pdf in the same skill group $j$. I denote this pdf hazard rate by $a_j := \frac{g_j'(\delta)}{g_j(\delta)}$.

**Condition 2.** The joint type distribution has the following properties:

(i) For each $j \in J$, $a_j(\delta)$ is weakly decreasing in $\delta$ with $\frac{d a_j(\delta)}{d \delta} \in \left[2 \frac{d A_j(\delta)}{d \delta}, 0\right]$.

(ii) For each $j \in J_{-n}$ and $\delta \in \Delta$, $0 \leq a_j(\delta) - a_{j+1}(\delta) \leq 2 \left[A_j(\delta) - A_{j+1}(\delta)\right]$.

Condition 2 imposes two novel conditions that have not been used in the literature before. They require that the pdf hazard rate $a_j$ varies across both type dimensions in the same direction as the cdf hazard rate $A_j$, but at a sufficiently small rate compared to

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32The same assumption is used by Choné & Laroque (2011) and Jacquet et al. (2013). Scheuer (2014) imposes a similar but stricter assumption on the joint type distribution.

33In general, Condition 1 is neither implying nor implied by first-order stochastic dominance.

34For the discrete set of skills studied here, Condition 2 gives rise to a monotonicity result that simplifies the following analysis. With a continuous set of skills as in most previous papers, this monotonicity result would come for free.
the latter. Both parts of Condition 2 are satisfied, e.g., if the fixed cost distributions are uniform or logistic for all skill groups. Moreover, part (ii) trivially holds whenever skill types and fixed cost types are independently distributed.

The third condition imposes mild restrictions on the effort cost function $h$.

**Condition 3.** There are two numbers $\mu_1 \in (0, \infty)$ and $\mu_2 \in (0, \infty)$ such that, for each $y > 0$ and $\omega > \omega_1$, the effort cost function $h$ satisfies

(i) \( \frac{1}{y} \frac{h_y(y, \omega)}{h_{yy}(y, \omega)} \leq \mu_1 \), and

(ii) \( -\frac{\omega}{y} \frac{h_{\omega y}(y, \omega)}{h_{yy}(y, \omega)} \geq \mu_2 \).

Condition 3 is satisfied for all commonly used functional forms, including the class of functions given by $h(y, \omega) = \frac{1}{1+1/\sigma} \left( \frac{y}{\omega} \right)^{1+1/\sigma}$ for any $\sigma \in (0, \infty)$.

### 4.2 Implications for labor supply elasticities

Condition 1 puts a restriction on the relative responses at the extensive margin in different skill groups. It proves helpful to measure these responses by the semi-elasticity $\eta_j$ of participation, formally defined by

\[
\eta_j(c, y) := \frac{\partial G_j}{\partial c_j} \left( c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0 \right) \frac{1}{G_j(c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0)} = A_j(\delta_j)
\]

for each skill group $j \in J$.

Condition 1 ensures consistency with the stylized fact that low-skill workers respond more elastically at the extensive margin than high-skill workers (see, e.g., Juhn et al. 1991, 2002 and Meghir & Phillips 2010).

**Lemma 2.** For each $j \in J_{-n}$, skill group $j$ has a strictly larger semi-elasticity of participation than skill group $j + 1$, $\eta_j(c, y) > \eta_{j+1}(c, y)$, in every implementable allocation.

As can be seen from equation (12), the semi-elasticities of participation are endogenous objects that vary with allocation $(c, y)$. In particular, Condition 1 implies that a uniform increase in the consumption levels of workers in skill groups $j$ and $j + 1$ leads to a reduction in the semi-elasticities $\eta_j$ and $\eta_{j+1}$. The effect on the ratio of both semi-elasticities $\hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} := \eta_j/\eta_{j+1}$ can go in any direction and have any magnitude, however. Condition 2 rules out erratic fluctuations of $\hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}$ by imposing bounds on the semi-elasticity $\varepsilon_{\hat{\eta},c}$ of this ratio with respect to such a uniform transfer.\(^{37}\)

\[^{35}\text{In Appendix B.10 I provide a set of commonly used distribution functions for which Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.}\]

\[^{36}\text{More precisely, } \eta_j \text{ represents the semi-elasticity of the participation share } G_j(\delta_j) \text{ with respect to the net-of-tax income } c_j = y_j - T(y_j) \text{ faced by the workers with skill type } \omega_j. \text{ It indicates by how much percent the participation share in skill group } j \text{ increases if } c_j \text{ is increased by one unit.}\]

\[^{37}\text{Formally, I define the semi-elasticity of the relative participation responses } \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} \text{ as } \varepsilon_{\hat{\eta},c}(c, y) := \frac{\partial \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, 0)}{\delta_{j+1}} \frac{1}{\hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, 0)}, \text{ where } \hat{\eta}_j(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, c') = \frac{G_j(\delta_j + c')}{G_j(\delta_j + c')} \frac{G_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c')}{G_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c')} \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, c').\]
Lemma 3. For each \( j \in J_{-n} \), the semi-elasticity of the relative participation responses 
\( \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} := \eta_j/\eta_{j+1} \) with respect to uniform transfers satisfies
\[
|\varepsilon_{\hat{\eta},c}(c,y)| < \eta_j(c,y) - \eta_{j+1}(c,y).
\] (13)

For this inequality to hold, uniform transfers towards adjacent skill groups may increase or decrease the relative responses \( \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} \), but need to have sufficiently small effects in absolute terms. While \( \varepsilon_{\hat{\eta},c} \) is in principle an observable object, I am not aware of any empirical results on the effects of tax reforms on participation elasticities (and their ratios). Most relatedly, [Juhn et al. (1991, 2002)] find that relative participation elasticities for different percentiles of the wage distribution have hardly changed between the 70s and the late 80s. Besides, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that condition (13) is reasonably weak.38

Finally, Condition 3 puts mild restrictions on the labor supply responses at the intensive margin. Effectively, it ensures that the individually optimal income does not respond in a degenerate way to tax changes.

Lemma 4. For each \( j \in J \), the elasticity of income with respect to

(i) the retention rate \( 1 - T'(y) \) is bounded from above by some number \( \mu_1 \in (0, \infty) \);

(ii) the skill level \( \omega \) is bounded from below by some number \( \mu_2 \in (0, \infty) \).

Condition 3 can hence be regarded as a weak regularity condition that guarantees a minimal degree of consistency with the empirical evidence. It is worth noting that the results of this paper would be unaffected if I would directly assume the before-mentioned properties of labor supply elasticities to hold, instead of imposing assumptions on the primitives in the first place.

5 Results

In the following, I present the formal results of this paper. As [Jacquet et al. (2013)], I start by solving a relaxed version of the optimal tax problem. The analysis of this relaxed problem allows to build up intuition and, eventually, to construct the sufficient condition for an optimal EITC. I then turn to the non-relaxed problem and the main results of this paper on the optimal distortions at both margins. As explained in Subsection 3.3, these results can easily be translated into results on the optimal signs of marginal and

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38If the participation elasticities for low-skill workers with earnings $1,000 and $1,500 are both given by 0.5 as assumed by [Saez (2002)] and the income tax is approximated as in Section 7, the ratio \( \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} \) is given by 1.5. Hence, the semi-elasticity of participation in the first group is 50% higher than in the second group. Condition (13) requires this relative difference to remain between 32.3% and 67.7% after an (additional) uniform transfer of $500 to both groups.
participation taxes. The economic mechanism behind these results is explained in Section 6 below. In particular, Section 6 derives the key features of the optimum in a simplified setting that can be interpreted as an extended two-type model.

5.1 Preliminary results

I start by studying a relaxed version of the optimal tax problem that ignores the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints between working agents with different skill types. More precisely, I study the problem of maximizing social welfare \( s \) subject to the feasibility constraint \( f \) and the subset of IC constraints, first, between all agents with identical skill types,

\[
\forall \omega \in \Omega, \delta, \delta' \in \Delta, \quad u(c(\omega, \delta), y(\omega, \delta); \omega, \delta) \geq u(c(\omega, \delta'), y(\omega, \delta'); \omega, \delta)
\]

for each \( \omega \in \Omega \) and \( \delta, \delta' \in \Delta \), and second, between all unemployed agents,

\[
c(\omega, \delta) \geq c(\omega', \delta')
\]

for each pair \( (\omega, \delta) \) and \( (\omega', \delta') \) in \( \Omega \times \Delta \) such that \( y(\omega, \delta) = y(\omega', \delta') = 0 \).

Lemma 1 continues to apply to the set of allocations satisfying this reduced set of IC constraints. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem involves, first, pooling by all unemployed agents and, second, pooling by all working agents with the same skill type. Moreover, an agent with skill type \( \omega_j \) provides positive output if and only if his fixed cost type is below the skill-specific threshold \( \delta_j = c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0 \). As a result, the solution to the relaxed problem for the social weight sequence \( \alpha \) can be denoted by the vectors \( (c_{\alpha R}^n)_{j=0}^n \), \( (y_{\alpha R}^n)_{j=1}^n \) and \( (\delta_{\alpha R}^n)_{j=1}^n \).

**Lemma 5.** There is a number \( \chi \in (1, 2] \) such that, if \( \alpha_j \in [0, \chi) \) for all \( j \in J \), the relaxed problem has a unique solution that satisfies

\[
h_y(y_{\alpha R}^n, \omega_j) = 1 \quad \forall \ j \in J , \text{ and }
\]

\[
\delta_{\alpha R}^n - \delta^*(\omega_j) = \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{A_j(\delta_{\alpha R}^n)} \quad \forall \ j \in J .
\]

Lemma 5 shows that the insights from Lemma 1 in Jacquet et al. (2013) extend to my model with a discrete skill set and, additionally, clarifies the conditions for the existence of a well-behaved solution. In particular, it indicates that the relaxed problem is well-behaved if the social weights of all groups of workers are below some threshold \( \chi \in (1, 2] \). For higher social weights, in contrast, an allocation may satisfy the first-order conditions, but violate a second-order condition. This is a well-known problem for models with labor
supply responses at the extensive margin\footnote{Formally, the Lagrangian can become strictly convex in \( c_j \) for \( \alpha_j > \chi \). In this case, the welfare function may have multiple local extrema (see discussion in Choné & Laroque 2011). Jacquet et al. (2013) do not comment on this complication or on the conditions for a well-behaved solution.} The resulting technical complications are not directly related to the research question of this paper. Hence, I proceed by restricting my attention to a subset of social weight sequences for which the existence of a well-behaved solution is ensured. In particular, I define the set \( A^x \subset A \) as the subset of decreasing weight sequences for which each element \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) is below the threshold \( \chi \). All results in the remainder of this paper will be derived for weight sequences in \( A^x \).

Second, equations (16) and (17) characterize the labor supply distortions in the solution to the relaxed problem. At the intensive margin, optimal output \( y^{\alpha R} \) is undistorted in all skill groups. This does not come as a surprise, because the IC constraints between different skill groups have not been taken into account in the relaxed problem\footnote{In the classical model by Mirrlees (1971), distortions at the intensive margin are optimal because they allow to relax the binding (downwards) IC constraints between adjacent skill types.} At the extensive margin, in contrast, optimal output \( y^{\alpha R} \) can be distorted in both directions. In particular, labor supply is distorted downwards at the extensive margin in each skill group with a social weight below the average weight of 1, and distorted upwards in each skill group with a weight above 1. With decreasing social weights, upwards distortions can only be optimal at the bottom of the skill distribution, consequently.

These results give rise to the crucial questions whether the introduction of the previously omitted IC constraints, first, leads to downwards, upwards or no distortions at the intensive margin, and second, changes this simple pattern of distortions at the extensive margin. In particular, upwards distortions at the intensive margin can only be expected to be optimal if the solution to the relaxed problem violates the upward IC constraints,

\[
\alpha_j - 1 > \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{\eta_j + 1} + B_j,
\]

for some pairs of adjacent skill types \((\omega_j, \omega_{j+1})\). In an intensive-margin model à la Mirrlees (1971), this is impossible as long as social weights are decreasing, \( \alpha_j \geq \alpha_{j+1} \). In the present model with labor supply responses at both margins, the answer to this question is more subtle.

In the relaxed problem’s solution, the workers in skill group \( k \in \{ j, j+1 \} \) receive a bundle \((c_k, y_k)\) that satisfies

\[
\alpha_j - 1 > \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{\eta_j + 1} + B_j,
\]

where the term \( B_j \) is strictly positive and depends on the distance between \( \omega_j \) and \( \omega_{j+1} \).
and on $\varepsilon_{y,1-T'}$ and $\varepsilon_{y,\omega}$, the elasticities of income with respect to the retention rate and the skill level.

By equation (19), it mainly depends on two statistics whether the upward IC constraint between skill types $j$ and $j + 1$ is satisfied or violated: the social weights $\alpha_j$ and $\alpha_{j+1}$ and the semi-elasticities of participation $\eta_j$ and $\eta_{j+1}$. Recall that $\alpha_j$ is larger than $\alpha_{j+1}$ for all considered weight sequences, and that $\eta_j$ is larger than $\eta_{j+1}$ by Lemma 2. Hence, equation (19) provides two important insights. First, the upward IC constraint can only be violated if both social weights $\alpha_j$ and $\alpha_{j+1}$ are above the population average of 1 and relatively close to each other. Second, if this condition is met, then an increase in the relative participation responses $\eta_j / \eta_{j+1}$ makes the upward IC constraint more likely to be violated.

Both insights are limited by the fact that the semi-elasticities $\eta_j$ and $\eta_{j+1}$ are endogenous quantities that depend on the social weights $\alpha_j$ and $\alpha_{j+1}$. To proceed, I can however exploit that equation (19) implicitly defines a function $\beta^U_j : [0, \chi) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that the upward IC constraint is violated if and only if $\alpha_{j+1} > \beta^U_j(\alpha_j)$. Similarly, I can use equation (17) to define a function $\beta^D_j : [0, \chi) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that the downward IC constraint

$$c^\alpha_{j+1} - h(y^\alpha_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}) \geq c^\alpha_j - h(y^\alpha_j, \omega_j)$$

is violated if and only if $\alpha_{j+1} < \beta^D_j(\alpha_j)$. For both functions, there exist no closed-form expressions. Nevertheless, I can use them to study the conditions under which each local IC constraint is violated in allocation $(c^\alpha, y^\alpha)$. It is worth noting that the functions $\beta^D_j$ and $\beta^U_j$ can be distinguished if and only if the difference between the skill levels $\omega_j$ and $\omega_{j+1}$ is bounded away from zero. This distinction proves to be useful in the following, thereby illustrating the advantage of considering a discrete skill set.

**Lemma 6.** For each $j \in J_{-n}$, the functions $\beta^D_j$ and $\beta^U_j$ are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and satisfy $0 < \beta^D_j(x) < \beta^U_j(x) < \chi$ for any $x \in [0, \chi)$. For each $j \in J_{-n}$, there is a number $a_j > 1$ such that, if $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j \in (1, a_j)$,

(a) $\beta^D_j(x) < x$ if and only if $x$ is above a unique number $\beta^D_j \in (0, 1)$, and

(b) $\beta^U_j(x) < x$ if and only if $x$ is above a unique number $\beta^U_j \in (1, \chi)$.

Lemma 6 provides conditions under which the relaxed problem’s solution, first, violates the downward IC constraint, second, satisfies both IC constraints or, third, violates the upward IC constraint between the workers in skill groups $j$ and $j + 1$, depending only on the social weights $\alpha_j$ and $\alpha_{j+1}$. If the relative distance between skill levels $\omega_j$ and $\omega_{j+1}$

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41 In Appendix B.4, I formally derive the term $B_j$ and provide an approximation based on observable objects. For $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j \rightarrow 1$, the term $B_j$ vanishes.

42 When the difference between $\omega_j$ and $\omega_{j+1}$ vanishes, both functions converge to the single condition that Jacquet et al. (2013) provide for the model with a twofold continuous type set.
is sufficiently small, each of these three cases arises for some pair of social weights with \( \alpha_j \geq \alpha_{j+1} \). \footnote{If the relative distance between \( \omega_j \) and \( \omega_{j+1} \) exceeds the bound \( a_j \), the solution of the relaxed problem may satisfy both local IC constraints (or one of them) for all \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_{j+1} \) in \((0, \chi)\).}

Figure 1 illustrates the formal statements in Lemma 6 to make them more easily accessible. The shaded area below the 45° line comprises all relevant combinations of the social weights \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_{j+1} \leq \alpha_j \) in set \( \mathcal{A}^\chi \). Additionally, Figure 1 contains two ascending graphs corresponding to the functions \( \beta_j^D \) and \( \beta_j^U \) in Lemma 6. Each graph crosses the 45° line exactly once, i.e., each function has a unique fixed point. The fixed point \( \bar{\beta}_j \) of function \( \beta_j^D \) is located between 0 and the average weight 1. The fixed point \( \bar{\beta}_j \) of function \( \beta_j^U \) is located between the average weight 1 and the upper threshold \( \chi \). By Lemma 6, the functions \( \beta_j^D \) and \( \beta_j^U \) partition the relevant set of weights \( \mathcal{A} \) into three regions.

Figure 1: Local IC constraints in the relaxed problem’s solution

For each pair \((\alpha_j, \alpha_{j+1})\) in region I, the relaxed problem’s solution violates the downward IC constraint, i.e., higher-skilled workers consider their bundle \((c^\alpha_{j+1}, y^\alpha_{j+1})\) less attractive than the bundle of the lower-skilled workers, \((c_j, y_j)\). As can be seen from Figure 1, this constellation results if either both social weights are low (below \( \bar{\beta} \)) or if the difference between the social weights \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_{j+1} \) is large. In the first case, the planner has a strong desire to redistribute resources from the workers in skill groups \( j \) and \( j+1 \) to lower-skilled workers and/or unemployed agents. In the second case, the social planner has a strong desire to redistribute resources from the workers in the higher skill group \( j+1 \) to the workers in the lower skill group \( j \).

For each pair \((\alpha_j, \alpha_{j+1})\) in region II, the relaxed problem’s solution satisfies both local IC constraints, i.e., the workers in each skill group prefer their own bundle to the one designated for the other group. As can be seen from Figure 1, this constellation mainly occurs if both social weights are close to 1. In this case, the social planner has only a
limited desire to redistribute resources between both groups of workers and the average agent in the economy.

For each pair \((\alpha_j, \alpha_{j+1})\) in region III, the relaxed problem’s solution violates the upward IC constraint, i.e., lower-skilled workers consider the bundle \((c^R_{j+1}, y^R_{j+1})\) more attractive than their own bundle. Figure 1 shows that this constellation occurs if both social weights are above the fixed point \(\beta_j > 1\) and close enough to each other. Hence, the social planner has a strong concern for redistribution from higher-skilled workers to the workers in the skill groups \(j\) and \(j+1\), but only a limited desire to redistribute resources between the two skill groups. For example, this condition is met if the planner’s goal is to reduce the poverty gap, and both \(c_j\) and \(c_{j+1}\) are below the poverty line \(\bar{c}\) (see Section 3.4). By Lemma 5, labor supply in both skill groups is upwards distorted at the extensive margin in this case.

Summarizing, Lemma 6 clarifies that the relaxed problem’s solution may as usual conflict with downward incentive-compatibility. But it may also conflict with upward incentive compatibility even if the social weight sequence is decreasing, which is true for all weights in \(A^x\). In this case, upwards distortions at the intensive margin would be optimal if the social planner only had to account for the IC constraints between skill groups \(j\) and \(j+1\). The main results in the following subsection provide conditions under which the same is true in the optimal (second-best) allocation, i.e., when the full set of local IC constraints is taken into account.

5.2 Main results

In the following, I characterize the labor supply distortions in the optimal allocation, i.e., the solution to the non-relaxed problem. I start by identifying a set of properties that are satisfied for any strictly decreasing weight sequence in set \(A^x\).

**Proposition 1.** For each \(\alpha \in A^x\), the optimal tax problem has a unique solution \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\) with \(\delta_j \in [\delta, \bar{\delta})\) for all \(j \in J\). In this solution,

(i) the consumption level \(c^\alpha_0\) of the unemployed is strictly positive;

(ii) there is a number \(k^\alpha \in (0, n)\) such that optimal output is

a) upwards distorted at the extensive margin in skill group \(j\) if and only if \(j \leq k^\alpha\), and

b) downwards distorted or undistorted at the intensive margin in skill group \(j\) if \(j > k^\alpha\);

(iii) optimal output in the highest skill group \(n\) is undistorted at the intensive margin and downwards distorted at the extensive margin.
Importantly, Proposition 1 clarifies the optimal income tax has the following common properties for any decreasing sequence of social weights: First, the optimal unemployed benefit is strictly positive. Second, upward distortions at the extensive margin can only be optimal in the lowest skill groups with \( j \leq k^\alpha \), and upward distortions at the intensive margin can only be optimal in a subset of these low-skill groups. Crucially, this implies that upward distortions at the extensive margin are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the optimality of upward distortions at the intensive margin. Third, Proposition 1 qualifies the classical no distortion at the top result. At the intensive margin, labor supply by the most productive workers is always undistorted as in Mirrlees (1971). At the extensive margin, in contrast, labor supply in the top skill group is always downwards distorted.

Apart from these common properties, there are substantial differences between the optimal allocations for alternative social weights in \( \mathcal{A}^x \). In the following, I focus on the social weights in specific subsets of \( \mathcal{A}^x \).

**Definition 1.** For each \( k \in \{2, \ldots, n-1\} \), set \( \mathcal{A}_k^U \) contains all welfare weight sequences \( \alpha \in \mathcal{A}^x \) such that

\[
\text{(i) } \alpha_{j+1} \geq \beta_j^U(\alpha_j) \text{ for all } j \in \{1, \ldots, k-1\} \text{ with at least one strict inequality, and}
\]

\[
\text{(ii) } \alpha_{j+1} \geq \beta_j^D(\alpha_j) \text{ for all } j \in \{k, \ldots, n-1\}.
\]

The construction of set \( \mathcal{A}_k^U \) can be illustrated using Figure 1 above. In this figure, any weight sequence \( \alpha \in \mathcal{A}^x \) can be depicted as an ascending scatter plot consisting of \( n-1 \) points, representing the weight-pairs \( (\alpha_j, \alpha_{j+1}) \) for all \( j \in J_n \). For simplicity, assume that the functions \( \beta_j^D \) and \( \beta_j^U \) were identical for all \( j \in J_n \). Then, for any sequence of social weights in \( \mathcal{A}_k^U \), the first \( k-1 \) weight-pairs \( (\alpha_1, \alpha_2), \ldots, (\alpha_{k-1}, \alpha_k) \) are located in region III in the upper right part of Figure 1 while each of the remaining weight-pairs is either located in region III or in the intermediate region II. The social weight sequence hence represents a social planner with a pronounced concern for redistribution from highly skilled workers to low-skill workers, but only a limited concern for redistribution among the workers in the lowest skill groups.

For any \( k \in \{2, \ldots, n-1\} \) and any weight sequence in the set \( \mathcal{A}_k^U \), the labor supply distortions in the optimal allocation can be characterized as follows.

**Proposition 2.** For any \( \alpha \in \mathcal{A}_k^U \), optimal output \( y^\alpha \) is

- upwards distorted at the extensive margin in skill groups \( \{1, \ldots, k\} \), and
- upwards distorted at the intensive margin in skill groups \( \{2, \ldots, k\} \).

\(^{44}\) It should be noted that this includes the case \( k^\alpha < 1 \), in which labor supply in all skill groups is (weakly) downwards distorted at both margins.
By Proposition 2, the optimal allocation involves upward distortions at both margins for any social weights in the set $A^U_k$. In particular, labor supply in the $k$ lowest skill groups is upwards distorted at the extensive margin, and labor supply by all workers with skill types $\omega_j \in \{\omega_2, \ldots, \omega_k\}$ is upwards distorted at the intensive margin. This optimal allocation can only be decentralized by an income tax with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes at low income levels. Proposition 2 hence provides a sufficient condition for the optimality of an EITC, expressed in terms of social welfare weights only. In Appendix B.1, I complement this result by two necessary conditions for the optimality of an EITC.\footnote{In particular, I identify social welfare weights for which the optimal marginal income tax is (a) strictly positive everywhere below the top or (b) zero at all relevant income levels.}

It is important to emphasize, however, that these social weights are endogenous objects that depend on the properties of the social objective and on the joint type distribution $K$. Hence, the previous result is only relevant if there exist plausible objective functions for which a weight sequence in the set $A^U_k$ arises endogenously (for some $k \in J$). In Section 3.4, I discuss two types of social objectives: classical welfare functions as considered by Mirrlees (1971), and the goal of poverty alleviation as considered by Kanbur et al. (1994) and Saez & Stantcheva (2016). With respect to the former, I focus on welfare functions that involve a transformation $\Psi : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ and a type-dependent weighting function $\gamma : \Omega \times \Delta \to \mathbb{R}^+$ with standard properties. More precisely, a welfare function $(\Psi, \gamma)$ is said to be regular if (a) $\Psi$ is strictly increasing and weakly concave and (b) $\gamma$ is weakly decreasing in $\omega$ and weakly increasing in $\delta$.

**Proposition 3.** There are two numbers $a^k_U > 1$, $m^k \geq k + 1$ and two vectors $(\phi^k_j)_{j=1}^{n_k}$, $(\delta^k_j)_{j=1}^{n_k}$ with $\phi^k_{j+1} \geq \phi^k_j$ for all $j \in J_n$, $\phi^k_j \geq 1$ for $j \geq m^k$ and $\delta^k_j \in (\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta})$ for all $j \in J$ such that, if

(a) $\omega_{j+1} / \omega_j < a^k_j$ for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\}$,

(b) $n \geq m^k$ and

(c) $\sum_{j=1}^{n_k} f_j G_j(\delta^k_j) \phi^k_j > 1$,

there exist regular welfare functions for which $\tilde{\alpha} \in A^U_k$.

Proposition 3 provides three conditions that jointly ensure the existence of well-behaved welfare functions for which an Earned Income Tax Credit with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes is optimal. Although these conditions appear complicated, they can easily be interpreted.

Condition (a) requires the relative distance between each pair of adjacent skill types $(\omega_j, \omega_{j+1})$ to be sufficiently small. It can hence be seen as a technical regularity condition with respect to the skill set $\Omega$.\footnotemark
The remaining two conditions ensure that there is a sufficiently large share of workers with higher skill types than $\omega_k$. By condition (b), the cardinality $n$ of the skill set $\Omega$ has to be equal to (or above) some finite threshold $m^k \geq k + 1$. Recall that the ratio $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j$ is assumed to exceed $1 + \varepsilon$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$. Hence, condition (b) requires the relative difference between the highest skill type $\omega_n$ and skill type $\omega_k$ to be large enough.

By condition (c), the population share of the agents with high skill types ($\omega_{m^k}$ or higher) and low fixed cost types has to be sufficiently large. To see this, note that the condition compares a weighted average over the increasing sequence $\phi^k = (\phi^k_1, \phi^k_2, \ldots, \phi^k_n)$ with 1. Each element $\phi^k_j$ is weighted by the population share of the agents with skill type $\omega_j$ and fixed cost types below some threshold $\delta^k_j$ (i.e., the agents in skill group $j$ with the largest preference for participating in the labor market). By construction, element $\phi^k_j$ is smaller than 1 for all skill groups below the threshold $m^k$, and larger than 1 for all higher skill groups. Hence, condition (c) is certainly satisfied if the population share $\sum_{j=m^k}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta^k_j)$ of highly productive agents is close to 1, and certainly violated if the same population share is close to zero.

Proposition 8 in Appendix B.13 provides a similar result for the case where the social objective is to reduce the poverty gap. Recall that this case can be formalized by specifying generalized welfare weights $\tilde{\alpha}$ that are constant and equal to $\alpha_p > 1$ for all skill groups with consumption below the poverty line $\bar{c}$. Such welfare weights unambiguously satisfy condition (b) in Definition 1 for all low-skill groups $j$, $j + 1$ with $c_{j+1} \leq \bar{c}$, as long as the relative distance $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j$ is sufficiently small. If two conditions resembling (b) and (c) are satisfied, there exists a monotonically decreasing sequence of welfare weights associated to the remaining skill groups such that condition (ii) in Definition 1 is satisfied as well. Hence, the optimal tax can also be given by an EITC if the social planner’s goal is to reduce the poverty gap.

Implicitly, Proposition 3 also provides insights about the optimal location of the phase-in endpoint, i.e., the highest income level for which the optimal marginal tax can still be negative. To see this, fix the type distribution $K$. It can be shown that the threshold $m^k$ is monotonically increasing in the level of the threshold skill group $k$, the highest skill group with upwards distortions at the intensive margin. Thus, the higher income level $y$ is, the harder to satisfy are conditions (b) and (c), the optimality conditions for $T'(y) < 0$.

In particular, there is a unique critical value $\bar{k} \leq n - 1$ such that both conditions are jointly satisfied if and only if $k$ is below $\bar{k}$. Put differently, Proposition 3 implies that the optimal allocation can only involve upwards distortions for workers in skill group $j \leq \bar{k}$.

From an applied perspective, results on the exact location of the critical skill $\omega_k$ and on the income range with optimally negative marginal taxes would be of primary interest. In principle, the conditions in Proposition 3 allow to determine $\omega_k$ precisely, given

\[\text{Hence, the endpoint of the EITC phase-in range is never located above the optimal income of workers in threshold group } \bar{k}.\]
appropriate information about the effort cost function and the joint type distribution. Unfortunately, these objects cannot be observed directly. In the next sections and in Appendix B, however, I use three strategies to derive additional insights on the optimality of upwards distortions at the intensive margin.

First, I calibrate the model to the US economy in Section 7, matching empirical moments such as the income distribution and labor supply elasticities. For the calibrated model, I am able to determine the critical skill level \( \omega_k \) and the corresponding (phase-in) income range numerically. Second, Lemma 25 in Appendix B.3 provides an upper bound on the critical skill \( \omega_k \), which is mainly expressed in terms of observable quantities such as the joint type distribution and labor supply elasticities. Third, I use this upper bound to show that the potential optimality of negative marginal taxes remains valid if the skill set converges from a discrete set to an interval in Appendix B.6. These additional results hence suggest that the main result of this paper – the potential optimality of negative marginal taxes – is both robust and empirically relevant.

6 The tradeoff between intensive efficiency and extensive efficiency

In the following section, I explain the economic mechanism behind Propositions [1] to [3]. The optimal pattern of labor supply distortions is driven by, first, the standard trade-off between equity and efficiency and, second, a previously neglected trade-off between labor supply distortions at both margins. The section focuses on an auxiliary problem that helps to isolate the latter trade-off and clarify its implications for the optimal allocation.

In particular, consider the auxiliary problem to maximize efficiency subject to a reduced set of incentive compatibility constraints and to the constraint that some fixed amount of resources is redistributed from the high-skill workers to the unemployed agents and the low-skill workers. More precisely, the planner’s problem is to minimize the deadweight loss from labor supply distortions over the set of feasible allocations, subject to the constraint that the exogenous amount \( R > 0 \) of resources is transferred from the set of workers with skill type \( \omega_3 \) and higher to the set of unemployed agents and workers with skill types \( \omega_1 \) and \( \omega_2 \),

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \left[ 1 - G_j(\delta_j) \right] c_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{2} f_j G_j(\delta_j)(c_j - y_j) = \sum_{j=3}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j) = R , \quad (21)
\]

[47] For the third point, I focus on an example with simple functional forms that allows to derive a limit result on the optimal phase-in range.

[48] At the end of this section, I also comment on the differences between this auxiliary problem and the optimal tax problem studied above.
and to the incentive compatibility constraints between all agents with identical skills
(14), between all unemployed agents (15), and between the workers in the lowest two
skill groups,

\[ c_2 - h(y_2, \omega_2) \geq c_1 - h(y_1, \omega_2), \]  
(22)

\[ c_1 - h(y_1, \omega_1) \geq c_2 - h(y_2, \omega_1). \]  
(23)

I henceforth refer to this program as the problem of efficient redistribution, and denote
its solution by the vectors \( c^E, y^E \) and \( \delta^E \). The following lemma identifies the labor supply
distortions in this solution.

**Lemma 7.** Consider a redistribution amount \( R > 0 \) such that the solution \((c^E, y^E)\) to
the efficient distribution problem exists and is interior.

(i) Output \( y^E \) is upwards distorted at the extensive margin in skill groups 1 and 2.

(ii) There is a number \( a^E > 1 \) such that, if \( \omega_2/\omega_1 \in (1, a^E) \), output \( y^E \) is upwards
distorted at the intensive margin in skill group 2.

By Lemma 7, redistributing resources in the most efficient way requires to distort
labor supply of low-skill workers upwards at both margins. This result holds whenever,
first, the distance between skill groups 1 and 2 is sufficiently small and, second, the
problem has an interior solution. The first qualification is related to the assumption of a
discrete skill set and will become clear below. The second qualification has to be made
because the problem may fail to have a well-behaved solution for high levels of \( R \). In
particular, it may be impossible to collect the required amount of resources from the
high-skilled workers due to Laffer curve effects.\(^{49}\) Besides, the solution for high levels of
\( R \) may involve labor market participation by all low-skill agents, i.e., a boundary solution
with extreme upward distortions. As both problems have no relevance for the optimal
income tax problem and the trade-off between intensive efficiency and extensive efficiency,
I henceforth focus on cases with a well-behaved solution.

Before I proceed by explaining the economic intuition behind Lemma 7, it is worth
emphasizing the crucial role of the redistribution target for the optimality of upwards
distortions. If the social planner’s objective were to maximize efficiency subject to meeting
some exogenous revenue requirement \( B > 0 \) (replacing the redistribution target \( R > 0 \)),
the optimal allocation would involve downwards distortions at both margins, in contrast
to Lemma 7. I provide a rigorous treatment of this alternative problem in Appendix
B.12.\(^{50}\)

\(^{49}\) The more resources are transferred from high-skill workers to unemployed agents, the more high-skill
workers become unemployed. Hence, the level of transfers is bounded from above.

\(^{50}\) The trade-off between distortions at both margins arises in the efficient funding problem as well.
There, however, it explains why the social planner should set strictly positive marginal taxes even
though he has no concerns for redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Upward distortions at the extensive margin. I start by explaining why efficient redistribution \( y^E \) gives rise to upward distortions at the extensive margin in both low-skill groups, i.e., why the participation threshold \( \delta^E_j \) exceeds its first-best level \( \delta^*(\omega_j) \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) (first part of Lemma 7). Assume first that the local IC constraints between the workers in skill groups 1 and 2 are not binding and can hence be ignored. In this case, the efficiency-maximizing allocation \((c^E, y^E)\) does not involve distortions at the intensive margin. Hence, the social planner only faces the problem to minimize the deadweight loss from distortions at the extensive margin.

For each \( j \in \{1, 2\} \), the optimal level of the participation threshold \( \delta^E_j \) is implicitly defined by the first-order condition with respect to \( c_j \),

\[
\delta^E_j - \delta^*(\omega_j) = c^E_j - y^E_j - c^E_0 = \frac{\lambda_E}{1 - \lambda_E} \frac{1}{\eta_j(c^E, y^E)} > 0 ,
\]

where \( \lambda_E \) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that \( R \) resources have to be transferred to the unemployed and the working poor. Equation (24) has two crucial implications.

First, low-skill labor supply is upwards distorted at the extensive margin whenever the redistribution constraint is binding, i.e., the amount \( R \) is strictly positive. Put differently, efficient redistribution always involves larger transfers to the low-skilled workers than to the unemployed. To provide the economic intuition behind this result, consider an initial allocation in which labor supply in both low-skill groups is undistorted at both margins. This requires that, first, the output levels \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) satisfy

\[ h_y(y_1, \omega_1) = h_y(y_2, \omega_2) = 1 \]

and, second, identical transfers are provided to the low-skill workers and the unemployed agents,

\[ c_1 - y_1 = c_2 - y_2 = c_0 > 0 . \]

Feasibility requires that these transfers are paid by the high-skill workers, i.e., \( y_j - c_j > 0 \) for all \( j \geq 3 \). Hence, labor supply in the high-skill groups must be downwards distorted at the extensive margin.

Assume now that the planner reduces the consumption level \( c_0 \) of the unemployed and increases the consumption levels \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) of the working poor in a budget-balancing way, holding \( R \) constant. This has two effects on labor supply. First, some previously unemployed agents in both low-skill groups start working, creating an upwards distortion at the extensive margin. Initially, this only leads to a negligible (second-order) increase in the deadweight loss, because labor supply in these groups was undistorted before. Second, some previously unemployed agents in all high-skill groups start working due to the reduction in \( c_0 \). This response leads to a first-order reduction in the deadweight loss, because labor supply was downwards distorted at the extensive margin before and is less so now. Hence, providing larger transfers to the low-skilled workers than to the unemployed increases extensive efficiency, although it leads to upward distortions at the extensive margin.

\[ \text{Note that } \lambda_E \text{ takes a value in the interval (0, 1) for any } R > 0 \text{ such that } (c^E, y^E) \text{ is interior.} \]
extensive margin. Figure 2a illustrates this insight by depicting the solid red tax schedule \( P_1P_2 \), under which the transfers to both types of low-skill workers are identical and larger than the unemployment benefit \( c_0 \). Figure 2b depicts the corresponding allocation with output-consumption bundles \( P'_1 \) and \( P'_2 \).

Second, the first-order conditions with respect to \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) imply that the workers in both low-skill groups receive different transfers. It is worth noting that, if the local IC constraints between both low-skill groups are ignored, the problem of efficient redistribution is structurally identical to the Ramsey problem of optimal commodity taxation. Accordingly, equation (24) represents an inverse elasticity rule: The transfer to skill group \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) has to be proportional to the inverse of the semi-elasticity \( \eta_j \) of participation.\(^{52}\) Recall that the relative sizes of participation responses are pinned down by Condition 1: \( \eta_1 \) exceeds \( \eta_2 \) in every implementable allocation (see Lemma 2). For any \( R > 0 \), the efficiency-maximizing allocation must hence involve strictly larger transfers to the higher-skilled workers than to the lower-skilled workers, \( c_2^E - y_2^E > c_1^E - y_1^E \). In Figure 2a, the implied tax schedule is depicted by the dashed blue line \( Q_1Q_2 \), while Figure 2b depicts the corresponding allocation that satisfies the inverse elasticity rule.

Additionally, the dashed arrows in Figure 2b illustrate the behavioral changes that are induced by switching from the horizontal tax schedule \( P_1P_2 \) to the decreasing schedule \( Q_1Q_2 \). First, as the transfers to workers in skill group 1 are reduced, some of these leave the labor market and become unemployed. Second, as the transfers to workers in skill group 2 are increased, some previously unemployed agents in skill group 2 start working. The former response decreases the initial upwards distortions, while the latter response increases upwards distortions. Because the former group responds more strongly at the participation margin, however, the net effect is positive: the decreasing tax schedule \( Q_1Q_2 \) induces less distortions at the extensive margin than the horizontal schedule \( P_1P_2 \).

\(^{52}\)Note that the classical inverse elasticity rule is expressed in terms of standard elasticities instead of semi-elasticities.
Upward distortions at the intensive margin. By the previous paragraph, the solution to the problem of efficient redistribution involves higher transfers to the workers in skill group 2 than to the less skilled workers in group 1. This gives rise to the question whether the allocation defined by equation (24) and the redistribution constraint (21) violates the upward IC constraint. As Lemma 7 indicates, the answer to this question is positive whenever the skill set is sufficiently “dense”, i.e., the distance between skill levels $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$ is sufficiently small.

Note that the formal derivation of this crucial result involves a non-standard complication. In particular, the violation of the upward IC constraint cannot be verified directly for specific skill distances, as I have not imposed any functional form assumptions on the effort cost function $h$ and the joint type distribution $K$. The formal proof resolves this problem by studying how the participation threshold $\delta^E_2$ is affected by variations in the skill level $\omega_2$. In particular, I first investigate the optimal relation between $\delta^E_1$ and $\delta^E_2$ for the limit case where $\omega_2$ equals $\omega_1$. Second, I show that the allocation defined by (24) violates the upward IC constraint after a marginal increase in $\omega_2$ whenever Condition 1 is satisfied.

The previous arguments have clarified that the upward IC constraint is binding in $(c^E, y^E)$ if the distance between $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$ is small enough. Assume that this condition is met. In this case, the social planner cannot set the transfers to both groups of low-skill workers according to the inverse elasticity rule (24) and avoid distortions at the intensive margin at the same time. Specifically, to satisfy the inverse elasticity rule, he has to relax the upward IC constraint by distorting labor supply $y_2$ upwards at the intensive margin. In Figure 2a, this upwards distortion is illustrated by the increase in output from $y_2$ (under the horizontal tax schedule $P_1P_2$) to $y_2'$ (under the decreasing tax schedule $Q_1Q_2$). Hence, the planner can only increase extensive efficiency if he reduces intensive efficiency and vice versa. This trade-off constitutes a major difference between the problem of efficient redistribution studied here and the standard Ramsey problem.

To minimize the overall deadweight loss (5), the planner has to implement the allocation that equates the marginal deadweight losses from distortions at both margins, representing the optimal compromise between intensive efficiency and extensive efficiency. In Figure 2a, this optimal compromise is given by a weighted average between the tax schedules $P_1P_2$ and $Q_1Q_2$. This compromising tax schedule is unambiguously decreasing, but less so than the dashed blue schedule $Q_1Q_2$. Formally, the efficiency-maximizing allocation has to satisfy

$$\frac{f_2G_2(\delta^E_2)}{h_y(y^E_2, \omega_2)} \left[ h_y(y^E_2, \omega_2) - 1 \right] = \Lambda \left\{ \eta_1 \left[ \delta^E_1 - \delta^*(\omega_1) \right] - \eta_2 \left[ \delta^E_2 - y^E_2 + h(y^E_2, \omega_2) \right] \right\} > 0,$$

(25)

53 By the previous arguments, the downward IC constraint is trivially satisfied for any $R \geq 0.$
where $\Lambda := \left[ f_1 f_2 G_1(\delta_1^E) G_2(\delta_2^E) \right] / \left[ f_1 G_1(\delta_1^E) + f_2 G_2(\delta_2^E) \right]$. 

For the interpretation of this condition, consider a marginal increase in $y_2$, which relaxes the upward IC constraint and hence allows to raise the difference between the transfers to the workers in skill groups 1 and 2. The left-hand side of equation (25) captures the induced increase in the intensive deadweight loss. In particular, the term in the numerator states the difference between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation, while the term in the denominator quantifies the extent to which the upward IC is relaxed.

The right-hand side of (25) captures the reduction in the extensive deadweight loss that results from raising the difference between both transfers. In particular, the term in brackets evaluates how much the allocation $(c^E, y^E)$ deviates from the inverse elasticity rule (24). The larger this term is, the more beneficial it is to distort $y_2$ upwards in order to increase the difference between both transfers.54

Summing up, the solution to the auxiliary problem of efficient redistribution involves upward distortions in labor supply at both margins. Note that these insights extend to a more general version of the efficient redistribution problem in which the planner wants to redistribute resources to the unemployed and the workers with the lowest $k \in (2, n)$ skill types (from all higher-skilled workers), and takes into account the local IC constraints between all workers with skill types $\omega_1$ to $\omega_k$. In this case, the efficiency-maximizing allocation involves upward distortions at the extensive margin in the skill groups 1 to $k$, and upward distortions at the intensive margin in the skill groups 2 to $k$. As shown in Subsection 3.3 this allocation can be decentralized through an EITC-type income tax schedule with negative participation taxes and negative marginal taxes for low-skill workers.

Finally, it should be noted that the tradeoff between intensive and extensive efficiency also provides the intuition for the potential optimality of an EITC in the optimal tax problem (see Propositions 1 to 3). Of course, this tradeoff does not provide a complete explanation for my results. In particular, the optimal tax problem differs in two crucial aspects from the auxiliary problem studied above: First, the social planner has concerns for redistribution among the poor, i.e., between the working poor and the unemployed. Second, the planner has to take into account all local incentive-compatibility constraints, instead of only those between low-skill workers. Intuitively, both aspects tend to increase the optimal levels of marginal taxes and participation taxes. Propositions 2 and 3 and their formal proofs in Appendix A show, however, that an EITC with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes remains optimal for all regular welfare functions that give rise to welfare sequences in any of the sets $A_2^U$, $A_3^U$, etc.55

54Note that equation (25) is also satisfied if the distance between both skill levels $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$ is above the threshold $a_E$. In this case, allocation $(c^E, y^E)$ satisfies the inverse elasticity rule and involves no distortion at the intensive margin. Thus, both sides of the equation equal zero.

55For the first aspect, Lemmas 5 and 6 show that upwards distortions at both margins remain optimal
7 Numerical simulations

The theoretical analysis above has shown that an EITC with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes at the bottom of the income distribution can be optimal, both in the case of regular welfare functions and the goal of poverty alleviation. Given its generality, however, this analysis cannot provide clear insights on quantitative aspects of this result, such as the income range on which an EITC should apply and the optimal levels of negative marginal and participation taxes. To make progress on these quantitative questions, I calibrate the model to match a set of empirical moments for the US economy. This allows me to numerically simulate the optimal income tax for specific sequences of welfare weights. I find that an optimal EITC can be quantitatively large in terms of the income range as well as the levels of (negative) marginal and participation tax rates. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that these conclusions are robust to variations in the labor supply elasticities at both margins (see Appendix B.3).

7.1 Calibration

To calibrate the model to the US economy, I target empirical estimates of the labor supply elasticities at both margins and the income distribution among workers in the US. This requires to impose further assumptions on the individual preferences and the joint type distribution of skills and fixed costs of working. I focus on childless singles in the US in order to, first, ensure consistency with the theoretical model studied above, which does not account for labor supply decisions within families, and second, relate to recent proposals to expand the EITC for childless workers in the US. To simplify comparisons with the previous literature, I closely follow the calibration by Jacquet et al. (2013).

First, a large literature estimates the elasticity of labor income with respect to the retention rate \(1 - T'(y)\) among workers. According to the survey by Saez et al. (2012), the best available estimates are in the range between 0.32 and 0.4. To match these numbers, I assume that the effort cost function is given by

\[
h(y^i, \omega^i) = \frac{\sigma}{1 + \sigma} \left( \frac{y^i}{\omega^i} \right)^{1+1/\sigma}.
\]

(26)

For this functional form, the elasticity of income with respect to the retention rate is equal to parameter \(\sigma\) for all individuals. I set \(\sigma\) equal to 0.3, slightly above the center of the range of empirical estimates.\[^{56}\]

[^56]: In Appendix B.3, I alternatively consider elasticities equal to 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. Besides, recall that the quasi-linearity of the utility function (1) assumes away income effects in labor supply. Because empirical studies tend to find small and often insignificant income effects, this seems to be an

if and only if the concerns for redistribution among the poor are sufficiently weak. For the second aspect, Appendix B.11 explains why optimal labor supply in skill groups 2 to \(k\) remains upwards distorted for all \(\alpha \in \mathcal{A}_k\), even if the entire set of IC constraints is taken into account.

[^56]: In Appendix B.3, I alternatively consider elasticities equal to 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. Besides, recall that the quasi-linearity of the utility function (1) assumes away income effects in labor supply. Because empirical studies tend to find small and often insignificant income effects, this seems to be an
Second, the empirical literature consistently finds that participation elasticities are decreasing over the skill distribution. Besides, participation responses differ considerably across gender and family type (e.g., Juhn et al. 1991, 2002, Eissa & Hoynes 2004 and Meghir & Phillips 2010).\(^{57}\) Recall that the participation elasticity in each skill group depends on the skill-specific distribution of fixed cost. Unfortunately, there is no evidence on the shape of these fixed cost distributions to the best of my knowledge. Given the lack of better alternatives, I calibrate the conditional fixed cost distributions exactly as in Jacquet et al. (2013).

In the first step, I specify the pattern of skill-specific participation elasticities and employment shares to target. In particular, I assume that the participation elasticity \(\pi_j = A_j(\delta_j)(c_j - c_0)\) and the employment rate \(L_j = G_j(\delta_j)\) in skill group \(j\) are given by

\[
\pi_j = 0.5 - 0.1 \left( \frac{\omega_j - \omega_1}{\omega_n - \omega_1} \right)^{1/3}, \quad \text{and} \quad L_j = 0.7 + 0.1 \left( \frac{\omega_j - \omega_1}{\omega_n - \omega_1} \right)^{1/3},
\]

respectively (under the current US tax system). Hence, skill-specific participation elasticities decrease from 0.5 in the lowest skill group to 0.4 in the highest skill group.\(^{58}\) In contrast, skill-specific employment rates increase from 0.7 in the lowest skill group to 0.8 in the highest skill group.\(^{59}\)

In the second step, I assume that fixed costs are distributed according to a logistic distribution of the form

\[
G_j(\delta) = \frac{\exp(-\psi_j + \rho_j \delta)}{1 + \exp(-\psi_j + \rho_j \delta)},
\]

in each skill group \(j\). For each \(j \in J\), the parameters \(\psi_j\) and \(\rho_j\) are chosen to match the levels of the participation elasticity \(\pi_j\) and the employment share \(L_j\) specified by (27). Note that the functional form of (28) ensures that the employment share is between 0 and 1 and that labor supply responds at the extensive margin in each skill group for any admissible tax function \(T\).

I calibrate the unconditional skill distribution to match the observed income distribution in the US economy. Specifically, I estimate the latter distribution based on labor income data for childless singles at ages 25 to 60 in the March 2016 CPS.\(^{60}\) Using the OECD tax database, I approximate the US income tax in 2015 for childless singles by acceptable simplification (see also Jacquet et al. 2013).

Typical estimates are in the range between 0.3 and 0.6 for low-skilled men and around 0.05 for high-skilled men. The literature mostly finds much higher participation elasticities for women, often even above 1 (especially for lone mothers and women from disadvantaged backgrounds).\(^{58}\) In Appendix B.3 I also consider a case with lower participation elasticities (between 0.4 and 0.3), and a case with more heterogeneous participation elasticities (between 0.6 and 0.3).\(^{59}\) In the calibrated model, the unconditional share of non-workers among childless singles is given by 23.4\% under the current US tax system.\(^{60}\) In particular, I compute for each worker his average income for each week in employment according to the CPS data. To calculate an agent’s skill, I then multiply the weekly income by 52 to get individually optimal incomes conditional on working the entire year.
a linear tax function with marginal tax rate 29.3\%  \textsuperscript{(OECD 2017)}\textsuperscript{61} Based on this approximation, I can use the first-order condition of the individual optimization program to back out the skill type of each CPS respondent with strictly positive labor income.

I consider a discrete skill set with \( n = 96 \) skill types, where the relative distance between each pair of adjacent skill types is equal to \( \omega_{j+1}/\omega_j = 1.05 \). Compared to most previous papers, this can be considered as a relatively fine or “dense” skill set. The lowest and highest skill types receive wages of \( \omega_1 = $129 \) and \( \omega_n = $13,300 \) per unit of work, corresponding to yearly incomes of $500 and $206,942, respectively.\textsuperscript{62} To obtain a smooth distribution, I estimate the share of workers in each skill group \( j \) with a kernel density approximation of the distribution of computed skill types. This procedure gives the conditional skill distribution among employed workers under the 2015 US tax regime.

In the last step, I use the pattern of skill-specific employment rates imposed by (27) to compute the unconditional skill distribution among all childless singles (workers and unemployed).

Finally, I study the optimal income tax for specific redistributive preferences that allow to illustrate the theoretical results of this paper and to assess their quantitative relevance.\textsuperscript{63} More precisely, I construct two sequences \( \alpha^A \) and \( \alpha^B \) of welfare weights that (i) are monotonically decreasing over the income distribution, (ii) are elements of the sets \( \mathcal{A}^U_{k_A} \) and \( \mathcal{A}^U_{k_B} \) according to Definition 1 (where \( k_A \) and \( k_B \) are two numbers below \( n \)), and (iii) satisfy the conditions in Proposition 3. Consequently, I already know that (ii) the optimal tax involves in both cases some kind of EITC from Proposition 2, and that (iii) both sequences can arise endogenously for regular welfare functions with standard properties from Proposition 3. As Figure 4 in Appendix B.2 shows, both sequences give rise to only weak (or no) concerns for redistribution among the poor, i.e., from low-income earners to even-lower-income earners and to the unemployed. Importantly, both weight sequences imply much weaker concerns for redistribution among the poor that the social objectives considered by \textsuperscript{64}\textsuperscript{Saez (2002)} and \textsuperscript{Jacquet et al. (2013)}.

### 7.2 Simulation results

In the following, I provide the simulation results for the social weight sequences \( \alpha^A \) and \( \alpha^B \). These sequences are constructed to provide insights on two quantitative aspects

\[61\text{The tax approximation is similar to the one in [Jacquet et al. (2013)], again. It takes into account central and (average) state income taxes as well as employee social security contributions [OECD 2017, see also http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm]. Note that this linear tax underestimates the marginal tax wedge for high-income earners to some extent.}\]

\[62\text{In the March 2016 CPS, 98.6\% single workers have a computed skill between \( \omega_1 \) and \( \omega_n \).}\]

\[63\text{For this purpose, I set the exogenous revenue requirement to 0 as imposed by (3). Hence, I assume that the government uses income taxation for redistributive purposes only.}\]

\[64\text{Both [Saez (2002)] and [Jacquet et al. (2013)] focus on cases where the marginal welfare weights are decreasing and strictly convex, i.e., redistributive concerns among low-income earners are stronger than among higher-income earners.}\]
of my theoretical results. First, which *levels* of negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes can be optimal, given well-behaved social preferences? Second, on which *income ranges* can the optimal marginal taxes be negative, i.e., which phase-in ranges can be optimal?

To answer the first question, I consider weight sequence $\alpha^A$, which associates identical welfare weights to all workers with incomes in the phase-in range of the 2015 *EITC* for childless workers, i.e., with incomes below $6,580$. Sequence $\alpha^A$ hence assumes away concerns for redistribution among the working poor. By Proposition 2, this ensures the optimality of negative marginal taxes at low incomes.

To answer the second question, I exploit that Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for the optimality of negative marginal taxes under regular welfare functions with standard properties. I construct weight sequence $\alpha^B$ so to maximize the phase-in range, i.e., the income range with negative marginal taxes. The resulting sequence implies weak concerns for redistribution among a larger set of the low-skill workers, compared to sequence $\alpha^A$.

Figure 3 illustrates the simulation results for weight sequences $\alpha^A$ and $\alpha^B$ by depicting the optimal participation taxes $T^p_A(y) = T_A(y) - T_A(0)$ and $T^p_B(y) = T_B(y) - T_B(0)$ for annual incomes below $50,000$. It proves helpful to compare the simulation results with the properties of the US income tax system as a benchmark (red dotted line in Figure 3). In 2015, childless singles were eligible for the *EITC* if their earned income was below $14,820. The marginal income tax for this group was $-7.65\%$ for incomes below $6,580$ (phase-in range) and $+7.65\%$ for incomes between $8,240$ and $14,820$ (phase-out range). Workers with incomes between $6,580$ and $8,240$ received the maximum tax credit of $503$.

First, the optimal income tax for weight sequence $\alpha^A$ involves an *EITC* with negative marginal taxes for all income levels up to $8,485$, and negative participation taxes for all incomes up to $21,970$ (see solid blue line in Figure 3). In the calibrated model, $14.3\%$ of all childless singles benefit from the optimal *EITC*, and $18.1\%$ of these recipients have incomes in the phase-in range. The share of non-working agents is reduced substantially to $12.9\%$.

65In particular, I set weight $\alpha^A_j = 1.05$ for all skill groups $j \leq 41$ (under laissez-faire, the income of workers in skill group 41 is equal to $7,014$). The weights of all higher skill groups are set to ensure that $\alpha^A$ is an element of $A^U_{41}$. For further details, see Appendix B.2.

66More precisely, Proposition 3 implicitly defines the highest skill group $\bar{k} \in J$ for which upward distortions at the intensive margin can be optimal with monotonic weights. Sequence $\alpha^B$ is constructed to be an element of the set $A^U_{\bar{k}}$, thereby maximizing the set of skill groups with negative marginal taxes. The exact construction of the sequences $\alpha^A$ and $\alpha^B$ is explained in Appendix B.2.

67Note that, in the phase-in region, the *EITC* rate exactly offsets the marginal social security contributions (employee share). *EITC* rates and payments are larger for single parents and married couples with children. Maag et al. (2012) show that, for these groups, effective marginal taxes are around $-20\%$ in some US states and strictly positive in other states if transfer programs such as TANF and SNAP are taken into account.
Figure 3: Optimal participation tax functions $T^P_A$ and $T^P_B$.

Under the optimal income tax, the maximum tax credit is given by $1,383 and reached at income level $8,485. For comparison, the optimal unemployment benefit is given by $3,019. The ratio $T^P_A(y)/y$ of optimal participation taxes to pre-tax incomes, which is sometimes referred to as the participation tax rate, is around $-60\%$ for very low incomes such as $y^A_1 = $555. The ratio subsequently diminishes to levels around $-16\%$ at the phase-in endpoint. As in any optimal tax model with a discrete skill set, marginal taxes can be measured in two alternative ways. On the one hand, the average marginal tax in the phase-in range is equal to $-13\%,2\%$. On the other hand, the implicit marginal taxes are between $-4.3\%$ and $-2\%$ in the middle of the phase-in range, and between $-1\%$ and $0$ close to both ends of the phase-in range. In the phase-out range, the average marginal tax is given by $9.5\%$, while implicit marginal taxes are equal to zero. Hence, labor supply in skill groups $\{2, \ldots, 44\}$ is upwards distorted at the extensive margin (substantially) and at the intensive margin (somewhat less).

Second, the optimal income tax for weight sequence $\alpha^B$ involves negative marginal taxes over a much larger income range, with the phase-in endpoint given by $15,016 (see dashed green line in Figure 3). The optimal participation taxes are even negative up to the income level $32,144$. In the calibrated model, the recipients of the optimal EITC

\[\text{As visible from Figure 3, these large negative participation taxes suggest that the optimal income tax may fall discontinuously at zero, in line with the results of Jacquet et al. (2013).}\]

\[\text{The average marginal tax between incomes } y_k \text{ and } y_j \text{ is computed as } [T(y_k) - T(y_j)] / (y_k - y_j), \text{ while the implicit marginal tax at income } y_j \text{ is given by } 1 - h(y_j, \omega_j).\]

\[\text{In the optimal allocation, all local upward IC constraints between skill groups 1 and 44 are binding, while all local IC constraints between skill groups 44 and 96 are non-binding (the associated Lagrange parameters are zero).}\]

\[\text{The highest skill group for which the optimal allocation can involve upward distortions at the intensive margin is given by skill group } k = 53 \text{ (given the joint type distribution in the calibrated model). Put differently, I find that regular welfare functions cannot give rise to weight sequences in set } A^U_k \text{ for any } k > 53.\]
account for about 27.7% of all childless singles, among whom 26% have incomes in the phase-in region. The share of unemployed agents falls to 12.4%.

Regarding the details of the optimal tax function, the maximum tax credit is given by $1,717, while the optimal unemployment benefit is equal to $2,281. The participation tax rate is between −10% and −11.5% at all income levels in the phase-in range. The average marginal tax rate in the phase-in range is equal to −11.5%, while the implicit marginal tax is negative but close to zero at any income level in this range. Finally, the average marginal tax in the phase-out range is given by 9.7%, while implicit marginal taxes are zero at all income levels above $9,722. The optimal marginal and participation tax rates are hence smaller in magnitudes for weight sequence $\alpha_B$ than for sequence $\alpha_A$, while the phase-in range, the EITC range and the maximum tax credit are larger.

Summing up, the numerical simulations show that the effects of the mechanism studied in this paper - the tradeoff between intensive efficiency and extensive efficiency - are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively important. When the concerns for redistribution among the poor are weak (as implied by the weight sequences $\alpha^A$ and $\alpha^B$), the optimal EITC may cover a much larger income range and feature a much larger maximum tax credit than the current EITC for childless workers in the US. Moreover, negative marginal taxes and participation taxes can be more than twice as large (in absolute terms) in the optimal scheme than in the current US scheme. Importantly, the sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.3 demonstrates that these general conclusions do not depend on the details of the calibration. In particular, they are neither affected by variations in the magnitude of intensive-margin responses, nor by variations in the profile of participation elasticities across the skill distribution, as long as these remain in the empirically plausible ranges.

Based on these results, two further conclusions can be drawn. First, the reported results imply that one could find another monotonically decreasing sequence of welfare weights for which the optimal income tax is a close approximation of the current EITC for childless singles in the US. Put differently, if one would seek to back out the implicit welfare weights of the US government in an inverse optimum exercise as in Jacobs et al. (2017) or Lockwood (2017), the estimated welfare weights would have arguably reasonable properties. Second, it even seems possible to rationalize the recent proposals to strongly expand – to effectively double – the EITC for childless workers based on either a well-behaved welfare function with standard properties or a poverty alleviation goal as formalized by Saez & Stantcheva (2016), and without reference to behavioral anomalies or paternalistic arguments (for example, see Executive Office 2014 and House Budget Committee 2014).

\footnote{Again, all local upwards IC constraints between skill groups 1 and 53 are binding in the optimal allocation, while all local IC constraints between skill groups 53 and 96 are non-binding.}
8 Conclusion

The paper has studied optimal income taxation in an empirically plausible model with labor supply responses at both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. Using a novel modeling strategy, it is the first paper to provide sufficient conditions for the optimality of an Earned Income Tax Credit with negative marginal and participation taxes at low income levels in such a model. In particular, the optimal income tax is given by an EITC if society has strong concerns for redistribution from the rich to the poor, but only weak concerns for redistribution from the poor to the very poor. As shown above, this result is driven by a trade-off between labor supply distortions at the intensive margin and at the extensive margin, which has not been discussed in the previous literature.

Importantly, the paper has shown that an EITC can be optimal although society considers the unemployed more deserving than the working poor, and the working poor more deserving than medium-income and high-income earners. The case for an EITC is particularly strong if all agents with available incomes below the poverty line are considered as equally deserving. It has repeatedly been argued that society might even consider the working poor more deserving than the unemployed (for example, see Beaudry et al. [2009] and Saez & Stantcheva [2016]). As a result of the trade-off between distortions at both margins, such redistributive preferences would not only strengthen the case for negative participation taxes, but also for negative marginal taxes. Hence, the results of this paper would even be reinforced.

Finally, while the paper has confirmed the conjecture of Saez (2002) that an EITC can be optimal when labor supply responds at the intensive and extensive margins, it has abstracted from several aspects that could further increase the desirability of such in-work benefit schemes. For example, an EITC might have additional benefits if there is learning on the job (Best & Kleven 2013) or if the agents fail to maximize their own well-being due to present bias (Lockwood 2017). For future research, it seems worthwhile to investigate the interaction of these non-standard aspects with the mechanism studied in this paper.
References


Lockwood, B. B. (2017), Optimal income taxation with present bias, Working paper. URL: https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/benlo/


Appendix

A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Using equation (1), incentive compatibility requires that, for all pairs of \((\omega, \delta)\) and \((\omega', \delta')\) in \(\Omega \times \Delta\),

\[
c(\omega, \delta) - h[y(\omega, \delta), \omega] - 1_{y(\omega, \delta) > 0} \delta \geq c(\omega', \delta') - h[y(\omega', \delta'), \omega] - 1_{y(\omega', \delta') > 0} \delta.
\]

To satisfy these constraints, first, all pairs of agents with types \((\omega_j, \delta)\) and \((\omega_j, \delta')\) who provide strictly positive output must receive the same gross (of fixed costs) utility \(c(\omega_j, \delta) - h[y(\omega_j, \delta), \omega_j] = z_j\). Second, all agents with types \((\omega, \delta)\) and \((\omega', \delta')\) who provide zero output must receive the same consumption \(c(\omega, \delta) = c(\omega', \delta') = c_0\). Third, an allocation can only be incentive-compatible if each agent with skill type \(\omega_j\) and fixed cost type below (above) \(\delta_j = z_j - c_0\) provides positive output (zero output).

Second-best Pareto efficiency requires, moreover, that all agents with skill type \(\omega_j\) and fixed cost type below \(\delta_j\) receive the same bundle \((c_j, y_j)\). By the strict convexity of effort cost function \(h\), there is a unique bundle \((c_j, y_j)\) that minimizes the net transfer \(c - y\), subject to \(c - h(y, \omega_j) = z_j\) and to the IC constraints along the skill dimension, \(z_k \geq c - h(y, \omega_k)\), for all \(k \neq j\). Assume there is an initial allocation in which some agent with type \((\omega_j, \delta)\) receives bundle \((c', y') \neq (c_j, y_j)\) with \(y' > 0\). Changing his allocation to \((c_j, y_j)\) allows to save resources without changing his utility level, and to redistribute these resources lump-sum to all agents in the economy. Hence, the initial allocation with \((c', y') \neq (c_j, y_j)\) was not Pareto efficient. 

Proof of Lemma 2

Proof. In every implementable allocation, the downward IC constraint between the workers with skill types \(\omega_j\) and \(\omega_{j+1}\) is satisfied, i.e.,

\[
c_{j+1} - h(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}) \geq c_j - h(y_j, \omega_{j+1})\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \delta_{j+1} - \delta_j \geq h(y_j, \omega_j) - h(y_j, \omega_{j+1}). \tag{29}
\]

By \(h(y, \omega) < 0\), this implies that \(\delta_{j+1} > \delta_j\). Parts \([\text{I}]\) and \([\text{II}]\) of Condition \([\text{I}]\) ensure that \(\eta_j(c, y) = \frac{g_j(\delta_j)}{G_j(\delta_j)} > \frac{g_j(\delta_{j+1})}{G_j(\delta_{j+1})} \geq \frac{g_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1})}{G_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1})} = \eta_{j+1}(c, y)\).

Proof of Lemma 3

Proof. Fix some implementable allocation \((c, y)\) with skill-specific participation thresholds \(\delta_j = c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0\) and \(\delta_{j-1} = c_{j+1} - h(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}) - c_0\), respectively. Assume now that the social planner provides an additional, uniform transfer \(c' \geq 0\) to the workers in both skill groups.
Then, the ratio of relative participation responses is given by
\[ \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, c') = \frac{g_j(\delta_j + c')}{G_j(\delta_j + c')} \frac{G_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c')}{g_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c')} \cdot \]

The partial derivative of \( \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, c') \) with respect to \( c' \) is given by
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}}{\partial c'} = \left[ \frac{\partial \eta_j}{\partial \delta_j} \frac{1}{\eta_j} - \frac{\partial \eta_{j+1}}{\partial \delta_{j+1}} \frac{1}{\eta_{j+1}} \right] \eta_j = \left[ (a_j(\delta_j + c') - A_j(\delta_j + c')) - (a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c') - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1} + c')) \right] \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1} \cdot \]

Setting \( c' = 0 \), the elasticity of \( \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}(\delta_j, \delta_{j+1}, c') \) with respect to \( c' \) follows as
\[ \varepsilon_{\eta, c'} = \frac{\partial \hat{\eta}_{j,j+1}}{\partial c'} a_j(\delta_j) - a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}) - A_j(\delta_j) + A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}) \cdot \]

Under Condition 2, the last expression is bounded from below by \(- [A_j(\delta_j) - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1})] = \eta_{j+1} - \eta_j < 0 \) and from above by \( A_j(\delta_j) - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}) = \eta_j - \eta_{j+1} > 0 \).

**Proof of Lemma 4**

Proof. For part 3, consider some implementable allocation \((c, y)\) and some working agent \(i\) with \(w^i = \omega_j\) and \(\delta^i < \delta_j\). Assume as usual that the tax function \(T\) is linear at income level \(y^*_T(\omega_j)\), which is defined by \(h_y(y^*_T(\omega_j), \omega_j) = 1 - T'(y^*_T(\omega_j))\). For this agent, the elasticity of income \(y_T(\omega^i, \delta^i)\) with respect to the retention rate \(r = 1 - T'(y^*_T(\omega_j))\) is given by
\[ \varepsilon_{y, r} = \frac{\partial y^*_T(\omega_j)}{\partial r} y^*_T(\omega_j) = \frac{1}{h_y(y^*_T(\omega_j), \omega_j)} h_y(y^*_T(\omega_j), \omega_j) \cdot \]
which is weakly below some \(\mu_1 \in (0, \infty)\) for all \(\omega_j \in \Omega\) and \(r > 0\) by Condition 3 [ii].

For part 3, consider the same allocation \((c, y)\) and agent \(i\). The elasticity of income with respect to his skill level \(\omega_j\) is given by
\[ \varepsilon_{y, \omega} = \frac{\partial y^*_T(\omega_j)}{\partial \omega} y^*_T(\omega_j) = \frac{1}{h_y(y^*_T(\omega_j), \omega_j)} h_y(y^*_T(\omega_j), \omega_j) \cdot \]
which is weakly above some \(\mu_2 \in (0, \infty)\) for all \(\omega_j \in \Omega\) and \(r > 0\) by Condition 3 [iii].

**Proof of Lemma 5**

The proof of Lemma 5 consists of three steps. I start with two preliminary Lemmas.

**Lemma 8.** Consider the relaxed problem formally defined in section [5.7]. For any \(\alpha \in A\) such that an solution \((c^{\alpha R}, y^{\alpha R})\) with \(\delta^{\alpha R} \in (\bar{\delta}, \bar{\delta})\) for all \(j \in J\) exists, it satisfies conditions \([16]\) and \([17]\).

Proof. Assume that the relaxed problem has a solution for social weights \(\alpha\). First, \((c^{\alpha R}, y^{\alpha R})\) must be Pareto-efficient in the set of allocations that are feasible and satisfy the IC constraints
Equation (16) follows from combining the first-order conditions with respect to $c \in \mathbb{R}$ be written as uses the IC constraints (14) and (15). Consequently, the Lagrangian of the relaxed problem can be written as

$$
\mathcal{L} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \left( \int_{\delta_j^L}^{\delta_j^U} g_j(\delta) \gamma(\omega, \delta) \Psi[c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta] d\delta + \int_{\delta_j^L}^{\delta_j^U} g_j(\delta) \gamma(\omega, \delta) \Psi(c_0) d\delta \right)
+ \lambda \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j + c_0) - c_0 \right],
$$

where $\delta_j = c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_0$ and $\lambda$ is the Lagrange parameter associated with the feasibility condition. Replacing the average weights $\bar{\alpha}_j$ and $\bar{\alpha}_0$ as defined in (9) and (10) by the exogenous numbers $\alpha_j$ and $\alpha_0$, the first-order conditions of this problem are given by

$$
\mathcal{L}_{c_j} = f_j \left[ G_j(\delta_j^R)(\alpha_j - \lambda) + \lambda g_j(\delta_j^R)(y_j^R - c_j^R + c_0^R) \right] \quad \vdash 0
$$

$$
\mathcal{L}_{y_j} = f_j \left[ -h_y y^R(\omega_j) \right. \left. \left( G_j(\delta_j^R) \alpha_j + \lambda g_j(\delta_j^R)(y_j^R - c_j^R + c_0^R) \right) + \lambda G_j(\delta_j^R) \right] \quad \vdash 0
$$

$$
\mathcal{L}_{c_0} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \left[ \left( 1 - G_j(\delta_j^R) \right) \alpha_0 + \lambda G_j(\delta_j^R) - \lambda g_j(\delta_j^R)(y_j^R - c_j^R + c_0^R) - 1 \right] \quad \vdash 0
$$

Equation (16) follows from combining the first-order conditions with respect to $c_j$ for all $j \in J$ and $c_0$ gives

$$
\lambda = \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \left[ G_j(\delta_j^R) \alpha_j + (1 - G_j(\delta_j^R)) \alpha_0 \right] = \alpha_M = 1,
$$

where the average weight $\alpha_M$ is normalized to 1 for all $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$. Using $\lambda = 1$ and $c_j = \delta_j + h(y_j, \omega_j) + c_0$, the FOC with respect to $c_j$ can be rewritten as

$$
\delta_j^R - y_j^R + h(y_j^R, \omega_j) = \frac{G_j(\delta_j^R)}{g_j(\delta_j^R)}(\alpha_j - 1).
$$

As $A_j(\delta) = \frac{g_j(\delta)}{G_j(\delta)}$ and $\delta^*(\omega_j) = \max_{y>0} \{ y - h(y, \omega_j) \} = y_j^R - h(y_j^R, \omega_j)$, this is identical to equation (17). \hfill \Box

**Lemma 9.** There is a number $\chi \in (1, 2]$ such that, if $\alpha_j < \chi$ for all $j \in J$, the relaxed optimal tax problem has a unique solution with $\delta_j^R \in (\delta, \delta)$ for all $j \in J$.

**Proof.** As shown above, the FOC with respect to $c_j$ is identical to

$$
k_j(\delta_j^R, \alpha_j) = G_j(\delta_j^R)(\alpha_j - 1) + g_j(\delta_j^R)(\delta^*(\omega_j) - \delta_j^R) = 0,
$$

for every $j \in J$. Hence, the relaxed problem has a unique interior extremum for $\alpha$ if and only if $k_j(\delta, \alpha_j)$ has a unique root in $\delta$ with $\delta \in (\delta, \delta)$. First, $k_j$ is continuous in $\alpha_j$ and $\delta$ for all $\delta \in (\delta, \delta)$. Second, $k_j(\delta, \alpha_j) \geq 0$ for any $\alpha_j \geq 0$ because $\delta^*(\omega_j) \geq \delta^*(\omega_1) > \delta$ for all $j \in J$ by (2) and the properties of $h$. Third, the derivative of $k_j$ with respect to $c_j$ (or its first argument)
Lemma 11. For any skill group where the numerator equals $-\alpha$ if and only if $\alpha$ that labor supply is downwards (upwards) distorted at the extensive margin in skill group that labor supply is undistorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups. Equation (17) implies supply distortions at both margins provided in Section 3.2. In particular, equation (16) implies $\delta$ all is given by

$$k_{j\delta}(\delta, \alpha_j) = g_j(\delta) (\alpha_j - 2) + g'_j(\delta)(\delta^*(\omega_j) - \delta).$$

If $k$ has a root at $\delta'$, this derivative has to be equal to

$$k_{j\delta}(\delta', \alpha_j) = G_j(\delta') \left[ A_j(\delta') (\alpha_j - 2) - a_j(\delta')(\alpha_j - 1) \right],$$

where $A_j(\delta) = \frac{g_j(\delta)}{g'_j(\delta)}$ and $a_j(\delta) = \frac{g''_j(\delta)}{g'_j(\delta)}$. Part [1] of Condition 1 ensures that $A_j(\delta) > a_j(\delta)$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$ and all $j \in J$. This implies that $k_{j\delta}(\alpha_j, \delta')$ is negative if

$$\alpha_j < \chi_j(\delta') := 1 + \frac{A_j(\delta')}{A_j(\delta') - a_j(\delta')},$$

and that $\chi_j(\delta') > 1$ for all $\delta' \in \Delta$ and all $j \in J$. Define $\chi_j$ as the minimum of $\chi_j(\delta')$ over $\delta' \in (\delta, \bar{\delta}]$. By assumption, $g_j(\delta)$ is larger than some number $g > 0$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$ and $g'_j(\delta) \leq 0$ for some $\delta \in \Delta$. By the first property, $\chi_j$ is bounded away from 1 for all $j \in J$. By the second property, $\chi_j \leq 2$ for all $j \in J$. Consequently, $k_j(\delta, \alpha_j)$ has at most one root in $\delta$ if $\alpha_j < \chi_j$. If this root exists, it constitutes a maximum because $k_{j\delta}(\delta, \alpha_j) < 0$.

The existence of a root is ensured if, additionally, $k_j(\delta, \alpha_j) < 0$, which is ensured for $\alpha_j < \chi_j' := 1 + g_j(\delta) (\delta - \delta^*(\omega_j))$. Note that $\chi_j' > 1$ for all $j \in J$ by [2]. Let $\chi$ be given by the minimum of $\chi_j$ and $\chi_j'$ over all $j \in J$. By the construction of $\chi$, the relaxed problem has a unique interior extremum for $\alpha$ if $\alpha_j < \chi$ for all $j \in J$.

Lemma 5 follows as a corollary from the Lemmas 8 and 9, using the definitions of labor supply distortions at both margins provided in Section 3.2. In particular, equation (16) implies that labor supply is undistorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups. Equation (17) implies that labor supply is downwards (upwards) distorted at the extensive margin in skill group $j \in J$ if and only if $\alpha_j$ is below (above) 1.

**Proof of Lemma 6**

Lemma 6 is proven through Lemmas 10 to 15.

**Lemma 10.** For every $j \in J$ and every $\alpha \in A^\chi$, $\delta^{\alpha R}_j$ is strictly increasing in $\alpha_j$.

**Proof.** Threshold $\delta^{\alpha R}_j$ is implicitly defined by condition (17) in Lemma 8. Using the implicit function theorem, its derivative with respect to $\alpha_j$ is given by

$$\frac{d\delta^{\alpha R}_j}{d\alpha_j} = \frac{A_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j)^{-1}}{1 + (1 - \alpha_j) \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j)^{-1}}{A_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j)^{-1}} \right)} = \frac{1}{(2 - \alpha_j)A_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j) - (1 - \alpha_j)a_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j)},$$

(32)

where the numerator equals $-k_\delta(\alpha_j, \delta^{\alpha R}_j)/G_j(\delta^{\alpha R}_j) > 0$ (see proof of Lemma 9). Hence, the derivative is strictly positive for all $\alpha_j < \chi$. [45]

**Lemma 11.** For any skill group $j \in J_- n$, if $\alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \alpha'$,
Consider the downward IC constraint (29) between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$ is satisfied;

(ii) $(c^R, y^R)$ satisfies the downward IC constraint (29) between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$ for all $\alpha' \in [1, \chi]$;

(iii) $(c^R, y^{aR})$ satisfies the upward IC constraint between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$,

\[
\delta_{j+1} - \delta_j \leq h(y_{j+1}, \omega_j) - h(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}),
\]

for all $\alpha' \in [0, 1]$.

**Proof.**

(i) Using (32), the derivative of $\delta_{j+1} - \delta_j$ with respect to $\alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \alpha'$ is strictly positive if

\[
(2 - \alpha') \left[ A_j(\delta_j^R) - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) \right] > (1 - \alpha') \left[ a_j(\delta_j^R) - a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) \right].
\]  

(34)

In all allocations that satisfy the downward IC constraint, $\delta_{j+1}^R > \delta_j^R$. By Conditions 1 and 2, we hence have $A_j(\delta_j^R) - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) > 0$ and $a_j(\delta_j^R) - a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) \geq 0$. Because $\chi \in (1, 2]$, this directly implies that inequality (34) is satisfied for any $\alpha' \in [1, \chi]$. Moreover, Condition 2 ensures that $a_j(\delta_j^R) - a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) \leq 2 \left[ A_j(\delta_j^R) - A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R) \right]$. Hence, inequality (34) is also satisfied for the alternative case $\alpha' \in (0, 1)$, where $(2-\alpha')/(1-\alpha') > 2$.

(ii) For $\alpha_j = 1$, $\delta_k^R = \delta^*(\omega_k)$ for $k \in \{j, j+1\}$. Inserting these into the downward IC constraint (29) and rearranging terms gives

\[
\delta^*(\omega_{j+1}) = y_{j+1}^R - h(y_{j+1}^R, \omega_{j+1}) \geq y_j^R - h(y_j^R, \omega_j),
\]

which holds with strict inequality by the single-crossing property. The left-hand side of (29) is given by $\delta_{j+1}^R - \delta_j^R$, which is strictly increasing in $\alpha'$ by part (i), while the right-hand side is constant. Hence, the downward IC constraint is satisfied for all $\alpha' \geq 1$.

(iii) For $\alpha_j = 1$, inserting $\delta_k^R = \delta^*(\omega_k)$ for $k \in \{j, j+1\}$ into the upward IC constraint (33) gives $y_j^R - h(y_j^R, \omega_j) \leq \delta^*(\omega_j) = \max_{y > 0} \{y - h(y, \omega_j)\}$, which is again satisfied with strict inequality. As the left-hand side of (33) is strictly increasing in $\alpha'$, the upward IC is satisfied for all $\alpha' < 1$ such that the downward IC is satisfied. As the downward and upward IC constraints cannot be violated at the same time, the upward IC constrained is also satisfied for all other $\alpha' < 1$.

**Lemma 12.** Consider the downward IC constraint (29) between the workers with skill types $\omega_j$ and $\omega_{j+1} = a_j \omega_j$ for some $j \in J_n$. Define $a_j^0$ as the supremum of the set of real numbers $\alpha' > 1$ such that, given $\alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = 0$, $(c^R, y^{aR})$ violates the downward IC constraint for all $a_j \in (1, a')$.

(i) If Condition 3 is satisfied, $a_j^0 > 1$ exists.
(ii) Let \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \alpha' \). For each \( \alpha_j \in \left(1, a_j^0\right) \), there exists a unique number \( \beta_j \in (0, 1) \) such that \( (c_{\alpha_j}, y_{\omega_j}) \) violates the downward IC constraint (20) if and only if \( \alpha' < \beta_j \).

Proof. (i) In the limit case \( a_j = 1 \), the downward IC constraint (29) simplifies to \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} - \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \geq 0 \). By (17), \( \delta_k^{\alpha_R} \) is implicitly defined by \( \frac{1}{A_k(\delta_k^{\alpha_R})} + \delta_k^{\alpha_R} = \delta^*(\omega_k) \) for \( \alpha' = 0 \) and any \( k \in J \). For \( a_j = 1 \), we have \( \delta^*(\omega_{j+1}) = \delta^*(\omega_j) \). By Condition 1 (ii), \( A_j(\delta) \geq A_{j+1}(\delta) \). Hence, there are two possible cases. First, if \( A_j(\delta_j^{\alpha_R}) > A_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R}) \), we have \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} < \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \). Hence, the downward IC constraint is violated for \( \alpha' = 0 \) and \( a = 1 \). Second, if \( A_j(\delta_j^{\alpha_R}) = A_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R}) \), we have \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} = \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \). Hence, the downward IC constraint is satisfied with equality for \( \alpha' = 0 \) and \( a = 1 \).

To consider the general case \( a_j > 1 \), I compare the derivatives of both sides of (29) with respect to \( a_j \) at \( a_j = 1 \). The derivative of the left-hand side is given by

\[
\frac{d\delta^*(\omega_{j+1})}{da_j} - \frac{2 - \frac{a_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})}{A_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})}}{2 - \frac{a_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})}{A_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})}} < 0,
\]

where the term in the denominator is strictly larger than 1 because \( a_{j+1}(\delta) < A_{j+1}(\delta) \) for all \( \delta \in \Delta \) by Condition 1 (i). The derivative of the right-hand side is given by

\[
-\omega_j h_\omega \left( y_j^{\alpha_R}, \omega_j a \right) > 0,
\]

which is strictly larger than the derivative of the left-hand side. Hence, the downward IC constraint is unambiguously violated for \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = 0 \) and all \( a_j \) between 1 and some number \( a' > 1 \). The supremum \( a_j^0 \) is hence well-defined, and may either be given by a finite number or by \( \infty \).

(ii) For any \( a_j \in \left(1, a_j^0\right) \), the right-hand side of (29) is independent of \( \alpha' \). The left-hand side \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} - \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \) is small enough to violate the downward IC constraint for \( \alpha' = 0 \) by part (i), and large enough to satisfy this constraint with strict inequality for \( \alpha' = 1 \) by Lemma 11 (ii). By Lemma 11 (ii), \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} - \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \) is strictly increasing in \( \alpha' \) for all levels of \( \alpha' \) such that (29) is satisfied. Consequently, there exists a unique threshold \( \beta_j \in (0, 1) \) such that the downward IC constraint is violated for all \( \alpha' \in \left(0, \beta_j\right) \) and satisfied for all \( \alpha' \in \left(\beta_j, \chi\right) \).

Lemma 13. Consider the upward IC constraint (18) between the workers with skill types \( \omega_j \) and \( \omega_{j+1} = a_j \omega_j \) for some \( j \in J_n \). Define \( a_j^\gamma(\gamma) \) as the supremum of the set of real numbers \( \alpha' > 1 \) such that, given \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \gamma > 1 \), \((c_{\alpha_j}, y_{\omega_j})\) violates the upward IC constraint for all \( a_j \in (1, \alpha') \).

(i) If Condition 1 is satisfied, \( a_j^\gamma(\gamma) \) exists for all \( \gamma \in (1, \chi) \).

(ii) Let \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \alpha' \). For each \( \gamma \in (1, \chi) \) and each \( a \in \left(1, a_j^\gamma(\gamma)\right) \), there exists a unique number \( \beta_j \in (1, \gamma) \) such that \((c_{\alpha}, y_{\omega})\) violates the upward IC constraint if and only if \( \alpha' \in (\beta_j, \chi) \).

Proof. (i) Fix a number \( \gamma \in (1, \chi) \). In the limit case \( a_j = 1 \), the upward IC constraint (33) simplifies to \( \delta_j^{\alpha_R} - \delta_j^{\alpha_R} \leq 0 \). For \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \gamma > 1 \), \( \delta_k^{\alpha_R} \) is implicitly defined by
\[
\frac{1 - \gamma}{A_k(\delta^R_k)} + \delta_k^R = \delta^*(\omega_k) \text{ for } k \in \{j, j + 1\}. \text{ For } a = 1, \delta^*(\omega_j) = \delta^*(\omega_{j+1}). \text{ By Condition } \text{(ii)}, A_j(\delta) \geq A_{j+1}(\delta) \text{ for all } \delta \in \Delta. \text{ Again, there are two possible cases. First, if } A_j(\delta^R) > A_{j+1}(\delta^R), \text{ we have } \delta_{j+1}^R > \delta_j^R \text{ so that (33) is violated. Second, if } A_j(\delta^R) = A_{j+1}(\delta^R), \text{ we have } \delta_{j+1}^R = \delta_j^R \text{ so that (33) is satisfied with strict equality.}
\]

To consider the general case \(a_j > 1\), I again compare the derivatives of both sides of (33) in \(a_j\), given a fixed \(\gamma\). The derivative of the left-hand side is given by
\[
-\omega_j h_\omega \left( y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}, a_j \omega_j \right) \left( 1 - (\gamma - 1) \left( 1 - \frac{a_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R)}{A_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}^R)} \right) \right) > 0,
\]
where the term in the denominator is strictly positive for any \(\gamma < \chi\) and strictly smaller than 1 by Condition \(\text{(ii)}\) for all \(\gamma > 1\). The derivative of the right-hand side is given by
\[
-\omega_j h_\omega \left( y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}, a_j \omega_j \right) + \left[ h(y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}, \omega_j) - h(y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}, a_j \omega_j) \right] \frac{dy_{j+1}^{\alpha R}}{da_j} > 0.
\]

At \(a_j = 1\), the term in squared brackets equals zero. Hence, the derivative of the left-hand side is strictly larger than the derivative of the right-hand side of (33). Thus, the upward CI constraint is violated for \(a_j = a_{j+1} = \gamma > 1\) and all \(a_j\) between 1 and some number \(a' > 1\). The supremum \(a_j^\gamma(\gamma)\) is hence well-defined, and may either be given by some finite number above 1 or by \(\infty\).

(ii) Fix any \(\gamma \in (1, \chi)\). If \(a_j \in \left(1, a_j^\gamma(\gamma)\right)\), the difference \(\delta_{j+1}^R(\gamma) - \delta_j^R(\gamma)\) is large enough to violate (33) for \(a' = \gamma\) and small enough to satisfy (33) for \(a' = 1\). Moreover, \(\delta_{j+1}^R(\gamma) - \delta_j^R(\gamma)\) is strictly increasing in \(a'\) for all \(a' > 1\) by Lemma \(\text{[11]}\) (iii) and (i). Consequently, there exists a unique threshold \(\bar{\beta}_j \in (1, \gamma)\) such that the downward IC constraint is violated for all \(a' \in (\bar{\beta}_j, \chi)\), and satisfied for all \(a' \in [0, \bar{\beta}_j]\).

\[\square\]

**Lemma 14.** Consider any \(j \in J_n\). If \(a_j < a_0^j\), there is a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing function \(\beta_j^D : [0, \chi] \to (0, \chi)\) such that \((e^{\alpha R}, y^{\alpha R})\) satisfies the downward IC constraint if and only if \(a_{j+1} \geq \beta_j^D(a_j)\). Function \(\beta_j^D\) has a unique fixed point at \(\beta_j^D \in (0, 1)\), where \(\frac{d\beta_j^D(a_j)}{da_j} < 1\).

**Proof.** Consider some \(j \in J_n\) and some \(a_j \in \left(1, a_0^j\right)\), where \(a_0^j\) is defined in Lemma \(\text{[12]}\) (i). Hence, there is a number \(\beta_j^D \in (0, 1)\) such that \((e^{\alpha R}, y^{\alpha R})\) satisfies the downward IC constraint \(\text{(29)}\) if \(a_j = a_{j+1} \geq \beta_j^D\), and violates \(\text{(29)}\) if \(a_j = a_{j+1} < \beta_j^D\). Recall that \(\delta_k^R\) is strictly increasing in \(\alpha_k\) for each \(k \in J\) and each \(\alpha_k \in [0, \chi]\) by Lemma \(\text{[10]}\) and that changes in \(\alpha_j\) and \(\alpha_{j+1}\) only affect the left-hand side of the downward IC \(\text{(29)}\).

First, fix some \(a_j = x \in (\bar{\beta}_j, \chi)\). For \(a_{j+1} = \beta_j^D\), the difference \(\delta_{j+1}^R - \delta_j^R\) is smaller than for \(a_j = a_{j+1} = \bar{\beta}_j\), and \(\text{(29)}\) is violated. For \(a_{j+1} = a_j = x\), in contrast, \(\text{(29)}\) is satisfied by Lemma \(\text{[12]}\). As \(\delta_{j+1}^R\) is increasing in \(\alpha_{j+1}\), there is a unique number \(\beta_j^D(x) \in (\bar{\beta}_j, x)\) such that \(\text{(29)}\) is satisfied for all \(a_{j+1} \geq \beta_j^D(x)\), and violated for all \(a_{j+1} < \beta_j^D(x)\).
Second, fix some \( \alpha_j = x \in [0, \beta_j) \). For \( \alpha_{j+1} = \beta_j \), the difference \( \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R - \delta \alpha_j^R \) is larger than for \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} = \beta_j \) so that (29) is satisfied. For \( \alpha_{j+1} = x \), in contrast, (29) is violated by Lemma 13. By the monotonicity of \( \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R \) in \( \alpha_{j+1} \), there is a unique number \( \beta_{j}^D(x) \in (x, \beta_j) \) such that (29) is satisfied if \( \alpha_{j+1} \geq \beta_{j}^D(x) \), and violated if \( \alpha_{j+1} < \beta_{j}^D(x) \). This also implies that Hence, \( \beta_{j}^D(x) \in (0, \chi) \) for all \( x \in [0, \chi) \).

To prove that \( \beta_{j}^D \) is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, note that \( \beta_{j}^D(\alpha_j) \) is implicitly defined by

\[
\delta \alpha_{j+1}^R (\beta_{j}^D(\alpha_j)) - \delta \alpha_j^R (\alpha_j) = h \left( y_{j+1}^R, \omega_j \right) - h \left( y_{j}^R, \omega_{j+1} \right) .
\]

The right-hand side of this equation is constant in \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_{j+1} \). The left-hand side is continuously differentiable and monotonic in both weights as long as these are below \( \chi \). Hence, \( \beta_{j}^D \) is continuously differentiable in \( \alpha_j \). Using the implicit function theorem, the derivative is given by

\[
\frac{d \beta_{j}^D(\alpha_j)}{d \alpha_j} = \frac{\frac{d \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R(\alpha_{j+1})}{d \alpha_j}}{\frac{d \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R(\alpha_{j})}{d \alpha_{j+1}}} > 0 ,
\]

where the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive by Lemma 10.

Finally, we know from Lemma 12 that \( \beta_{j}^D \) has a unique fixed point at \( \beta_{j} < 1 \) whenever \( \alpha_j \in \left( 1, a_j^\gamma \right) \). As the downward IC constraint is satisfied at this fixed point, Lemma 11 ensures that \( \frac{d \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R(\alpha_{j+1})}{d \alpha_j} < \frac{d \delta \alpha_j^R(\alpha_j)}{d \alpha_{j+1}} \), Hence, \( \frac{d \beta_{j}^D(\alpha_j)}{d \alpha_j} < 1 \).

Lemma 15. Consider any \( j \in J_n \). If \( a_j < a_j^\gamma(\gamma) \) for some \( \gamma \in (1, \chi) \), there is a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing function \( \beta_{j}^U : [0, \chi) \to (0, \chi_n) \) such that \( (c^\alpha R, y^\alpha R) \) violates the upward IC constraint if and only if \( \alpha_{j+1} > \beta_{j}^U(\alpha_j) \). Function \( \beta_{j}^U \) has a unique fixed point at \( \beta_{j} \in (1, \chi) \), where \( \frac{d \beta_{j}^U(\alpha_j)}{d \alpha_j} < 1 \).

Proof. The proof of Lemma 15 follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 14. Consider some \( j \in J_n \) and some \( \alpha_j \) between 1 and the threshold \( a_j^\gamma(\gamma) \) for some \( \gamma \in (1, \chi) \), as defined in Lemma 13. Hence, there is a number \( \beta_{j} \in (1, \gamma) \) such that \( (c^\alpha R, y^\alpha R) \) satisfies the upward IC constraint \( (33) \) if \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} \geq \beta_{j} \), and violates \( (33) \) if \( \alpha_j = \alpha_{j+1} < \beta_{j} \).

First, fix some \( \alpha_j = x \in (\beta_{j}, \chi) \). The upward IC constraint is satisfied for \( \alpha_{j+1} = \beta_{j} \), and violated \( \alpha_{j+1} = x \) by Lemma 13. By the monotonicity of \( \delta \alpha_{j+1}^R \) in \( \alpha_{j+1} \), there is a unique number \( \beta_{j}^U(x) \in (\beta_{j}, x) \) such that \( (33) \) is satisfied if \( \alpha_{j+1} \leq \beta_{j}^U(x) \), and violated if \( \alpha_{j+1} > \beta_{j}^U(x) \).

Second, fix some \( \alpha_j = x \in [0, \beta_{j}) \). The upward IC constraint is violated for \( \alpha_{j+1} = \beta_{j} \), and satisfied for \( \alpha_{j+1} = x \) by Lemma 13. Hence, there is a unique number \( \beta_{j}^U(x) \in (x, \beta_{j}) \) such that \( (33) \) is satisfied if \( \alpha_{j+1} \leq \beta_{j}^U(x) \) and violated if \( \alpha_{j+1} > \beta_{j}^U(x) \). Hence, we also have \( \beta_{j}^U(x) \in (0, \chi) \) for all \( x \in [0, \chi) \).

For each \( \alpha_j \in [0, \chi) \), \( \beta_{j}^U(\alpha_j) \) is implicitly defined by

\[
\delta \alpha_{j+1}^R (\beta_{j}^U(\alpha_j)) - \delta \alpha_j^R (\alpha_j) = h \left( y_{j+1}^R, \omega_j \right) - h \left( y_j^R, \omega_{j+1} \right) ,
\]

where the left-hand side is continuously differentiable and monotonic in \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_{j+1} \), and the
right-hand side is constant in both social weights. Using the implicit function theorem, the derivative of $\beta_j^U$ with respect to $\alpha_j$ is given by

$$\frac{d\beta_j^U(\alpha_j)}{d\alpha_j} = \frac{d\delta_j^R(\alpha_j)}{d\alpha_j} > 0, \quad (38)$$

where the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive by Lemma 10. This derivative is continuous and strictly positive for all $\alpha_j \in [0, \chi]$.

Finally, Lemma 13 implies that $\beta_j^U$ has a unique fixed point at $\beta_j \in (1, \chi)$ whenever $a_j \in (1, a_j^U(\gamma))$ for some $\gamma \in (1, \chi)$. At this fixed point, the downward IC constraint is satisfied and $\frac{d\delta_j^R(\beta_j)}{d\alpha_j} < \frac{d\delta_j^R+1(\beta_j)}{d\alpha_j+1}$ by Lemma 11. Consequently, $\frac{d\beta_j^U(\beta_j)}{d\alpha_j} < 1$. $\square$

Finally, this allows us to prove Lemma 6.

Proof. Define $a_j^U := \sup \{a_j^U(\gamma) | \gamma \in (1, \chi)\}$. For all $a_j < \min \{a_j^0, a_j^U\}$, Lemmas 14 and 15 directly ensure the existence of two functions $\beta_j^D$ and $\beta_j^U$ with the properties stated in Lemma 6.

It only remains to prove that $\beta_j^U(\alpha_j) > \beta_j^D(\alpha_j)$ for all $\alpha_j \in [0, \chi)$. Note that $h \left( y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j \right) = h \left( y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1} \right) - h \left( y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j \right) - h \left( y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1} \right)$ by the properties of the effort cost function $h$. Hence, equations (35) and (37) imply that $\delta_{j+1}^R(\beta_j^U(x)) > \delta_{j+1}^R(\beta_j^D(x))$. Because $\delta_j^R$ is strictly increasing in $\alpha_j+1$ by Lemma 10, we have $\delta_j^U(x) > \delta_j^D(x)$ for all $x \in [0, \chi)$. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 1

I prove Proposition 1 through Lemmas 16 to 21, which identify properties of the optimal allocation $(c^*, y^*)$ for different sets of binding IC constraints along the skill dimension. To refer to these different constellations, I will henceforth say that two skill groups $j$ and $k$ are downwards-linked (upwards-linked) if all downward (upward) IC constraints between the pairs $(j, j+1)$, $(j+1, j)$, $(k-1, k)$, and $(k, k-1)$ are binding.

Lemma 16. For each $j \in J$, output $y_j^*$ and participation threshold $\delta_j^*$ satisfy the conditions

$$\delta_j^* = y_j^* - h(y_j^*, \omega_j) + \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{A_j(\delta_j^*)} + \frac{\nu_j^D - \nu_j^U}{f_j g_j(\delta_j^*)}, \quad (39)$$

$$1 - h(y_j^*, \omega_j) = \frac{h(y_j^*, \omega_j) - h(y_j^*, \omega_{j+1})}{f_j G_j(\delta_j^*)} \nu_j^D - \frac{h(y_j^*, \omega_{j-1}) - h(y_j^*, \omega_j)}{f_j G_j(\delta_j^*)} \nu_j^U, \quad (40)$$

where $\nu_j^D$ and $\nu_j^U$ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the downward IC (20) and the upward IC (18), respectively, between the workers with skill types $\omega_k$ and $\omega_{k+1}$.

Proof. The Lagrangian of the optimal tax problem is given by

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j \left( \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta_{j+1}} g_j(\delta) \gamma(\omega, \delta) \Psi(c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta) d\delta + \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta_{j+1}} g_j(\delta) \gamma(\omega, \delta) \Psi(c_0) d\delta \right)$$

50
\[ + \lambda \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_jG_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j + c_0) - c_0 \right] + \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \nu_j^D [c_{j+1} - h(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}) - c_j + h(y_j, \omega_{j+1})] + \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \nu_j^U [c_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - c_{j+1} + h(y_{j+1}, \omega_j)]. \]

For any \( j \in \{2, \ldots, n - 1\} \), the FOCs with respect to \( c_j \) and \( y_j \) are given by:

\[
\mathcal{L}_{c_j} = f_j \left[ G_j(\delta_j^0)(\alpha_j - \lambda) + \lambda g_j(\delta_j^0)(y_j^0 - c_j^0 + c_0^0) \right] + \nu_j^{D} - \nu_j^{U} + \nu_j^{U} = 0
\]

\[
\mathcal{L}_{y_j} = f_j \left[ -h_j(y_j^0, \omega_j) \left( G_j(\delta_j^0)\alpha_j + \lambda g_j(\delta_j^0)(y_j^0 - c_j^0 + c_0^0) \right) + \lambda G_j(\delta_j^0) \right] - (\nu_j^{U} + \nu_j^{D}) h_j(y_j^0, \omega_j) + \nu_j^D h_j(y_j^0, \omega_{j+1}) + \nu_j^{U} h_j(y_j^0, \omega_{j-1}) = 0
\]

The FOC with respect to \( c_0 \) is identical to the one for the relaxed problem (see Lemma 8). Combining the FOCs with respect to \( c_j \) for all \( j \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n\} \) gives \( \lambda = 1 \). Equation (39) then follows from rearranging the FOC with respect to \( c_j \). Combining the FOCs with respect \( c_j \) and \( y_j \) gives equation (40).

Below, I will exploit that, setting \( \nu_j^U = \nu_j^D = 0 \), Lemma 16 also provides the conditions for the solution to a relaxed problem that ignores the local IC constraints between the workers with skill types \( j \) and \( j + 1 \).

**Lemma 17.** For any \( \alpha \in A^k \), if \( k \) is the lowest skill group that is upwards-linked with \( l > k \), then

(i) \( \alpha_k > 1 \),

(ii) \( \delta_j^0 > y_j^0 - h(y_j^0, \omega_j) \) for all \( j \in \{k, \ldots, l\} \), and

(iii) \( \alpha_j > 1 \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \).

**Proof.** For part (i) note first that \( k \) and \( l > k \) cannot be upwards-linked unless either \( \alpha_{j+1} > \alpha_j(\beta_j^U) \) for at least one \( j \in \{k, \ldots, l - 1\} \) or the downward IC between \( l \) and \( l + 1 \) is binding, \( \nu_l^D > 0 \). Assume both conditions would be violated, and consider a relaxed problem where all local ICs between \( k \) and \( l \) are ignored. In the solution to this problem, \( \delta_k \geq \delta_k^R \), \( \delta_j = \delta_j^R \) for all \( j \in \{k + 1, \ldots, l\} \) and \( y_j = y_j^R \) for all \( j \in \{k, \ldots, l\} \). Hence, the solution to this relaxed problem satisfies all upward IC constraints between \( k \) and \( l \). Consequently, these upward IC constraints cannot be binding in \( (\alpha^R, y^R) \).

Second, assume that there is a skill group \( j \in \{k, \ldots, l - 1\} \) such that \( \alpha_{j+1} > \alpha_j(\beta_j^U) \). By Lemma 8, \( \alpha_j > \beta_j > 1 \). For the monotonicity of \( \alpha \in A \), this ensures that \( \alpha_k > 1 \).

Third, assume that the upward IC between \( l - 1 \) and \( l \) as well as the downward IC between \( l \) and \( l + 1 \) are binding and that \( \alpha_{j+1} \leq \alpha_j(\beta_j^U) \) for all \( j \in \{k, \ldots, l - 1\} \). Consider a relaxed problem where only the local ICs between skill groups \( l - 1 \) and \( l \) are ignored. In the solution to this relaxed problem, the downward IC between \( l \) and \( l + 1 \) has to be binding as well.
As usual, incentive compatibility also requires that optimal labor supply is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin in any skill group. If the downward IC constraint (29) is binding, then optimal labor supply is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin in any skill group $j$. Hence, this can only result if

$$
\left( \frac{1}{A_l(\delta_l)} - \frac{1}{A_{l-1}(\delta_{l-1})} \right) (\alpha_{l-1} - 1) + y_l - h(y_l, \omega_l) - \delta^*(\omega_{l-1}) > 0 ,
$$

where the last inequality follows by the definition of $\delta^*(\omega_{l-1})$. Recall that $A_l(\delta_{l-1}^{UP}) < A_{l-1}(\delta_{l-1}^{UP})$ by Lemma 2. Hence, the condition above can only be satisfied if $\alpha_{l-1}$ is strictly larger than 1. But this implies that $\alpha_k > 1$ for all $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^k$.

For part [iii] note that $k$ is by construction the lowest skill group that is upwards-linked to $l$, i.e., the upward IC between $k - 1$ and $k$ is not binding. Hence, $\delta_k^\alpha > y_k^\alpha - h(y_k^\alpha, \omega_k) + \frac{\alpha_{k-1}}{A_k(\delta_k^\alpha)} > y_k^\alpha - h(y_k^\alpha, \omega_k)$ because $\alpha_k > 1$ as shown in part [i]. By Lemma 16 we have $y_j^\alpha > y_j^{UP}$ for all $j \in \{k, \ldots, l - 1\}$ because the corresponding upward IC constraints are binding, i.e., $\nu_j^U > 0$. As usual, incentive compatibility also requires $y_{j+1}^\alpha > y_j^\alpha$. The single-crossing condition hence ensures that, for all $j \in \{k, \ldots, l - 1\}$, $y_j^\alpha - h(y_j^\alpha, \omega_j) > y_{j+1}^\alpha - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j)$ and

$$
\delta_{j+1}^\alpha = \delta_j^\alpha + h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j) - h(y_j^\alpha, \omega_j) > y_j^\alpha - h(y_j^\alpha, \omega_j) + h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j) - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1}) \geq y_{j+1}^\alpha - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1}) .
$$

For part [iii] finally, assume that $m$ is the highest skill group that is upwards-linked with $k$. By the previous arguments, $\delta_m^\alpha > y_m^\alpha - h(y_m^\alpha, \omega_m)$. At the same time, $\delta_m^\alpha < y_m^\alpha - h(y_m^\alpha, \omega_m) + (\alpha_m - 1)/A_m(\delta_m^\alpha)$ by equation (39). Both statements can only be consistent if $\alpha_m > 1$. For all $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^k$, we hence have $\alpha_j > 1$ for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$.

**Lemma 18.** For any $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^k$, if the skill groups $j$ and $j + 1$ are downwards-linked and $\delta_j^\alpha \leq y_j^\alpha - h(y_j^\alpha, \omega_j)$, then $(c^\alpha, y^\alpha)$ also involves $\delta_{j+1}^\alpha \leq y_{j+1}^\alpha - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_j)$.

**Proof.** If the downward IC constraint (29) is binding, $\delta_{j+1} = \delta_j + h(y_j, \omega_j) - h(y_j, \omega_{j+1})$. Hence, we have $\delta_{j+1} \leq y_{j+1}^\alpha - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1}) \leq y_{j+1}^\alpha - h(y_{j+1}^\alpha, \omega_{j+1})$. The second inequality results because $y_j \leq y_{j+1}$ in every incentive-compatible allocation and $y_{j+1}^\alpha \leq \arg \max_{y \geq 0} y - h(y, \omega_{j+1})$ if the skill groups $j$ and $j + 1$ are downwards-linked.

**Lemma 19.** For any $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^k$, there exists a number $k^\alpha \in \{0, n\}$ such that labor supply in skill group $j$ is upwards distorted at the extensive margin if and only if $j \in \{l \in J : l \leq k^\alpha\}$.

**Proof.** Fix some $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^k$. Consider a skill group $j$ for which labor supply in $(c^\alpha, y^\alpha)$ is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin, $\delta_j^\alpha \leq y_j^\alpha - h(y_j^\alpha, \omega_j)$. As I will show, this ensures that optimal labor supply is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin in any skill group $h > j$ as well.
By Lemma 17, \( j \) cannot be upwards-linked to other skill groups. Let \( l \) be the highest skill group to which \( j \) is downwards-linked. (Note that \( l \) equals \( j \) if the downward IC between skill groups \( j \) and \( j+1 \) is slack.) By Lemma 18, \( \delta_h^k \leq y_h^k - h(y_h^k, \omega_k) \) for all \( k \in \{j, \ldots, l\} \). By Lemma 16, we must at the same time have \( \delta_l^\alpha \geq y_l^\alpha - h(y_l^\alpha, \omega_l) + (\alpha_l - 1)/A_l(\delta_l^\alpha) \). Hence, we must have \( \alpha_l \leq 1 \).

Consequently, there cannot be upwards-linked skill groups above \( l \) by Lemma 16. For any unlinked skill group \( k > l \), \( \alpha_k < \alpha_l \leq 1 \) ensures that labor supply is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin. For any downwards-linked skill groups \( k > l \) and \( m \), \( \alpha_k < 1 \) and \( \nu_k^D > 0 \) jointly ensure that \( \delta_k < y_k^\alpha - h(y_k^\alpha, \omega_k) \). By Lemma 18, the same conditions holds for the skill groups \( k+1 \) to \( m \). Hence, labor supply is not upwards distorted at the extensive margin in any skill group \( h > j \).

**Lemma 20.** Consider some weight \( \alpha \in A^\chi \) such that the optimal tax problem has an interior solution \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\). Then,

(i) the consumption level \( c_0^\alpha \) of the unemployed is strictly positive;

(ii) there is a number \( k^\alpha \in (0, n) \) such that optimal output is

(a) upwards distorted at the extensive margin in skill group \( j \) if and only if \( j \leq k^\alpha \), and

(b) downwards distorted or undistorted at the intensive margin in skill group \( j \) for all \( j \geq k^\alpha \);

(iii) optimal output in the highest skill group \( n \) is undistorted at the intensive margin and downwards distorted at the extensive margin.

**Proof.** (i) Consider some implementable and Pareto-efficient allocation \((c, y)\) with \( c_0 \leq 0 \). In this allocation, the feasibility condition must be satisfied with equality, so that \( c_0 = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j + c_0) \leq 0 \). Moreover, an increase in \( c_0 \) must not self-financing. I will show that there exists a marginal variation that is feasible, incentive-compatible and welfare-increasing given any weight sequence \( \alpha \in A^\chi \).

Consider an allocation \((\tilde{c}, \tilde{y})\) with \( \tilde{c}_j = c_j - \epsilon \) for all \( j \in J \) and \( \tilde{c}_0 \) chosen to balance the feasibility condition. In particular, consider a marginal increase in \( \epsilon \) from \( \epsilon = 0 \). This leaves the IC constraints between all workers satisfied, but induces some workers in all skill groups to leave the labor force. Taking these responses into account, we have

\[
\frac{dc_0}{d\epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j) - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j)Z_j}{1 - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j) + \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j)Z_j},
\]

where the denominator is strictly positive (otherwise, an increase in \( c_0 \) would be self-financing) and \( Z_j = \frac{g_j(\delta_j)}{G_j(\delta_j)}(y_j - c_j + c_0) = \frac{g_j(\delta_j)}{G_j(\delta_j)}(y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta_j) \). If allocation \((c, y)\) is welfare-optimal, there is a unique number \( k \in (0, n) \) such that \( Z_j < 0 \) for all \( j < k \) and \( Z_j \geq 0 \) for all \( j \geq k \) by Lemma 18. Moreover, \( \frac{g_j(\delta_j)}{G_j(\delta_j)} = \frac{A_j(\delta_j)}{A_k(\delta_k)} > \frac{A_j(\delta_j)}{A_k(\delta_k)} \) for all \( j < k \) and
Lemma 21. For all $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$, the optimal tax problem has a maximum $(c^\alpha, y^\alpha)$ with $\delta_j \in [\underline{\delta}, \overline{\delta})$.

Proof. Fix some $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$. By Lemma 19, the FOCs with respect to $y_j$ and $\delta_j$ are satisfied by a unique tuple $(y_j^\alpha, \delta_j^\alpha)$ if the local IC constraints between skill groups $j$, $j-1$ and $j+1$ are non-binding. In the following, I only consider the cases where skill group $j$ is either downwards-linked or upwards-linked to skill group $j+1$ only. Similar proofs are available on request for cases where some skill groups $k$ and $l > k + 1$ are downwards-linked or upwards-linked.
First, assume that the downward IC (29) between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$ is binding. For simplicity, I henceforth write $H_j(y_j) := h(y_j, \omega_j) - h(y_j, \omega_{j+1})$. The FOCs with respect to $c_j$, $c_{j+1}$ and $y_j$ (see Lemma 16) can be combined to get the optimality conditions
\[
\begin{align*}
Z_1(y_j, \delta_j) &= B_j(\delta_j, y_j) + B_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}, y_{j+1}) = 0 \\
Z_2(y_j, \delta_j) &= B_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}, y_{j+1}) + f_j G_j(\delta_j) C_j(y_j) = 0,
\end{align*}
\]
where I define $B_k(\delta_k, y_k) := f_k [G_k(\delta_k)(\alpha_k - 1) + g_k(\delta_k)(y_k - h(y_k, \omega_k) - \delta_k)]$ and $C_j(y_j) := \left[1 - h_y(y_j, \omega_j)\right] / H_j(y_j)$. By the binding downward IC constraint, we have $1 - h_y(y_j, \omega_j) > 0$, $C_j > 0$, $B_{j+1} < 0$ and $B_j > 0$ in allocation $(\epsilon^\alpha, \eta^\alpha)$. $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are continuous in $y_j$, $\delta_j$ and $\delta_{j+1}$. Moreover, I will show that $Z_1$ has a root in $\delta_j$ at which $\partial Z_1 / \partial \delta_j < 0$, and that $Z_2$ has a root in $y_j$ at which $\partial Z_2 / \partial y_j < 0$.

To start, consider function $Z_1$ for some fixed level $y_j < y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. Function $B_j(\delta_j, y_{j+1}^{\alpha R})$ has a unique root $\delta_{j+1} \in (\delta, \delta_j)$ for any $\alpha_k \in [0, \chi]$ by Lemma 5. Function $\tilde{B}_{j+1}(\delta_j) := B_{j+1}(\delta_j + H_j(y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}), y_{j+1}^{\alpha R})$ either has a unique root $\delta_{j+2}$ in $(\delta, \delta_j)$ as well, or it is negative for all $\delta_{j+1} \in \Delta$. In the first case, $\tilde{\delta} < \delta_{j+2} < \delta_{j+1} < \delta$. By Lemma 5, $B_k$ is strictly decreasing in $\delta_k$ at its roots for any $k \in J$. For any $y_j < y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$, the root $\delta_{j+2}$ is increased, while the root $\delta_{j+1}$ is decreased. As $B_j$ and $B_{j+1}$ are continuous, $Z_1$ must have a root in the interval $(\delta_{j+2}, \delta_{j+1})$. In the second case, if $\delta_{j+2} = \delta_j$ results if and only if $B_j(\delta, y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}) + B_{j+1}(\delta + H_j(y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}), y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}) < 0$.

Next, consider $Z_2$ for some fixed $\delta_j \in (\delta, \delta_j)$. At any root of $Z_2$ in $y_j$, we have $B_{j+1} < 0$ and $C_j(y_j) > 0$. Note that $C_j'(y_j) = -h_y(y_j, \omega_j)H_j'(y_j) + H_j''(y_j) / H_j(y_j)$. By $h_y < 0$ and $h_{y\omega} \leq 0$, $C_j'(y_j) < 0$ for all $y_j \leq y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. The root $y_{j+1}$ of $B_{j+1}$ must again be located left of $y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$, the root of $C_j$. Hence, function $Z_2$ has a root $y_j$ in the interval $(y_{j+1}, y_{j+1}^{\alpha R})$.

Second, assume that the upward IC constraint (53) is binding. Recall that this only results for $\alpha_{j+1} > 1$ and $\alpha_{j+1} > 1$. Then, the optimal tuple $(\delta_j, y_{j+1})$ is implicitly defined by
\[
\begin{align*}
Z_3(y_{j+1}, \delta_j) &= B_j(\delta_j, y_j) + B_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}, y_{j+1}) = 0 \\
Z_4(y_{j+1}, \delta_j) &= B_{j+1}(\delta_{j+1}, y_{j+1}) + f_j G_j(\delta_j) C_j(y_j) = 0,
\end{align*}
\]
where $C_{j+1}(y_{j+1}) := \left[1 - h_y(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1})\right] / H_j(y_{j+1})$. By the binding upward IC constraint, we have $1 - h_y(y_{j+1}, \omega_{j+1}) < 0$, $C_j(y_{j+1}) < 0$, $B_{j+1} > 0$ and $B_j < 0$ in this optimum.

Again, I start by showing that $Z_3$ has a root in $\delta_j$ for some fixed $y_{j+1} > y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. Function $B_j$ has a unique root $\delta_{j+3} \in (\delta^*(\omega_j), \lim_{\alpha_j \to \chi} \delta_{j+1}^{\alpha R})$. For any $y_{j+1} < y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$, function $\tilde{B}_{j+1}(\delta_j) = B_{j+1}(\delta_j + H_j(y_{j+1}), y_{j+1})$ has a unique root $\delta_{j+4}$ such that $\delta_{j+4} < H_j(y_{j+1})$ is below the optimal $\delta_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$ for $\alpha_{j+1} < \chi$. Both functions are strictly positive left of these roots, and strictly negative right of these roots. As $B_{j+1} > 0$ and $B_j < 0$ must be satisfied, $\delta_{j+3} < \delta_{j+4}$. Hence, $Z_3$ must have a root in $\delta_j$ in the interval $(\delta_{j+3}, \delta_{j+4})$.

Finally, consider function $Z_4$ for some fixed $\delta_j > \delta_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. $B_{j+1}$ has a unique root in $y_{j+1}$ above $y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$, while $C_{j+1}(y_{j+1})$ has a unique root at $y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. Both $B_{j+1}$ and $C_{j+1}$ are strictly decreasing at their roots. Hence, $Z_4$ has a root in $y_{j+1}$ with $y_{j+1} > y_{j+1}^{\alpha R}$. \[\Box\]
Proof of Proposition 2

I prove Proposition 2 in two steps, starting with a preliminary Lemma.

Lemma 22. Consider a partially relaxed version of the optimal tax problem in which all constraints from the relaxed problem and, additionally, all local IC constraints between the workers in skill groups 1 and k are taken into account. For any \( \alpha \in A_k^U \), optimal output in the solution \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\) to this partially relaxed problem is

- upwards distorted at the intensive margin in skill groups \( \{2, \ldots, k\} \);
- upwards distorted at the extensive margin in skill groups \( \{1, \ldots, k\} \).

Proof. Fix some \( \alpha \in A_k^U \). By Lemma 15, the relaxed problem’s solution \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\) violates the upward IC for at least one pair of skill groups \( (j, j+1) \) with \( j \in \{1, \ldots, k-1\} \), where \( \alpha_{j+1} < \beta^D_j(\alpha_j) \).

For the first step, consider the intermediate problem \( A \) that takes into account the local IC constraints between skill groups \( j \) and \( j+1 \), but ignores the ICs between all other skill pairs. I denote the solution to this problem by \((c^A, y^A)\). By \( \beta^U_j(\alpha_j) \), the upward IC is binding with \( \nu^U_j > 0 \). From Lemma 16, we know that \( y^A_{j+1} < y^\alpha_{j+1}, \delta^A_j = \delta^\alpha_j \) and \( \delta^A_{j+1} = \delta^\alpha_{j+1} \). For any other skill groups \( l \), we have \( y_l^A = y_l^\alpha \) and \( \delta_l^A = \delta_l^\alpha \). In particular, this is true for skill group \( j+2 \). If \( j+2 \leq k \), \((c^A, y^A)\) violates the upward IC constraint between skill groups \( j+1 \) and \( j+2 \), because \( \delta^R_{j+2} - \delta^R_{j+1} \geq h(y^R_{j+2}, \omega_{j+1}) - h(y^R_{j+2}, \omega_{j+1}) \) by construction for any \( \alpha \in A_k^U \).

For the second step, consider the intermediate problem \( A2 \) that takes into account the local IC constraints between the skill groups \( j, j+1 \) and \( j+2 \). In the solution \((c^{A2}, y^{A2})\) to problem \( A2 \), both upward IC constraints are binding with \( \nu^U_j > 0 \) and \( \nu^U_{j+1} > 0 \). Consequently, we have \( y^A_{j+2} > y^\alpha_{j+2}, y^A_{j+1} > y^\alpha_{j+1}, \delta^A_{j+2} < \delta^\alpha_{j+2} \) and \( \delta^A_{j+1} = \delta^\alpha_{j+1} \), while \( y^A_{j+3} = y^\alpha_{j+3} \) and \( \delta^A_{j+3} = \delta^\alpha_{j+3} \). These inequalities imply that, if \( j+3 \leq k \), \((c^{A2}, y^{A2})\) violates the upward IC between skill groups \( j+2 \) and \( j+3 \) for any \( \alpha \in A_k^U \). The same arguments can be repeated to show that, in the solution to problem \( B \) that takes into account the local ICs between skill groups \( \{j, \ldots, k\} \) only, all upward IC constraints are binding and labor supply in each skill group \( j \in \{j+1, \ldots, k\} \) is upwards distorted at the intensive margin.

For the third step, note that the solution to problem \( B \) involves \( y_j^B = y_j^\alpha, \delta_j^B > \delta_j^\alpha \) and \( \delta_{j-1}^B = \delta_{j-1}^\alpha \). Hence, this allocation violates the upward IC constraint between skill groups \( j-1 \) and \( j \) for any \( \alpha \in A_k^U \). In problem \( B2 \) that takes into account the local ICs between skill groups \( \{j-1, \ldots, k\} \) only, all upwards IC constraints are binding again. Hence, we have \( y_j^{B2} > y_j^\alpha, y_{j-1}^{B2} = y_{j-1}^\alpha, \delta_{j-1}^{B2} > \delta_{j-1}^\alpha \) and \( \delta_{j-2}^{B2} = \delta_{j-2}^\alpha \), which ensures that the upward IC between skill groups \( j-2 \) and \( j-1 \) is violated. The same arguments can be repeated to show that, in allocation \((c^P, y^P)\), all upward IC constraints along the skill dimension are binding and that labor supply is downwards distorted at the intensive margin in each skill group \( j \in \{2, \ldots, k\} \).

Finally, Lemma 17 implies that, if skill groups 1 and \( k \) are upwards-linked, then labor supply in all these skill groups is upwards distorted at the extensive margin.

Building on Lemma 22, I can now prove Proposition 2.
**Proof.** Fix some $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}_k^U$ such that $\alpha_{j+1} \leq \beta_j^U(\alpha_j)$ for all $j \in \{k,\ldots,n-1\}$, i.e., that the solution to the relaxed problem violates no upward IC except the ones between skill groups $k$ and $k+1$. This also implies that $\alpha_j > \alpha_{j+1} > 1$ for all $j \in \{1,\ldots,k-1\}$. The following proof focuses on this case. The results derived below hold for the alternative case that $(c^{\alpha R},y^{\alpha R})$ violates additional upward ICs among higher-skilled workers a forteriori. To economize on notation, I write $H_k(y_j) := h(y_j,\omega_k) - h(y_j,\omega_{k+1})$ in the following.

Consider an auxiliary problem $A$ that takes into account all local IC constraints except the ones between skill groups $k$ and $k+1$. By Lemma [22] the solution $(c^A,y^A)$ involves binding upward IC between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$ with $\nu_j^U > 0$ for all $j \in \{1,\ldots,k-1\}$, while all other local IC constraints are non-binding with $\nu_j^D = \nu_j^U = 0$ for all $j \in \{k+1,\ldots,n-1\}$. Recall that the relaxed problem’s solution satisfies both neglected IC constraints for any $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}_k^U$, i.e.,

$$H_k(y_k^{\alpha R}) \leq \delta_k^{\alpha R} - \delta_k^{\alpha R} \leq H_k(y_{k+1}^{\alpha R}).$$

By Lemma [16], the solution $(c^A,y^A)$ involves $y_k^A > y_k^{\alpha R}$, $\delta_k^A < \delta_k^{\alpha R}$ and $y_j^A = y_j^{\alpha R}$ as well as $\delta_j^A = \delta_j^{\alpha R}$ for all $j > k$. By $h_{yw} < 0$, $y_k^A > y_k^{\alpha R}$ implies that $H_k(y_k^A) > H_k(y_k^{\alpha R})$. Hence, $(c^A,y^A)$ may violate the downward IC between $k$ and $k+1$, the corresponding upward IC or none of them. If $(c^A,y^A)$ satisfies both IC constraints, we have $(c^\alpha,y^\alpha) = (c^A,y^A)$. In the following, I consider the remaining two cases.

First, assume that $(c^A,y^A)$ violates the downward IC constraint between skill groups $k$ and $k+1$. Consider problem $B$ that takes into account all local IC constraints except those between $k+1$ and $k+2$. In its solution $(c^B,y^B)$, the upward IC between $k-1$ and $k$ and the downward IC between $k$ and $k+2$ are binding with $\nu_{k-1}^U > 0$ and $\nu_{k+2}^D > 0$. Hence, we have $\delta_k^B < \delta_k^{\alpha R}$ and $\delta_{k+1}^B > \delta_{k+1}^{\alpha R}$. By the binding downward IC, we have $H_k(y_k^B) = \delta_{k+1}^B - \delta_k^B > \delta_{k+1}^{\alpha R} - \delta_k^{\alpha R} = H_k(y_k^{\alpha R})$. This ensures that $y_k^B > y_k^{\alpha R}$ by $h_{yw} < 0$. Note further that (i) $\delta_k^B < \delta_k^A$ and (ii) $y_j^B = y_j^{\alpha R}$ and $\delta_j^B = \delta_j^{\alpha R}$ for all $j > k+1$. By (i), the upward IC between $k-1$ and $k$ continues to be binding. By (ii), allocation $(c^B,y^B)$ satisfies the (neglected) upward IC between skill groups $k+1$ and $k+2$, and may satisfy or violate the corresponding downward IC. Adding the IC constraints for all skill groups above $k+1$ stepwise, similar arguments as in the proof to Proposition [3] in Appendix [B.1] can be applied to show that the optimal allocation $(c^\alpha,y^\alpha)$ satisfies the following conditions:

(a) the upward ICs between all skill levels $1$ and $k$ are binding and $y_j^\alpha > y_j^{\alpha R}$ for all $j \in \{2,\ldots,k\}$,

(b) $y^\alpha$ is upwards distorted at the extensive margin in all skill groups $1$ to $k$ by Lemma [17],

(c) there is a unique skill group $l \in \{k+1,\ldots,n\}$ such that the skill groups $k$ and $l$ are downwards-linked, while all skill groups between $l$ and $n$ are unlinked.

Second, assume that $(c^A,y^A)$ violates the upward IC constraint between skill groups $k$ and $k+1$. Then, allocation $(c^B,y^B)$ involves binding upward ICs between $k-1$ and $k$ as well as between $k$ and $k+1$. Hence, we have $\delta_{k+1}^B < \delta_{k+1}^{\alpha R}$ and $y_{k+1}^B > y_{k+1}^{\alpha R}$. By the previous arguments, allocation $(c^B,y^B)$ may violate the downward IC between $k+1$ and $k+2$, the corresponding...
upward IC or none of both. In all three cases, skill groups 1 and \(k + 1\) continue to be upwards-linked in \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\) and \(y_j^\alpha > y_j^{\alpha R}\) for all \(j \in \{2, \ldots, k + 1\}\) as shown above. Besides, labor supply in all skill groups \(j \in \{1, \ldots, k + 1\}\) is upwards distorted at the extensive margin in \((c^\alpha, y^\alpha)\) by Lemma 17. The same arguments can be repeated to show that there always exists a skill group \(l \in \{k + 1, \ldots, n - 1\}\) such that the skill groups 1 and \(l\) are upwards-linked and (a) either all skill groups between \(l\) and \(n\) are unlinked or (b) there is a skill group \(q \in \{l, \ldots, n\}\) such that the skill groups \(l\) and \(q\) are downwards-linked, while all skill groups between \(q\) and \(n\) are unlinked. Finally, note that skill groups 1 and \(n\) cannot be upwards-linked, i.e., \(l \neq n\), by Proposition 4.

**Proof of Proposition 3**

Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of regular combinations of \(\Psi\) and \(\gamma\) such that the endogenous (average) welfare weights \(\tilde{\alpha}\) are elements of the set \(\mathcal{A}^U\). It is proven in Lemmas 23 and 24 below by example, for \(\Psi\) being equal to the identity function, i.e., \(\Psi(x) = x\) for all \(x \in \mathbb{R}\).

**Lemma 23.** Fix some \(k \in \{2, \ldots, n - 1\}\) and consider a sequence \(\alpha'(\tau) = \left(\alpha'_j(\tau)\right)_{j=k}^n\) such that \(\alpha'_{k}(\tau) = \tau\) and \(\alpha'_{j+1}(\tau) = \beta_j^D(\alpha'_j(\tau))\) for all \(j \in \{k, \ldots, n - 1\}\). For any \(\tau \in (1, \chi)\), there is a unique natural number \(m^k \geq k + 1\) such that \(\alpha'_j(\tau) < 1\) if only if \(j \in \{m^k, \ldots, n\}\).

**Proof.** By Lemma 14, \(\beta_j^D(\alpha_j) < \alpha_j\) for all \(\alpha_j > 1\) and \(\beta_j^D(\alpha_j) < 1\) for all \(\alpha_j < 1\) (for any \(j \in J_{-n}\)). Hence, there exists at most one natural number \(m\) such that \(\alpha'_m \geq 1\) and \(\alpha'_m < 1\). It remains to show that there is a real number \(\mu' > 0\) such that \(\alpha_j - \beta_j^D(\alpha_j) > \mu'\) for all \(j \in J\) and all \(\alpha_j \in [1, \chi]\). If this is true, \(\alpha'_j(\tau) < \max\{\tau - (j - k)\mu', 1\}\) for all \(j > k\). Hence, \(\alpha'_j(\tau) < 1\) is ensured for all \(j > k + \frac{\tau - 1}{\mu'}\), which directly implies that \(m^k < k + \frac{\tau - 1}{\mu'}\) and that \(\alpha_n < 1\) whenever \(n\) is large enough. The following proof shows that this is true under Condition 3.

With some abuse of notation, I henceforth denote by \(\delta_k^{\alpha R}(\alpha_k)\) the level of \(\delta_k\) in \((c^{\alpha R}, y^{\alpha R})\) given social weight \(\alpha_k\). By construction, function \(\beta_j^D\) satisfies

\[
\delta_j^{\alpha R}(\beta_j^D(x)) - \delta_j^{\alpha R}(x) = h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_j) - h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1}),
\]

while, for all \(x \geq 1\),

\[
\delta_j^{\alpha R}(x) - \delta_j^{\alpha R}(\beta_j^D(x)) \geq \delta^*(\omega_{j+1}) - \delta^*(\omega_j) - \left[h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_j) - h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1})\right]
\]

\[
= y_j^{\alpha R} - h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1}) - [y_j^{\alpha R} - h(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1})]
\]

\[
= \int_{y_j^{\alpha R}}^{y_j^{\alpha R}} [1 - h(y, \omega_{j+1})] dy
\]

\[
= \int_{y_j^{\alpha R}}^{y_j^{\alpha R}} \left[1 - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{h_y(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1}) - h(y, \omega_{j+1})}{h_y(y, \omega_{j+1})}}\right] dy,
\]

where I exploit that \(h_y(y_j^{\alpha R}, \omega_{j+1}) = 1\). Let \(\hat{\gamma}(\omega) := \arg\max_{y \in \mathbb{R}} y - h(y, \omega)\), and \(\hat{w}(y) :=

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Moreover, for any $A_n$ where $\mu_3$ is bound away from zero for any $\omega' \in (\omega, \omega_j + 1)$. In particular, let $\omega' = \sqrt{\omega_j \omega_{j+1}}$ and recall that, by assumption, $\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j \geq 1 + \varepsilon$ for all $j \in J - n$ and some number $\varepsilon > 0$. Denoting $\bar{\varepsilon} = \ln (1 + \varepsilon)$, we get

$$
\delta_j^{oR}(x) - \delta^{oR}_j(\beta^D_j(x)) > \frac{(\mu_2 \bar{\varepsilon})^2}{\mu_1 + \mu_2 \bar{\varepsilon}} y_j^R
$$

where $\mu_3$ is bound away from zero for any $j \in J - n$.

From equation (32), the left-hand side of the last inequality can also be written as

$$
\int_{\beta^D_j(x)}^x \frac{d\delta_j^{oR}(x')}dx' = \int_{\beta^D_j(x)}^x \left[ A_{j+1} \left( \frac{\delta_j^{oR}(x')}{\beta^D_j(x')} \right) \right]^{-1} dx'
$$

By Lemma 2, $A_j(\delta_j^{oR}) > A_n(\delta_n^{oR})$ in any allocation that satisfies all downward IC constraints. Moreover, $\alpha_j'(\tau) \leq \tau$ for all $j \geq k$, and $1 - a_j \left( \delta_j^{oR} / A_j(\delta_j^{oR}) \right) < 1 / (\chi - 1)$ for any $\alpha \in A^x$ by the construction of $\chi$ (see Lemma 5). Hence, $d\delta_j^{oR}(x')/dx$ is strictly smaller than $\mu_4 := A_n[\delta_n^{oR}(\tau)]^{-1}(\chi - 1) / (\chi - \tau)$ for all $j \in J$ and $x' \in [1, \tau]$. For all $j \geq k$ and $\alpha \in [1, \tau]$, we consequently have

$$
\int_{\beta^D_j(x)}^x \mu_4 dx' = \mu_4 \left[ x - \beta^D_j(x) \right] > \mu_3 y_j^R \leftrightarrow x - \beta^D_j(x) > \frac{\mu_3}{\mu_4} y_j^R =: \mu'.
$$

As argued above, this ensures that $\tau - \alpha_j'(\tau) = \sum_{i=k}^{j-1} \left( \alpha_k'(\tau) - \beta^D_k(\alpha_k'(\tau)) \right) > (j - k)\mu'$ if
\(\alpha'(\tau) \geq 1, \text{ and } \alpha'_j(\tau) < 1 \text{ for all } j > k + \frac{\tau - 1}{\mu'}\). Hence, there exists a level \(m^k \in [k+1, k+(\tau-1)/\mu']\) such that, if \(n > m^k\), we have \(\alpha_j < 1\) if and only if \(j \geq m^k\).

**Lemma 24.** Define \(\hat{\alpha}^k_z(\zeta) := \min\{a^1_z(\zeta), \ldots, a^u_z(\zeta)\}\). Let Condition \[\bar{z}\] and \(\bar{w}_{j+1}/\bar{w}_{j} < \hat{\alpha}^k_z(\zeta)\) be satisfied for all \(j \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\}\) and some \(\zeta \in (1, \chi)\). Then, there exist a number \(m^k \geq k + 1\) and two vectors \((\phi^k\gamma)_{j=1}^n, (\bar{\phi}^k\gamma)_{j=1}^n\) with \(\phi^k_0 < \bar{\phi}^k_0\), \(\phi^k_j > 1 \geq \bar{\phi}^k_{m^k-1}\) and \(\delta^k_j \in (\delta, \hat{\delta})\) for all \(j \in J\) such that, if

\[
(i) \quad n \geq m^k \text{ and } \\
(ii) \quad \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta^k_j) \phi^k_j > 1,
\]

there exist regular combinations of \(\Psi\) and \(\gamma\) for which \(\bar{\alpha} \in A_k^U\).

**Proof.** Assume that \(\Psi\) is the identity function and fix some number \(\hat{\delta} \in (\delta(\omega_n), \bar{\delta})\). Recall that \(\bar{\beta}_j\) is the fixed point of function \(\beta^U_j\), which exists if \(\bar{w}_{j+1}/\bar{w}_j < \alpha^U_j(\zeta)\) for some \(\zeta \in (1, \chi)\) under Conditions \[1\] and \[2\]. Define \(\hat{\beta}^k_j := \max\{\bar{\beta}_j, \ldots, \bar{\beta}_{k-1}\}\), \(\gamma^k = \hat{\beta}^k_1\), \(\gamma^k = \min\{\hat{\beta}^k_1, \beta^U_1(\gamma_{j-1})\}\) for all \(j \in \{2, \ldots, k\}\) and \(\gamma^k_j = \max\{\beta^U_j(\gamma_{j-1}), \bar{\beta}_j, \ldots, \bar{\beta}_{n-1}\}\) for all \(j \in \{k+1, \ldots, n\}\). By construction, \(\gamma^k_j \leq \gamma^k_1\) for all \(j \in J_n\). By Lemma \[23\] there is a number \(m^k \geq k + 1\) such that \(\gamma^k_j < 1\) if and only if \(j \in \{m^k, \ldots, n\}\) whenever \(n \geq m^k\) (i.e., if \(n\) in the Lemma above holds).

Now, consider the type-dependent weighting function \(\hat{\gamma}^k : \Omega \times \Delta \to \mathbb{R}\) such that

\[
\hat{\gamma}^k(\omega_j, \delta) = \begin{cases} \\
\gamma^k_j = 1 - \sum_{\gamma^k_j} f_j G_j(\delta) \gamma^k_j & \text{for } j \in J, \delta < \hat{\delta}, \\
\gamma^k_0 = 1 - \sum_{\gamma^k_0} f_j G_j(\delta) \gamma^k_0 & \text{for } j \in J, \delta \geq \hat{\delta}.
\end{cases}
\]

Let \(\delta^k_j \) be equal to \(\delta^j_{\alpha^k}(\gamma^k_j)\) for each \(j \in J\). Then, the implied average weight \(\bar{\alpha}_n\) (among workers in skill group \(n\)) equals \(\gamma_n < 1\), and \(\delta^k_n < \delta^*(\omega_n) < \bar{\delta}\). Moreover, the average weight of workers in skill group \(j\) is given by \(\bar{\alpha}_j = \gamma^k_j\) and \(\delta^k_j < \delta^k_{\alpha^k}(\gamma^k_j) < \bar{\delta}\) for all \(j \in J_n\) (as all downward IC constraints are satisfied, see proof of Lemma \[2\]). Finally, the average social weight of the unemployed is given by \(\bar{\alpha}_0 = 1 - \sum_{\gamma^k_0} f_j G_j(\delta^k_0) / \left[1 - \sum_{\gamma^k_0} f_j G_j(\delta^k_0)\right]\).

By construction, \(\bar{\alpha}^k_0 \geq \bar{\beta}^U_j(\bar{\alpha}_j)\) for all \(j \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\}\) and \(\bar{\alpha}_j \geq \bar{\beta}^U_j(\bar{\alpha}_j)\) for all \(j \in \{k, \ldots, n - 1\}\). Moreover, \(\bar{\alpha}_j \geq \bar{\alpha}_{j+1}\) for all \(j \in J\) and \(\bar{\alpha}_j > \bar{\alpha}_{j+1}\) for all \(j \in \{k, \ldots, m^k\}\). We also have \(\bar{\alpha}_0 > \bar{\alpha}_1 = \beta^U_1\) if and only if

\[
\sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta^k_j) \left[\hat{\beta}^k_1 - \gamma^k_j\right] > \hat{\beta}^k_1 - 1. \tag{41}
\]

Let \(\delta^k_j = (\beta^k_1 - \gamma^k_j)/(\hat{\beta}^k_1 - 1)\) for all \(j \in J\). Then, condition \[iii\] in Lemma \[24\] ensures \(\bar{\alpha}_0 > \beta^U_1\).

For the final step, note that the average welfare weights \(\bar{\alpha}\) are not an element of \(A_k^U\) given \(\gamma\) because \(\bar{\alpha}_j = \bar{\alpha}_{j+1} = \bar{\beta}_j = \beta^U_j(\bar{\beta}_j)\) for at least one \(j \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\}\). Consider the weighting function \(\gamma^*\) such that

\[
\gamma^*(\omega_j, \delta) = \begin{cases} \\
\gamma^*_j = \gamma^k_j + \varepsilon_k & \text{for } j \in \{1, \ldots, k\}, \delta < \hat{\delta}, \\
\gamma^*_j = \max\{\beta^D_j(\gamma^*_j), \bar{\beta}_j, \ldots, \bar{\beta}_{n-1}\} & \text{for } j \in \{3, \ldots, n\}, \delta < \hat{\delta}, \\
\gamma^*_j = 1 - \sum_{\gamma^k_j} f_j G_j(\delta) \gamma^k_j & \text{for } j \in J, \delta \geq \hat{\delta}.
\end{cases}
\]
where $\delta_j$ is the level of $\delta$ in the relaxed problem’s solution given $\alpha_j = \gamma_j$ for each $j \in J$. For each $j \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$, fix $\varepsilon_j$ at some level in $(0, \chi - \beta_k)$ such that $\varepsilon_j > \varepsilon_{j+1}$. By Lemma 13, for any $j$ such that $\gamma_j = \gamma_{j+1}$, there is a unique number $\bar{\varepsilon}(\varepsilon_{j+1}) > 0$ such that $\gamma_{j+1} \geq \beta_{j+1}^U(\gamma_j)$ if and only if $\varepsilon_j - \varepsilon_{j+1} \in (0, \bar{\varepsilon}(\varepsilon_{j+1}))$. If the difference $\varepsilon_j - \varepsilon_{j+1}$ is sufficiently small for each $j \in \{1, \ldots, k-1\}$, the resulting average weight $\bar{\alpha}_0$ of the unemployed agents continues to be strictly larger than $\gamma_j$. Hence, the implied average weights satisfy $\bar{\alpha}_j > \bar{\alpha}_{j+1}$ for all $j \in \{0, \ldots, m-1\}$. Consequently, $\bar{\alpha} \in A^U$ results if $\gamma_{j+1} \leq \gamma_j$ for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ as well. (If $\gamma$ involves $\gamma_{j+1} = \gamma_j$ for some $j \geq m$, then one can construct a weighting function $\gamma$ that is strictly decreasing over the skill dimension and has otherwise identical properties, i.e., for which $\bar{\alpha} \in A^U_k$.)

### Proof of Lemma 7

**Proof.** First, note that minimizing the deadweight loss (5) is equivalent to maximizing the term $\sum_{j=1}^n f_j f_j g_j(\delta) [y_j - h(y_j, \omega) - \delta] d\delta$ over $c$ and $y$. The Lagrangian for the problem of efficient redistribution is hence given by

$$
\mathcal{L} = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j \int_2^{\delta_j} g_j(\delta) [y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta] d\delta + \lambda_E \left[ \sum_{j=3}^m f_j G_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j) - R \right] + \lambda_F \left[ \sum_{j=3}^m f_j g_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j) - \bar{\delta} \right] + \lambda_E \left[ \sum_{j=1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j)(c_j - y_j) - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j [1 - G_j(\delta_j)] c_0 - R \right] + \mu [c_1 - h(y_1, \omega_1) - c_2 + h(y_2, \omega_1)] ,
$$

where I have included the constraints that resources $R$ are transferred away from the workers in skill groups 3 and higher (Lagrange parameter $\lambda_F$), the same resources are transferred towards the unemployed and the workers in skill groups 1 and 2 ($\lambda_E$), and the upward IC constraint between the workers in skill groups 1 and 2 ($\mu$). Note that the first two constraints are binding in the solution of the efficient redistribution problem for any $R > 0$. Hence, $\lambda_E$ and $\lambda_F$ are strictly positive in any solution.

First, I solve the problem ignoring the upward IC constraint, and denote the solution by $(c^E, y^E)$. The FOCs with respect to $c_j$ and $y_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ are given by

$$
\mathcal{L}_{c_j} = (1 - \lambda_E) f_j g_j(\delta_j) [y_j^E - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) - \delta_j^E] + \lambda_E f_j G_j(\delta_j^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) \right] - h(y_j^E, \omega_j)(1 - \lambda_E) f_j g_j(\delta_j^E) [y_j^E - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) - \delta_j^E] - \lambda_E f_j G_j(\delta_j^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) \right] = 0 ,
$$

$$
\mathcal{L}_{y_j} = f_j G_j(\delta_j^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) \right] - h(y_j^E, \omega_j)(1 - \lambda_E) f_j g_j(\delta_j^E) \left[ y_j^E - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) - \delta_j^E \right] - \lambda_E f_j G_j(\delta_j^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) \right] = 0 .
$$

The combination of both FOCs yields that labor supply in both low-skill groups is undistorted at the intensive margin, $h(y_j^E, \omega_j) = 1$, which also implies $y_j^E - h(y_j^E, \omega_j) = \delta^*(\omega_j)$. Rearranging the first condition, we additionally get the inverse elasticity rule (24). From the second-order condition, $\lambda_E$ has to attain a value below some bound $\hat{\lambda} < 1$ at any solution (the exact level of $\hat{\lambda}$ depends on the type distribution $K$). Hence, $\delta_j^E \geq \delta^*(\omega_j)$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ and any $R > 0$ such that an interior solution exists. From Lemma 2, we know that

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\( \eta_1(c, y) = \frac{g_1(\delta_1)}{c_1(\delta_1)} > \eta_2(c, y) = \frac{g_2(\delta_2)}{c_2(\delta_2)} \) in any incentive-compatible allocation, which implies that \( c_2^{ER} - y_2^{ER} > c_1^{ER} - y_1^{ER} \). Hence, allocation \((c^{ER}, y^{ER})\) satisfies the downward IC \((22)\), and might satisfy or violate the upward IC \((23)\).

Fix a number \( R > 0 \), the type distribution \( K \) and all skill levels except \( \omega_2 \). Similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma \([13][1]\) can be applied to show that there is some number \( a^E > 1 \) such that the upward IC constraint is violated by the allocation \((c^{ER}, y^{ER})\) whenever \( \omega_2 \in (\omega_1, a^E \omega_1) \).

First, consider the limit case \( \omega_2 = \omega_1 \). In this case, \( \lambda_E \in (0, 1) \) and \( \delta_1 \leq \delta_2 \leq \delta_2^{ER} \) by Condition \([1][1]\). As shown in the proof of Lemma \([13][1]\), allocation \((c^E, y^E)\) unambiguously violates the upward IC constraint after a marginal increase in \( \omega_2 \) for any fixed \( \lambda_E \in (0, 1) \). Because \( \omega_2 \) and all other variables enter the maximization program continuously, \( \omega_2 \) also affects the value of the Lagrange parameter \( \lambda_E \) continuously. Hence, \( \lambda_E \) is bounded away from 0 and 1 after a marginal increase in \( \omega_2 \). Thus, there is a number \( a^E > 1 \) such that the upward IC constraint is violated for any \( \omega_2 \in (\omega_1, a^E \omega_1) \).

Next, consider a combination of \( R > 0 \) and \( \omega_2 \in (\omega_1, \omega_3) \) such that \((c^{ER}, y^{ER})\) violates the upward IC constraint. Taking into account this constraint for the Lagrangian, the adjusted FOCs with respect to \( c_1, c_2 \) and \( y_2 \) are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{L}_{c_1} &= (1 - \lambda_E) f_1 g_1(\delta_1) \left[ y_1^E - h(y_1^E, \omega_1) - \delta_1^E \right] + \lambda_E f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) + \mu \frac{1}{\lambda_E} = 0, \\
\mathcal{L}_{c_2} &= (1 - \lambda_E) f_2 g_2(\delta_2) \left[ y_2^E - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) - \delta_2^E \right] + \lambda_E f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) - \mu = 0, \quad \text{and} \\
\mathcal{L}_{y_2} &= f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) \right] - h(y_2^E, \omega_2)(1 - \lambda_E) f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) \left[ y_2^E - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) - \delta_2^E \right] \\
&= -\lambda_E f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) + \mu h(y_2, \omega_1) = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Combining the two latter conditions shows that, as usual, \( y_2^E \) is upwards distorted if and only if the upward IC constraint is binding with \( \mu > 0 \),

\[
f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) \right] (1 - \lambda_E) = \mu \left[ h(y_2^E, \omega_1) - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) \right] > 0.
\]

Using the FOC with respect to \( c_2 \), we can replace \( \mu \) in the previous condition to get

\[
\frac{f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) \left[ 1 - h(y_2^E, \omega_2) \right]}{h(y_2, \omega_1) - h(y_2, \omega_2)} = \frac{\lambda_E}{1 - \lambda_E} \frac{f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) - f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E) \left[ h(y_2^E, \omega_2) \right]}{f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) + f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E)} = \lambda_E = \frac{f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) - \delta^*(\omega_1)}{f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) + f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E)}.
\]

Combining the FOCs with respect to \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) and inserting \( y_1^E - h(y_1^E, \omega_1) = \delta^*(\omega_1) \) gives

\[
\lambda_E = \frac{f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) - \delta^*(\omega_1)}{f_1 g_1(\delta_1^E) + f_2 g_2(\delta_2^E)}.
\]

Combining the last equation and equation \((42)\), we can eliminate the Lagrangian parameter \( \lambda_E \) and rearrange terms to obtain the optimality condition \((25)\), according to which the optimal level of \( y_2^E \) equates the marginal deadweight losses from distortions at both margins. \( \square \)
B Supplementary material

Appendix B provides additional formal results, comments and figures that complement the arguments and theoretical results in the main text. The proofs to all formal results are available upon request.

B.1 Optimal income taxes for other welfare weights

In the following, I define two further sets of social weight sequences, for which specific properties of the optimal allocation can be identified unambiguously (see Propositions 4, 5, 6 and 7 below).

Definition 2. The sets of weight sequences $A^N$ and $A^D$ are defined as follows:

(i) Set $A^D$ contains all sequences $\alpha \in A^X$ such that $\alpha_{j+1} \leq \beta_j^D(\alpha_j)$ for all $j \in J_n$, with a strict inequality for at least one $j \in J_n$.

(ii) Set $A^N$ contains all sequences $\alpha \in A^X$ such that $\alpha_{j+1} \in [\beta_j^D(\alpha_j), \beta_j^U(\alpha_j)]$ for all $j \in J_n$.

The construction of both subsets can again be illustrated using Figure 1 in Section 5. As before, assume that the functions $\beta_j^D$ and $\beta_j^U$ were identical for all $j \in J_n$. For social weights in $A^D$, all weight-pairs are located in region I at the lowest part of Figure 1. This case represents a social planner with large concerns for local redistribution between all pairs of workers with adjacent skill types, including the workers with the lowest skill types. A limit case is given by the Rawlsian welfare function. For social weights in $A^N$, all weight-pairs are located in region II in the center of Figure 1. This case represents a social planner with rather limited concerns for redistribution between all groups of workers.

Proposition 4. For any $\alpha \in A^D$, optimal output $y^\alpha$ is

- downwards distorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups $j \in J_n$,
- downwards distorted at the extensive margin in all skill groups if $\alpha_1$ is below some threshold $\gamma^D > 1$.

By Proposition 4, optimal labor supply by all except the highest-skilled workers is downwards distorted at the intensive margin for any social weights in the set $A^D$. For social weight in this set, the “central result of optimal income taxation” (Hellwig 2007) is hence valid: The optimal marginal tax is strictly positive for all income levels below the top income $y_n^\alpha$. At the extensive margin, labor supply in all skill groups is downwards distorted if $\alpha_1$, the weight of the lowest-skilled workers, is below some threshold $\gamma^D$. Note that the threshold $\gamma^D$ is strictly higher than in the solution to the relaxed problem characterized in Lemma 5 (where it is equal to 1). If and only if $\alpha_1 < \gamma^D$, the optimal participation taxes are strictly positive at all income levels as well: the optimal income tax is a Negative Income Tax.

Proposition 5. For any $\alpha \in A^N$, optimal output $y^\alpha$ is

- undistorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups;
• upwards distorted at the extensive margin in each skill group \( j \) such that \( \alpha_j > 1 \).

By Proposition 5, optimal labor supply is undistorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups for any social weights in the set \( A^N \). This does not imply identical tax levels for all agents\(^{73}\). The optimal allocation can be decentralized by a piecewise horizontal tax schedule, however, in stark contrast to the before-mentioned “central result of optimal tax theory”. The optimal distortions at the extensive margin in each skill group depend on whether the social weight associated to this group is below or above the average weight of 1. If and only if \( \alpha_1 > 1 \), the least-productive workers benefit from a negative participation tax. Hence, the labor supply distortions in the solutions to the relaxed problem and the full problem of optimal taxation are identical (see Lemma 5).

Proposition 3 above provides conditions under which the marginal welfare weights belong to set \( A^U \) for some regular combinations of \( \Psi \) and \( \gamma \), giving rise to the optimality of an EITC with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes. In the following, I clarify the conditions under which some welfare functions with standard properties give rise to welfare weights in the sets \( A^D \) and \( A^N \).

**Proposition 6.** There is a number \( a^D > 1 \) such that, if \( \omega_{j+1} < a^D \) for all \( j \in J_n \), there exist regular combinations of \( \Psi \) and \( \gamma \) for which \( \bar{\alpha} \in A^D \).

**Proposition 7.** There exist regular combinations of \( \Psi \) and \( \gamma \) for which \( \bar{\alpha} \in A^N \).

By Proposition 6, there exist well-behaved welfare functions for which a Negative Income Tax is optimal whenever the relative distance between all pairs of adjacent skill types is sufficiently small. By Proposition 7, there exist well-behaved welfare functions for which optimal labor supply is undistorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups whenever Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied.

### B.2 Construction of weight sequences for simulations

Figure 4 below graphically depicts for all agents with incomes up to $100,000 the welfare weight sequences \( \alpha^A \) and \( \alpha^B \), which are used in the numerical simulation in Section 7. In particular, it plots the welfare weight \( \alpha_j \) associated to each skill group \( j \in J \) (on the vertical axis) against the skill-specific gross income \( y^A_j \) in the optimal allocation (on the horizontal axis). As can be seen, both sequences \( \alpha_A \) and \( \alpha_B \) are monotonically decreasing.

The blue solid line shows sequence \( \alpha^A \), which is constructed by setting \( \alpha^A_j = 1.05 \) for all \( j \in \{1, \ldots, 41\} \), i.e., all workers with incomes below \( y_{41}^A = $7,022 \). Note that this weight is above the fixed-point \( \bar{\beta}_j \), implying that the upward IC constraint between skill group \( j \) and \( j + 1 \) is violated for each \( j \leq 40 \) (see Lemma 6). For all \( j > 41 \), I set weight \( \alpha^A_j = \max \{ \bar{\beta}_j (\alpha^A_{j-1}), \bar{\beta}_j, \ldots, \bar{\beta}_{n-1} \} \). By construction, \( \alpha^A \) is hence an element of set \( A^U_{41} \). The

\(^{73}\)In contrast, the tax schedule will always be increasing over some income range. Additionally, it may also be decreasing over some (low) income range.
weight $\alpha^A_0$ on the unemployed is set to have an average weight of 1 in the optimal allocation. It is slightly larger than 1.09.\footnote{Note that the weight sequence $\alpha_A$ satisfies the properties of generalized welfare weights for poverty gap reduction, as specified in (46). In particular, they can be closely approximated by using the simple functional form $q(c_j) = [(c_j - \bar{c}_j)/c_j]^p(\alpha_p - \alpha_{np})$, given parameters $\bar{c} = 7.022$, $\alpha_p = 1.05$, $\alpha_{np} = 0.96$ and $p = 1.6$ (see FN 31).}

The green dashed line shows sequence $\alpha^B$, which is constructed just as sequence $\gamma^k$ in the proof of Lemma 24. First, I define the auxiliary function $\hat{\beta}^k_j := \max\{\bar{\beta}_j, \ldots, \bar{\beta}_{j-1}\}$. Then, I construct $\alpha^B$ by setting $\alpha^B_1 = \hat{\beta}^k_1$, $\alpha^B_j = \min\{\hat{\beta}^k_j, \beta^U_j - (\gamma_j - 1)\}$ for all $j \in \{2, \ldots, \bar{k}\}$ and $\alpha^B_j = \max\{\beta^D_j - (\alpha^B_j - 1)\}$ for all $j \in \{\bar{k} + 1, \ldots, n\}$. Threshold $\bar{k}$ is set to 53, which is the highest number in $J$ such that the conditions in Proposition 3 are satisfied, given $\phi^B_j$ equal to $(\alpha^B_1 - \alpha^B_j)/(\alpha^B_1 - 1)$ and $\delta^B_j$ equal to the level of $\delta_j$ in the relaxed problem’s solution for sequence $\alpha^B$. Note that $y_{B3}^k = $15,016. Finally, I again set $\alpha^B_0 \approx 1.045 > \alpha^B_1 \approx 1.035$ to have an average weight of 1.

### B.3 Sensitivity analysis for numerical simulations

The following section investigates the sensitivity of the numerical tax simulations. In particular, I study how the simulated optimal tax varies with the (intensive-margin) elasticity of income with respect to the retention rate, and with the profile of the (extensive-margin) participation elasticities. I concentrate on variations in the empirically relevant ranges.

First, I simulate the optimal tax function if the intensive-margin elasticity $\sigma$ is higher or lower than in the benchmark calibration. For this purpose, I fix a sequence of welfare weights $\alpha^C$ that assigns a weight of 1.0475 to the workers in the lowest 39 skill groups (corresponding to an annual income of $5,568 or less under the current US tax system), and convexly decreasing weights to the higher-skilled workers.\footnote{Note that sequence $\alpha^C$ is constructed to be an element of $A_{39}^U$ for all three considered values of $\sigma$. The shape of $\alpha^C$ is very similar to the shape of sequence $\alpha_A$ (see Figure 4).} The results of this sensitivity analysis are provided in Figure 5 and Table 1. In Figure 5, the solid green line shows the optimal participation tax...
Figure 5: Optimal participation taxes for different intensive-margin elasticities.

\[ T_P(y) = T_M(y) - T_M(0) \]

for the benchmark value of \( \sigma = 0.3 \), and the dotted black line again illustrates the current US EITC for childless workers. The blue dashed line in Figure 5 shows the optimal participation tax \( T_{IH}(y) \) for a higher intensive-margin elasticity of \( \sigma = 0.4 \), while the red dash-dotted line shows the optimal participation tax \( T_{IL}(y) \) for a lower elasticity of \( \sigma = 0.2 \). Table 1 reports key statistics such as phase-in and phase-out endpoints, maximum tax credits, marginal tax rates (MTR), participation tax rates (PTR), unemployment benefits and unemployment rates for the corresponding tax functions \( T_{IH}, T_{IL} \) and \( T_M \).

Table 1: Simulation results for different intensive-margin elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensive-margin elasticity (( \sigma ))</th>
<th>( \pi_j \in [0.4, 0.5] )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase-in endpoint [$]</td>
<td>6,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-out endpoint [$]</td>
<td>21,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum tax credit [$]</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-in [%]</td>
<td>-18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-out [%]</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at bottom [%]</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at phase-in endpoint [%]</td>
<td>-18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit [$]</td>
<td>2,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate [%]</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5 shows that the optimal tax credits for all three cases are remarkably similar and more than twice as large as the current US EITC for childless workers. Three differences between the participation tax functions \( T_{IH}, T_{IL} \) and \( T_M \) are worth mentioning. First, the optimal width of the phase-in range is increasing in the magnitude of the intensive-margin elasticity. One
reason for this result is that, the higher the income elasticity, the larger is the income response that is induced by a decrease in the marginal tax rates (from the current US taxes to the optimal taxes).\footnote{77} Second, the average marginal tax in the phase-in range for the case \( \sigma = 0.4 \) is only half as large as for the case \( \sigma = 0.2 \), i.e., the optimal tax schedule is much flatter. Third, for the case of a low elasticity, the optimal participation tax rate is almost constant between \(-17\%\) to \(-18\%\) over the entire phase-in range. For the case of a high elasticity, in contrast, the participation tax rate is substantially more negative with \(-65.3\%\) for very low incomes at the bottom, and increases strongly over the phase-in range to reach \(-13.6\%\) at the phase-in endpoint. This also suggests that the optimal income tax may involve a discontinuity at income zero, as argued by \cite{jacquet2013}. The intuition behind the last two aspects comes from the planner’s desire to implement the optimal compromise between labor supply distortions at both margins. As explained in Section \ref{sec:6}, the planner needs to use negative marginal taxes in order to reduce the distortions at the extensive margin. When the intensive-margin elasticity is larger, negative marginal taxes are more harmful because they create larger distortions. Hence, the planner only uses them to a smaller extent and, consequently, has to accept a less desirable pattern of extensive-margin distortions. In particular, this involves suboptimally high participation taxes (and extensive-margin distortions) for very-low skill workers at the bottom. When the intensive-margin elasticity is smaller, instead, the planner uses more negative marginal taxes to implement a more desirable pattern of extensive-margin distortions.

Table 2: Maximal EITC ranges for different intensive-margin elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensive-margin elasticity ((\sigma))</th>
<th>(\pi_j \in [0.4, 0.5])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase-in endpoint [$]</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-out endpoint [$]</td>
<td>14,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum tax credit [$]</td>
<td>31,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-in [%]</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-out [%]</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at bottom [%]</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at phase-in endpoint [%]</td>
<td>-15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit [$]</td>
<td>-18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate [%]</td>
<td>2,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Section\footnote{77} I additionally investigate the maximal income ranges for which an EITC can be rationalized given regular welfare functions with monotonically decreasing welfare weights. Figure\footnote{77} provides key statistics of the optimal tax functions for the three alternative values of the intensive-margin elasticity parameter \(\sigma\). The EITC income ranges are remarkably similar, with phase-in endpoints between \$14,500 and \$15,600 and phase-out endpoints between \$31,000 and \$32,300. In line with the previous arguments, marginal taxes are much higher in the low-elasticity case than in the high-elasticity case. Reflecting this difference in phase-in rates, the maximum tax credit for the case \(\sigma = 0.2\) is almost twice as large as the maximum tax credit for...
the case $\sigma = 0.4$. In these simulations, the participation tax rates for all three cases are by and large constant over the phase-in range, suggesting that the optimal tax systems do not involve discontinuities. Finally, both the optimal unemployment benefit and the optimal unemployment rate share are decreasing in the magnitude of the intensive-margin elasticity.

Figure 6: Optimal participation taxes for different participation elasticity profiles.

Second, I simulate the optimal tax function for three different profiles of participation elasticities. Again, I solve the optimal tax problem for a fixed sequence $\alpha^D$ of welfare weights that assigns a constant weight of 1.0475 to all workers in the first 39 skill groups, and convexly decreasing weights to higher-skilled workers\textsuperscript{78} The results are shown in Figure 6 and Table 3. In particular, the solid green line shows the optimal participation tax $T_{EL}^P(y)$ for the benchmark case, where participation elasticities vary between 0.5 for the lowest skill group and 0.4 for the highest skill group (see equation 27 for details). The dashed blue line shows the optimal participation tax $T_{ED}^P(y)$ for a more decreasing profile of participation elasticities. Specifically, I assume that participation elasticities vary between 0.6 for the lowest and 0.3 for highest skill group. Hence, participation responses are concentrated more heavily on the lowest skill groups, while the average participation elasticity is almost unchanged. Finally, the red dash-dotted line shows the optimal participation tax $T_{EL}^P(y)$ for the case where labor supply responds less strongly at the extensive margin, with participation elasticities ranging from 0.4 to 0.3.

As can be seen in Figure 6, these variations have only very limited effects on the optimal tax schedules. Again, the implied tax credits are more than twice as large as under the current US EITC for childless workers. Phase-in endpoints, phase-out endpoints and maximal tax credits are almost identical across all three cases. There only appear to be two relevant differences. First, the optimal unemployment benefit and the unemployment rate are larger for the case of lower participation responses than for the two other cases. Correspondingly, tax schedule $T_L$ attains higher levels for medium and high incomes. Intuitively, when participation responses are

\textsuperscript{78}Again, sequence $\alpha^D$ is constructed to be an element of $\mathcal{A}^U_{39}$ for all three considered cases.
smaller, a reduction in the unemployment benefit is less effective in reducing the unemployment rate. Put differently, the planner can provide transfers to the unemployed at a lower efficiency cost. Second, for the case of more concentrated participation responses, the participation tax $T^D$ is somewhat more negative in almost the entire phase-in range than for the two cases with more homogeneous responses.\footnote{In particular, the optimal participation tax is more negative for very low incomes, pointing to a larger discontinuity at zero.}

Table 3: Simulation results for different participation elasticity profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of participation elasticities ($\pi_j$)</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.3$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.4$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.5$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.6$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase-in endpoint [$]</td>
<td>7,474</td>
<td>7,474</td>
<td>7,474</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-out endpoint [$]</td>
<td>19,352</td>
<td>19,352</td>
<td>19,352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum tax credit [$]</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-in [%]</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>-13.2</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-out [%]</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at bottom [%]</td>
<td>-34.7</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
<td>-47.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at phase-in endpoint [%]</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit [$]</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>3,014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate [%]</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, Table 4 provides insights into how the maximum phase-in and EITC ranges depend on the profile of participation responses. By and large, there are only negligible differences in the key statistics for the considered profiles. In all three cases, the phase-in endpoints are located between $14,000 and $15,000, the phase-out endpoints are located between $30,000 and $32,000, and the maximum tax credits range between $1,600 and $1,700. Again, the most notable difference is that optimal unemployment benefits and unemployment rates are larger in the case with low participation responses than in the other two cases.

Table 4: Maximal EITC ranges for different participation elasticity profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of participation elasticities ($\pi_j$)</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.3$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.4$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.5$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.6$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase-in endpoint [$]</td>
<td>14,093</td>
<td>15,016</td>
<td>15,016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-out endpoint [$]</td>
<td>30,168</td>
<td>32,144</td>
<td>32,144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum tax credit [$]</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-in [%]</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average MTR phase-out [%]</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at bottom [%]</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR at phase-in endpoint [%]</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit [$]</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>2,281</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate [%]</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\section*{B.4 Elasticity-based condition for violated IC constraints}

Equation (19) in Section 5 provides a condition under which the solution to the relaxed problem violates the upward IC constraint between two adjacent skill groups, expressed in terms of labor supply elasticities and welfare weights. Note first that the participation threshold $\delta_j$ in skill group $j$ in the relaxed problem’s solution is defined by equation (17). Inserting this equation into the upward IC constraint (33) between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$, we get

\[
\frac{\alpha_{j+1} - 1}{A_{j+1}(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})} - \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{A_j(\delta_j^{\alpha_R})} \leq -\delta^*(\omega_{j+1}) + \delta^*(\omega_j) + h(y_{j+1}^R, \omega_j) - h(y_j^R, \omega_{j+1}) \\
= [y_j^R - h(y_j^R, \omega_j)] - [y_{j+1}^R - h(y_{j+1}^R, \omega_j)] =: B_j,
\]

where I use that $\delta_k = y_k^R - h(y_k^R, \omega_k)$ for each $k \in J$. With $\eta_k(\epsilon_k^R, y_k^R) = A_k(\delta_k^R)$, this gives equation (19).

To rewrite $B_j$ in terms of elasticities, I define $\hat{y}(\omega) = y \in \mathbb{R} : h_y(\hat{y}(\omega), \omega) = 1$. Then, there is a unique number $\hat{\omega} \in (\omega_j, \omega_{j+1})$ such that

\[
\begin{align*}
B_j &= [h(y_{j+1}^R, \omega_j) - y_{j+1}^R] - [h(y_j^R, \omega_j) - y_j^R] \\
&= \int_{\omega_j}^{\omega_{j+1}} [h_y(\hat{y}(\omega), \omega_j) - h_y(y_j^R, \omega_j)] d\omega \\
&= [h_y(\hat{y}(\hat{\omega}), \omega_j) - h_y(y_j^R, \omega_j)] (y_j^R - y_{j+1}^R).
\end{align*}
\]

Using the definitions of $\epsilon_{y,\omega}$ and $\epsilon_{y,1-T}$, an approximation of $B_j$ is given by

\[
B_j \approx \left[\frac{\epsilon_{y,\omega}(y_j^R, \omega_j)}{\epsilon_{y,1-T}(y_j^R, \omega_j)}h_y(y_j^R, \omega_j)\frac{\hat{\omega} - \omega_j}{\omega_j}\right] \left[\frac{\epsilon_{y,\omega}(y_j^R, \omega_j)}{\epsilon_{y,1-T}(y_j^R, \omega_j)}y_j^R\frac{\omega_{j+1} - \omega_j}{\omega_j}\right].
\]

A similar equation as (19) can be provided for the violation of the downward IC constraint (29). In particular, after inserting (17) and $\delta_k^R = y_k^R - h(y_k^R, \omega_k)$, I find that the downward IC constraint between skill groups $j$ and $j+1$ is violated if

\[
\frac{\alpha_{j+1} - 1}{\eta_{j+1}(\epsilon^R, \gamma^R)} < \frac{\alpha_j - 1}{\eta_j(\epsilon^R, \gamma^R)} - B'_j,
\]

where $B'_j = [y_{j+1}^R - h(y_{j+1}^R, \omega_{j+1})] - [y_j^R - h(y_j^R, \omega_{j+1})] > 0$.

\section*{B.5 Elasticity-based result for optimal phase-in range}

By Proposition 3 the optimal allocation may upward distortions at the intensive margin for skill groups 2 to $k$ given well-behaved welfare functions if a set of conditions on the primitives of the model (joint type distribution, type set, effort cost function) is satisfied. As argued in Section 5, there exists a unique threshold group $\bar{k}$ such that these conditions are met if and only if $k \leq \bar{k}$. The location of threshold $\bar{k}$ depends on the type distribution and the effort cost function. Unfortunately, these quantities are not directly observable. They are related to quantities such as labor supply elasticities and skill shares that can be estimated empirically.
In the following, I derive a necessary condition for the optimality of negative marginal taxes in skill groups 2 to \( k \) that is expressed mainly in terms of these observable quantities. Thereby, I also provide an upper bound on threshold \( \bar{k} \) that can be computed from empirical estimates. The derivation of this result makes use of the following condition, which imposes a lower bound on the income elasticity with respect to the retention rate and an upper bound on the income elasticity with respect to the skill type (complementing Condition 3).

**Condition 4.** There are two numbers \( \mu_3 \in (0, \mu_1] \) and \( \mu_4 \in [\mu_2, \infty) \) such that, for each \( y > 0 \) and \( \omega > 0 \), \( \varepsilon_{y,1-T^r(y, \omega)} \geq \mu_3 \) and \( \varepsilon_{y,\omega}(y, \omega) \leq \mu_4 \).

**Lemma 25.** Let Condition 4 be satisfied. For any \( k \in \{2, \ldots, n-1\} \), there can only exist regular combinations \((\Psi, \gamma)\) for which \( \bar{\alpha} \in A_k^U \) if

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} f_j + \sum_{j=k+1}^{n} f_j \left[ 1 - G_j(\delta_j^{k}) \right] < \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta_{k-1} - 1} \sum_{j=m^k}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j^{k}),
\]

where vector \((\delta_j^{k})_{j=1}^{n}\) is given as in Proposition 3 and threshold \( m^k \) satisfies

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\omega_{m^k}}{\omega_k} \right) > \frac{\mu_3}{2\mu_4^2 \eta_k} \frac{\bar{\beta}_{k-1} - 1}{y_{m^k}^{\alpha R}}.
\]

By Lemma 25, the share of workers with upward distortions at the intensive margin (skill groups \( k \) and lower) has to be small enough, compared with the share of highly skilled workers in the optimal allocation. Thereby, it supports the interpretation of Proposition 3 provided in Section 5. More precisely, Lemma 25 first compares the combined shares of unemployed agents and workers in skill group 1 to \( k \) on the one hand, and the share of workers in a threshold skill group \( m^k \) and higher, weighted by a factor that only depends on the fixed-points identified in Lemma 6 on the other hand. Second, Lemma 25 provides an upper bound on the relative distance between \( k \) and the threshold skill group \( m^k \) that depends on the intensive-margin and extensive-margin labor elasticities and one of the fixed-points mentioned above. (It should be noted that the fixed-points \( \bar{\beta}_{k-1} \) and \( \beta_{n-1} \) are functions of the labor elasticities and the relative distances between adjacent skill types themselves.) It is easy to see that these conditions can only be satisfied if skill level \( \omega_k \) is smaller enough, both in terms the share of workers with skill \( \omega_k \) and lower and in terms of the ratio between skill \( \omega_k \) and the average skill in the population. Put differently, there exists a unique threshold \( \tilde{k} \) such that the conditions in Lemma 25 are satisfied if and only if \( k < \tilde{k} \). This threshold \( \tilde{k} \) is hence an upper bound on the critical value \( \bar{k} \) that is implied by Proposition 3.

Finally, note that the threshold group \( m^k \) (for each \( k \)) and the critical values \( \bar{k} \) and \( \tilde{k} \) can be computed explicitly if one has more exact information about the labor supply elasticities, the skill distribution and the underlying primitives of the model. In particular, this is done numerically for the calibrated model in Section 4 and analytically for the example considered in Subsection B.6 below (for the limit case where the discrete skill set converges to an interval).
B.6 Limit result for continuous skill sets

All theoretical results have been derived under the assumption that skill set $\Omega$ is given by some discrete set $\{\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n\}$, while the fixed cost set $\Delta$ is given by an interval $[\underline{\delta}, \overline{\delta}]$. In particular, the formal proofs for Lemma 6 and Propositions 2 and 3 exploit the discreteness of $\Omega$. Besides, the results are relatively general as I have not imposed any functional forms assumptions (except for the quasi-linearity of utility in consumption). Still, one might ask whether the central insight of this paper – the potential optimality of an EITC with negative marginal taxes – extends to a model with a continuous skill set as in Jacquet et al. (2013) and many other related papers. Under the level of generality maintained in the analysis above, this question cannot be clarified.

In the following, however, I show the optimality of negative marginal taxes indeed extends to a continuous skill set for an example with simple, commonly used functional forms. In particular, I impose the following set of assumptions.

**Condition 5.** The economy has the following properties:

(i) The effort cost function is given by $h(y, \omega) = \frac{1}{1+\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{y}{\omega} \right)^{1+1/\sigma}$ with $\sigma > 0$,

(ii) the skill space is given by the finite set $\{\omega_1, \omega_2, \ldots, \omega_n\}$ with constant relative distances $\frac{\omega_{j+1}}{\omega_j} = a > 1$ for each $j \in J \setminus \{n\}$,

(iii) the fixed cost space is given by the interval $[0, \overline{\delta}]$, and

(iv) for each $j \in J$, the conditional distribution $G_j$ of fixed costs is given by a uniform distribution on $[0, \overline{\delta}_j]$, with $\overline{\delta}_j \leq \overline{\delta}$ for all $j \in J$.

The first two parts of Condition 5 have already been imposed for the calibration in Section 7. Part (i) implies that the elasticity of output (or gross income) $y$ with respect to the retention rate is equal to parameter $\sigma$ for all workers and all admissible tax functions. Part (ii) plays a crucial role for the following exercise, because parameter $a$ can be seen as a measure of how “dense” the skill set is. In particular, it allows to consider the limit case where $a$ converges to 1, i.e., the skill set converges to an interval. Parts (iii) and (iv) imply that fixed cost types are uniformly distributed in each skill group, in contrast to the logistic distributions used in Section 7. Importantly, this assumption allows me to obtain closed-form expressions of the optimal skill-specific participation thresholds $\delta_{1}^{R}, \ldots, \delta_{n}^{R}$ and the fixed-points $\beta_j, \overline{\beta}_j$ established in Lemma 6. Ultimately, this simplification enables me to derive analytical limit results. The drawback of part (iv) is that participation elasticities are larger than 1, which is at odds with most of the available empirical evidence. Besides, Condition 5 allows to match all other empirical moments targeted in Section 7. Note also that Conditions 1, 2 and 3 in Section 4 are satisfied for all parameter constellations under Condition 5.

In the following, I am interested in studying whether an EITC with negative marginal taxes remains optimal for some well-behaved welfare function if the relative distance $a$ between adjacent skill types converges to 1, i.e., the discrete skill set $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n\}$ converges to the interval $[\omega_1, \omega_n]$. Formally, I want to investigate whether there exist regular combinations $(\Psi, \gamma)$ such that $\alpha \in A_k^U$ for some $k \in J$ in the limit case $a \to 1$. Additionally, I am interested in
whether the skill range (and the corresponding income range) with potentially optimal marginal
taxes shrinks, or even disappears, in this limit case. For this purpose, I reconsider Lemma 25
which was established in Appendix B.5, for an economy that satisfies Condition 5.

Lemma 26. Let Assumption 5 be satisfied and consider the limit case \( a \to 1 \). For any \( \sigma > 0 \)
and \( \omega_k \in (\omega_1, \omega_n) \), there can only be regular combinations of \((\Psi, \gamma)\) such that \( \bar{\alpha} \in A^U_k \) if

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{k} f_j + \sum_{j=k+1}^{n} f_j \left[ 1 - G_j(\delta_j^k) \right] < \sum_{j=m^k}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j^k),
\]

where \( m_k \) is defined implicitly by \( y_{m^k}^{\alpha R} = 2y_k^{\alpha R} \).

By Lemma 26, the optimal allocation can involve upwards distortions at the intensive margin
for a substantial set of low-skill workers even in the limit case where \( \Omega \) converges to a continuous
set. To see this, consider some skill type \( \omega_k \in (\omega_1, \omega_n) \). Lemma 25 implies that the optimal
allocation can involve upwards distortions for all workers with skills in \( (\omega_1, \omega_k] \) if and only if
the share of high-skill workers with incomes above \( 2y_k^{\alpha R} \) is larger than the share of agents with
incomes below \( y_k^{\alpha R} \) (unemployed agents and low-skill workers). Hence, the optimal income tax
can only involve negative marginal taxes for, first, a minority of agents and, second, for agents
with earned incomes below the population average. There is no doubt that these conditions
limit the optimal phase-in range, i.e., the subset of agents facing optimally negative marginal
taxes, making more transparent the restrictions that are already present in Proposition 3.
However, the potential optimality of negative marginal taxes clearly does not vanish or shrink to
a economically irrelevant subset of low-skill workers. Interestingly, this insight does not depend
on parameter \( \sigma \), which determines the level of the (intensive-margin) elasticity of income with
respect to the retention rate.

B.7 Definition and illustration of labor supply distortions

The analysis above investigates the labor supply distortions in the optimal allocation, as defined
in Subsection 3.2. The characterization of these distortions is based on the following thought
experiment, which I illustrate in Figures 7 and 8 below. Consider an initial allocation in which
agent \( i \)’s bundle is given by \( (c^i, y^i) \geq 0 \). Now consider providing agent \( i \) with a different bundle
\( (\tilde{c}, \tilde{y}) \geq 0 \) such that \( \tilde{y} - y^i = \tilde{c} - c^i \neq 0 \). The set of these potential deviations is given by a
straight line through \( (c^i, y^i) \) with slope equal to 1, the economy’s marginal rate of transformation
between consumption and output. Agent \( i \)’s labor supply is said to be distorted if there is a bundle
\( (\tilde{c}, \tilde{y}) \) on this line that \( i \) strictly prefers to \( (c^i, y^i) \).

First, it might be possible to increase \( i \)’s utility through a marginal deviation from \( (c^i, y^i) \). This will be the case if and only if \( i \)’s marginal rate of substitution, \( h_y(y^i, \omega^i) \), differs from 1. If \( h_y(y^i, \omega^i) < 1 \), \( i \) would strictly prefer an output-increasing deviation. Then, \( i \)’s labor supply
is said to be downwards distorted at the intensive margin. Correspondingly, if \( h_y(y^i, \omega^i) > 1 \), \( i \)
would strictly prefer an output-decreasing deviation, and \( i \)’s labor supply is said to be upwards
distorted at the intensive margin.
Second, it might be possible to increase $i$’s utility through a large deviation from $(c^i, y^i)$ that changes his participation status (from zero output to positive output or vice versa). Consider an initial allocation with $y^i = 0$ and the deviation to bundle $(c^i + \tilde{y}, \tilde{y})$ for some $\tilde{y} > 0$. Agent $i$ would be strictly better off with the new bundle than with his initial bundle if and only if $i$’s total costs of providing output $\tilde{y}$ are below the additional utility from consuming $\tilde{y}$, $h(\tilde{y}, \omega_i) + \delta^i < \tilde{y}$. Hence, $i$’s labor supply is said to be **downwards distorted at the extensive margin** if both $y^i = 0$ and $\delta^i < \delta^*(\omega_i) := \max_{y>0} y - h(y, \omega_i)$.

Correspondingly, consider an initial allocation with $y^i > 0$. Agent $i$ would be strictly better off with bundle $(c^i - y^i, 0)$ than with his initial bundle if and only if $i$’s total costs of providing output $y^i$ exceed the utility from consuming $y^i$, $h(y^i, \omega^i) + \delta^i > y^i$. Hence, $i$’s labor supply is said to be **upwards distorted at the extensive margin** if both $y^i > 0$ and $\delta^i > y^i - h(y^i, \omega^i)$.

By Lemma 1, it is possible to characterize the labor supply distortions for the agents in each skill group $j \in J$ simultaneously. In particular, labor supply in skill group $j$ is said to be distorted at the intensive margin if the marginal rate of substitution $h(y^i, \omega^i)$ differs from one for all working agents with skill type $\omega_j$. Similarly, labor supply in skill group $j$ is said to be distorted at the extensive margin if the skill-specific participation threshold $\delta_j$ is either located below $\delta^*(\omega_j)$ (downward distortion) or above $y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j)$ (upward distortion).

The following Figures 7 and 8 illustrate these definitions of labor supply distortions graphically. In each figure, point $A$ marks the initial bundle $(c^i, y^i)$ allocated to agent $i$. The sets of hypothetical deviations are given by the solid lines through $A$ and $B$. The indifference curves of Agent $i$ are given by the union of the dashed line and point $Z$ (in figure 7) and the union of the dashed line and point $A$ (in figure 8), respectively, corresponding to the discontinuity in $i$’s utility due to the fixed cost $\delta^i$.

![Figure 7: Labor supply distortions, example 1.](image)

In Figure 7, $i$’s initial output is strictly positive, $y^i > 0$. In point $A$, the slope of the indifference curve is below 1, the marginal rate of substitution. Hence, $i$’s utility could be increased by moving slightly upwards the solid line. Alternatively, $i$’s utility could also be increased by jumping downwards to point $B$, where output provision is zero. Hence, $i$’s labor supply is both

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downwards distorted at the intensive margin and upwards distorted at the extensive margin. In Figure 8, \(i\) does not provide output initially, \(y^i = 0\). Jumping upwards to point \(B\) with positive output \(y^* (\omega^i) = \arg \max_{y>0} \{y - h(y,\omega^i)\}\) would increase \(i\)'s utility, as \(B\) is located above the indifference curve. Hence, \(i\)'s labor supply is downwards distorted at the extensive margin.

![Figure 8: Labor supply distortions, example 2.](image)

### B.8 Decomposition and illustration of deadweight loss

Following the literature, I formally define the deadweight loss in an implementable allocation \((c, y)\) as

\[
DWL(c, y) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta^* (\omega_j)} g_j(\delta) [\delta^* (\omega_j) - \delta] d\delta - \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta^* (\omega_j)} g_j(\delta) [y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) - \delta] d\delta .
\]

By construction, the deadweight loss measures the maximum increase in the difference between the consumption possibilities that result from providing labor and the total cost of providing labor that can be achieved by moving from allocation \((c, y)\) to some other feasible allocation. As usual, \(DWL(c, y)\) is minimized and equal to zero if labor supply in all skill groups is undistorted at both margins, i.e., if \(h_y(y_j, \omega_j) = 1\) and \(\delta_j = \delta^*(\omega_j) = \max_{y>0} y - h(y, \omega_j)\) for every \(j \in J\).

The overall deadweight loss can also be decomposed as

\[
DWL(c, y) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j) [\delta^* (\omega_j) - y_j + h(y_j, \omega_j)] + \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j \int_{\delta_j}^{\delta^* (\omega_j)} g_j(\delta) [\delta^* (\omega_j) - \delta] d\delta .
\]

\(^{80}\)In a model without fixed costs as in, e.g., [Mirrlees (1971)], this would be impossible by construction.
where the first term captures the deadweight loss from distortions at the intensive margin and the second term captures the deadweight loss from distortions at the extensive margin (across all skill groups).

Figure 9 below illustrates the deadweight loss from distortions in skill group $j$ and its decomposition graphically. It depicts the quantity $G_j(\delta_j)$ of labor of skill type $\omega_j$, and the labor supply $S_j$ and labor demand $D_j$ (measured in mass of workers) for an allocation that involves bundle $(y_j, \delta_j)$. $D_j^*$ depicts the labor demand that would result without distortions at the intensive margin, i.e., if each worker would provide efficient output. In particular, the figure depicts a case where labor supply in skill group $j$ is downwards distorted at both margins, $h(y_j, \omega_j) < 1$ and $\delta_j < y_j - h(y_j, \omega_j) < \delta^*(\omega_j)$. The red shaded area $(L_i)$ depicts the efficiency loss due to intensive-margin distortions, the blue-shaded area $(L_e)$ depicts the efficiency loss due to extensive-margin distortions in this skill group.

**Figure 9: Illustration of deadweight loss in skill group $j$.**

### B.9 Monotonicity of social weights

In Subsection 3.4, the endogenous marginal social weights are defined in equations (9) and (10).

In the following, I assume that all type-specific weight are equal, i.e., that $\gamma(\omega, \delta) = 1$ for all $(\omega, \delta) \in \Omega \times \Delta$. Then, concavity of $\Psi$ ensures that $\alpha_0 > \alpha_j$ for all $j \in J$. For $j \geq 1$, however, the endogenous weight sequence $\bar{\alpha}$ is only ensured to be decreasing if additional conditions on the joint type distribution $K$ are met.

**Lemma 27.** If $\Psi$ is strictly concave and $\gamma$ is constant over $\Omega \times \Delta$, $G_j$ dominates $G_{j+1}$ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance for all $j \in J_{n}$ and Condition 4 holds, $\bar{\alpha}_j > \bar{\alpha}_{j+1}$ for all $j \in J_{n}$ in all implementable allocations.

In the following, I provide a simple example to demonstrate that the concavity of $\Psi$ per se does not guarantee decreasing social weights.

**Example 1.** Assume that $n > 2$, $\omega_1 = 1$, $\omega_2 = 3/2$, $\omega = 0$, $\delta = 10$, $h(y, \omega) = \frac{1}{2} (\frac{y}{\omega})^2$, $\Psi(x) = x^{1/2}$, $\gamma(\omega, \delta) = 1$ for all $(\omega, \delta) \in \Omega \times \Delta$, $g_1(\delta) = 0.1$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$, $g_2(\delta) = \varepsilon$ for $\delta \in [0, 1]$ and $g_2(\delta) = \frac{1}{\delta^2}$ for $\delta \in (1, 10]$. 

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Note that function $\Psi$ is strictly concave. Fixed costs types are uniformly distributed in skill group 1, and piecewise uniformly distributed in skill group 2. For $\varepsilon$ below (above) 0.1, $G_2$ dominates (is dominated by) $G_1$ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.

Consider the allocation $(c', y')$ with $c'_0 = 0.1$, $(c'_1, y'_1) = (1.1, 1)$, $(c'_2, y'_2) = (9/4 + .1, 9/4)$, $\delta'_1 = 1/2$ and $\delta'_2 = 9/4$. Note that this allocation satisfies both IC constraints between workers with skill types $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$ with strict inequalities. The social weights in this allocation are given by $\hat{\alpha}_0(c'_0) \approx 1.581/z$, $\hat{\alpha}_1(\delta'_1, c'_0) \approx .917/z$ and $\hat{\alpha}_2 \approx (1.265 + 44.272\varepsilon)/(1 + 71\varepsilon/z)$, where $z > 0$ is again a normalizing parameter. I find that $\hat{\alpha}_2 > \hat{\alpha}_1$ if and only if $\varepsilon$ is below some threshold $\hat{\varepsilon} \approx 0.0167$. In this example, the social weights are hence locally increasing if $G_2$ first-order stochastically dominates $G_1$ “sufficiently much”. Loosely speaking, the workers in skill group 2 are on average worse off than the workers in skill group 1 in this case, because they have on average much higher fixed costs.

### B.10 Validity of Conditions 1 and 2 for common functions

The theoretical results are valid whenever the skill-specific fixed cost distributions satisfy Conditions 1 and 2. In the following, I show that these conditions indeed hold for many commonly used functional forms. First, Condition 1 (ii) requires the fixed cost distribution $G_j$ to be log-concave for each $j \in J$.

**Observation 1.** For any $j \in J$, Condition 1 (ii) is satisfied if $G_j$ is given by

(a) a uniform distribution on $[\delta_j, \delta_j]$;

(b) a logistic distribution of the functional form (28) with location parameter $\psi_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and scale parameter $\rho_j \not= 0$;

(c) a Pareto distribution with scale parameter (minimum value) $\hat{\delta}_j > 0$ and shape parameter $k_j > 0$;

(d) a log-normal distribution with location parameter $\xi_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and scale parameter $\sigma_j > 0$;

(e) a normal distribution with mean $\xi_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and standard deviation $\sigma_j > 0$.

Condition 1 (ii) refers to the co-variation of distributions $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ for each pair of skill groups $j$ and $j+1$. In particular, it assumes that the cdf hazard rates can be monotonically ordered for each $\delta \in \Delta$, $A_j(\delta) \geq A_{j+1}(\delta)$. In general, this assumption is neither stronger nor weaker than the assumption that $G_{j+1}$ first-order stochastically dominates $G_j$. Within each of the families of distribution functions considered here, however, both properties are equivalent.

**Observation 2.** For any $j \in J$, Condition 1 (iii) is satisfied and $G_{j+1}(\delta) \geq G_j(\delta)$ for all $\delta \in \Delta$ if the fixed cost distribution $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ are given by

(a) uniform distributions with upper endpoints $\delta_j \geq \delta_{j+1}$ and lower endpoints $\delta_j = \delta_{j+1}$;

(b) logistic distributions of form (28) with location parameters $\psi_j \geq \psi_{j+1}$ and scale parameter $\rho_j = \rho_{j+1}$, or scale parameters $\rho_j \geq \rho_{j+1}$ and location parameters $\psi_j = \psi_{j+1}$;

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(c) Pareto distributions with shape parameters $0 < k_j \leq k_{j+1}$ and scale parameters (minimum values) $\delta_j = \delta_{j+1} > 0$;

(d) log-normal distributions with location parameters $\xi_j \geq \xi_{j+1} \in \mathbb{R}$ and scale parameters $\sigma_j = \sigma_{j+1} > 0$;

(e) normal distributions with expected values $\xi_j \geq \xi_{j+1} \in \mathbb{R}$ and standard deviations $\sigma_j = \sigma_{j+1} > 0$.

Finally, Condition 2 requires the pdf hazard rate $a_j(\delta_j)$ to be weakly decreasing in $\delta$ and weakly increasing in $\omega$, but only at a sufficiently small rate compared to the derivative of the cdf hazard rate $A_j(\delta_j)$.

**Observation 3.** For any $j \in J$, Condition 2 is satisfied

(a) for all $\delta \in \Delta$ if $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ are given by uniform distributions with upper endpoints $\tilde{\delta}_j \geq \tilde{\delta}_{j+1}$ and identical lower endpoints $\delta_j = \delta_{j+1}$;

(b) for all $\delta \in \Delta$ if $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ are given by logistic distributions of form (28) with location parameters $\psi_j \geq \psi_{j+1}$ and identical scale parameters $\rho_j = \rho_{j+1}$, or with scale parameters $\rho_j \geq \rho_{j+1}$ and identical location parameters $\psi_j = \psi_{j+1}$;

(c) for all $\delta$ below some threshold level $z_j > \xi_j$ if $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ are given by normal distributions with means $\xi_j \geq \xi_{j+1}$ and identical standard deviations $\sigma_j = \sigma_{j+1} > 0$.

Condition 2 is not satisfied if $G_j$ and $G_{j+1}$ are given by Pareto or log-normal distributions. In particular, Condition 2(i) is violated: the pdfs of these distribution functions are not log-concave for any combination of parameters. It is possible, however, to provide a relaxed version of the condition that (a) is satisfied for these distribution functions in many cases and (b) continues to ensure the validity of Lemma 6 and all subsequent results. The details are available upon request.

### B.11 Illustration: Optimally binding upward IC constraints

By Proposition 2, optimal labor supply in all skill groups $j \in \{2, \ldots, k\}$ is upwards distorted at the intensive margin for every social weight in the set $A^U_k$. In particular, the formal proof in Appendix A shows that the upward IC constraint between skill groups $j$ and $j+1 \leq k$ will always be binding in the optimal allocation. With respect to the IC constraints between skill groups $k$ and $k+1$, there are multiple possible constellations. In particular, the downward IC constraint between workers in both skill groups may be binding or slack in the optimal allocation. In both cases, however, labor supply in skill group $k$ is upwards distorted at the intensive margin.

Figure 7 illustrates both cases in panels 7a and 7b for the case $k = 2$. In both panels, the filled circles mark the bundles allocated to workers with skill types $\omega_1$, $\omega_2$ and $\omega_3$ in the solution to the relaxed problem. The indifference curves corresponding to these bundles are drawn as solid lines. As can be seen, workers with skill type $\omega_1$ prefer the bundle $(c^R_2, y^R_2)$ to the bundle
while workers with skill type $\omega_3$ are indifferent between their own bundle and the bundle designed for workers with skill type $\omega_2$.

Consider an intermediate problem $A$ that takes into account only the IC constraints between the workers with the two lowest skill types (see proof to Proposition 2). The solution to this problem is represented by the empty circles and the corresponding dashed indifference curves for workers with skill types $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$. As can be seen, the utility of workers in skill group 1 is higher than in the solution to the relaxed problem, while the utility of workers in skill group 2 is lower. The output provided by workers in skill group 2 is strictly upwards distorted, $y^{A_2} > y^{\alpha_{R_2}}$.

In the case depicted in the left panel, the solution to the intermediate problem $A$ satisfies the downward IC constraint between workers in skill groups 2 and 3. In this case, the solution to intermediate problem $A$ also solves the non-relaxed problem of optimal taxation. In the case depicted in the right panel, the solution to intermediate problem $A$ violates the downward IC constraint between the workers in groups 2 and 3. In the solution to the non-relaxed problem (not shown), this downward IC constraint will hence be binding. The optimal output level $y^{A_2}$ will nevertheless be upwards distorted. More precisely, it will always be located between the output levels $y^{A_2}$ and $y^{Z_2}$ (corresponding to the intersection point $Z$ between the red dashed indifference curve of the workers in skill group 2 and the green indifference curve of the workers in skill group 3). Which of the two cases prevails, depends in a non-trivial way on the joint type distribution $K$, the effort cost function $h$ and the complete sequence of social weights $\alpha$.

**B.12 The efficient funding problem**

Lemma 7 shows that an EITC with negative marginal taxes and negative participation taxes represents the most efficient scheme to redistribute some fixed amount $R > 0$ from high-income earners to the unemployed and the working poor. One driving force of this result is the planner’s desire to smooth deadweight losses over both margins and the entire skill distribution. Another crucial ingredient is the planner’s desire for redistribution, however: An EITC is only the most
efficient tax system conditional on some redistribution from high incomes to low incomes taking place.

To clarify this point, I contrast the results of the efficient redistribution problem with the results of a structurally similar problem that does not involve any redistribution. In particular, assume that the social planner faces an exogenous revenue requirement \( B > 0 \), which he has to fund by imposing taxes. Assume further that the unemployed do not have any non-labor income and that their consumption has to be non-negative. Hence, the social planner cannot use lump-sum taxes, but must rely on distortionary income taxation. Now, consider the problem to minimize the deadweight loss from labor supply distortions \( 5 \) over the set of feasible allocations, subject to the budget constraint that the tax revenue is weakly larger than \( B > 0 \),

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j G_j(\delta_j)(y_j - c_j) - \sum_{j=1}^{n} f_j [1 - G_j(\delta_j)] c_0 \geq B ,
\]

(44)
to the non-negativity constraint \( c_0 \geq 0 \), and to the incentive compatibility constraints between all agents with identical skills \( 14 \), between all unemployed agents \( 15 \), and between the workers in the lowest two skill groups, \( 22 \) and \( 23 \). I henceforth refer to this program as the efficient funding problem and denote its solution by the vectors \( c^F, y^F \) and \( \delta^F \). The following lemma identifies the labor supply distortions in this solution.

**Lemma 28.** Consider an exogenous revenue requirement \( B > 0 \) such that a solution \( (c^F, y^F) \) to the efficient funding problem exists.

(i) Output \( y^F \) is downwards distorted at the extensive margin in all skill groups \( j \in J \).

(ii) There is a number \( a^F > 1 \) such that, if \( \omega_2/\omega_1 \in (1, a^F) \), output \( y^F \) is downwards distorted at the intensive margin in skill group 1.

By Lemma 28, the most efficient tax scheme to fund a public budget does not involve upward distortions in labor supply. In contrast, it involves downward distortions at both margins and a binding downward IC constraint between the two lowest skill groups. Importantly, constrained efficiency cannot be maximized by conditional lump-sum taxes on all employed agents. Instead, the efficiency-maximizing taxes are increasing in labor income even though the planner has no redistributive concerns whatsoever. This result holds whenever, first, the distance between skill groups 1 and 2 is sufficiently small and, second, the problem has solution given the level of \( B \). The first qualification is again related to the assumption of a discrete skill set; its role is explained in Section 6 above. The second qualification has to be made because the achievable tax revenue is limited due to Laffer curve effects. Note that this pattern generalizes to a version of the efficient funding problem that contains the entire set of local IC constraints along the skill dimension: In that version of the problem, optimal output is downwards distorted at the intensive margin in all skill groups 1 to \( n - 1 \), whenever the relative difference between all pairs of adjacent skill groups is sufficiently small. Besides, optimal output continues to be downwards distorted at the extensive margin in all skill groups \( j \in J \).

The intuition behind Lemma 28 again comes from the trade-off between intensive efficiency and extensive efficiency. To start with, the optimal transfers to the unemployed are equal to
zero, i.e., the non-negativity constraint is binding. Consequently, the public budget can only be funded if the workers in some skill groups pay strictly positive taxes, which induce downwards distortions at the extensive margin. As in the efficient redistribution problem, the minimization of deadweight losses from distortions at the extensive margin requires to satisfy an inverse elasticity rule, this time given by

\[ \delta^*(\omega_j) - \delta_j^F = y_j^F - c_j^F = \lambda_F \frac{G_j(\delta_j^F)}{1 + \lambda_F g_j(\delta_j^F)} > 0 \]

for all skill groups \( j \in J \). In line with standard arguments, minimizing the deadweight loss over all types of labor requires to, first, set strictly positive participation taxes for all skill groups and, second, set higher taxes for skill groups that respond less elastically at the participation margin. As the participation elasticities are strictly decreasing over the skill dimension by Lemma 2, the efficient funding scheme involves strictly increasing taxes over the entire income range. With a sufficiently dense skill set, the allocation defined by (45) violates all local downward IC constraints. Hence, the planner cannot satisfy the inverse elasticity rule (45) and avoid intensive-margin distortions at the same time. Put differently, he has to introduce downward distortions at the intensive margin in order to relax these constraints and, thereby, reduce the distortions at the extensive margin.

B.13 Generalized welfare weights and poverty alleviation

In this section, I discuss whether an EITC is the optimal policy for alleviating poverty. Following Mirrlees (1971), optimal income taxation is commonly studied under the assumption that the social objective is given by a (utilitarian) welfare function (see Weinzierl 2014 for a recent critique). As an alternative, Kanbur et al. (1994) as well as Besley & Coate (1992, 1995) suggest the goal of alleviating poverty as measured by the available income. They advocate this objective as being more consonant with public debates and, consequently, as providing better insights into real-world policy choices. In particular, they argue that neither policy-makers nor taxpayers seem to value the leisure enjoyed by the poor (which is an argument of standard utility functions), but rather seem to focus on income as a more visible sign of poverty (see, e.g., Besley & Coate (1995): 189 and Kanbur et al. (1994): 1615-1616).

Support for this view comes from the recent public debate surrounding a potential expansion of the EITC for childless workers. Most prominently, President Barrack Obama and Paul Ryan, then Republican Chairman of the House of Representative Budget Committee, independently proposed to expand the EITC by doubling the phase-in and phase-out rates, raising the phase-out start and the eligibility threshold, and relaxing age restrictions for childless workers (Executive Office 2014, House Budget Committee 2014). The Obama proposal emphasizes the goal to reduce poverty for childless low-income workers. In particular, the proposal estimates that “the increase in the credit would lift about half a million people above the poverty line and reduce the depth of poverty for 10 million more” (Executive Office 2014: 2). It also criticizes that the current US tax code pushes childless workers with low incomes ”into or deeper into
poverty” (Executive Office 2014: 3), both directly and indirectly through discouraging work.

The Ryan proposal suggests a number of reforms to reduce poverty and increase economic self-sufficiency. It argues that the EITC is the most successful program in fighting poverty among families, and that its expansion would significantly reduce poverty among childless workers. The Ryan proposals also emphasizes that an EITC expansion would provide greater incentives for people to work and “earn enough money to place them above the poverty line” (House Budget Committee 2014: 7). A number of further proposals provide similar arguments for an even more generous EITC expansion, emphasizing the goals of lifting people above the poverty line, reducing the depth of poverty for others and, in particular, eliminating the possibility that low-income workers are taxed into poverty. For example, such poverty-related arguments were made to support two recent proposals for EITC expansion, introduced in the House of Representatives in February 2017, and in the Senate in June 2017.

I continue by sketching the most common poverty measures and their formalization in optimal tax problems. Let \( \bar{c} \) denote the poverty line, expressed in terms of consumption or available income (after tax and transfers).\(^{83}\) Foster et al. (1984) introduce a class of poverty measures given by

\[
P_a(c, \bar{c}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{\bar{c} - c_i}{\bar{c}} \right)^a \mathbb{1}_{c_i \leq \bar{c}} ,
\]

where \( n \) is the number of agents in the population and \( c_i \) is agent \( i \)’s available income. For \( a = 0 \), this measure is equal to the poverty rate or head count ratio, the share of a population with available incomes below \( \bar{c} \). For \( a = 1 \), it is equal to the poverty gap, the average (percentage) shortfall of available income from the poverty line. In contrast to the poverty rate, the poverty gap also accounts for the intensity (depth) of poverty. For \( a > 1 \), the measure assigns higher weights to larger shortfalls from the poverty line. Institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations commonly use the first two measures, the poverty rate and the poverty gap.

Kanbur et al. (1994) were the first to study optimal income taxation under the goal of poverty alleviation instead of welfare maximization. They formalize the objective of poverty alleviation by using what they call a generalized poverty gap measure (with \( a > 1 \)). For an intensive-margin model, they find that the optimal marginal tax might be negative at incomes below the poverty line. Numerical simulations show large positive marginal taxes to be optimal even at the very bottom, however. They also point out that their formalization of poverty alleviation is inconsistent with the Pareto principle, because it fails to account for the agents’ disutility of providing output instead of enjoying leisure. To reconcile the poverty gap criterion with the Pareto principle, Saez & Stantcheva (2016) suggest to apply their approach of generalized welfare weights by setting welfare weights equal to \( \alpha_p \) for all agents with consumption below the poverty line \( \bar{c} \), and equal to \( \alpha_{np} \in [0, \alpha_p) \) for all agents with consumption above \( \bar{c} \). Note

\(^{81}\) Besides, the proposal argues that an EITC expansion would increase employment rates, and that this might benefit society through positive external effects such as increasing marriage rates, supporting child outcomes and reducing incarceration rates (Executive Office 2014: 9).


\(^{83}\) Sometimes, the poverty line is also defined in terms of pre-tax income.
that, with intensive-margin responses alone, the optimal marginal taxes for this criterion are strictly positive both below and above the poverty line \(\bar{c}\) (Saez & Stantcheva 2016). \(^{84}\)

Finally, I show that the optimal income tax can be given by an EITC when the social objective is to reduce the poverty gap. For comparison, recall that Proposition 3 shows the existence of well-behaved welfare functions for which the endogenous marginal welfare weights are an element of \(A^U_k\) if (i) the relative distance between the first \(k\) skill levels is sufficiently small, and (ii) the share of highly productive workers is sufficiently large. In the following, I demonstrate that a similar result holds for the endogenous welfare weights that arise if the social objective is to reduce the poverty gap. In particular, I use the following generalized version \(^{46}\) of the welfare weights suggested by Saez & Stantcheva (2016):

\[
\tilde{\alpha}_j(c_j) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_p & \text{for } c_j \leq \bar{c} \\
\alpha_p - q(c_j) & \text{for } c_j > \bar{c}.
\end{cases}
\]

Function \(q_j\) determines how the generalized weights decrease for workers with available income above the threshold line. Intuitively, function \(q\) measures the planner’s reluctance to cut workers’ consumption to levels very close to the poverty line \(\bar{c}\), and how this reluctance fades out with increasing distance from \(\bar{c}\). Note first that, for the calibrated model in Section 7, the weight sequence \(\alpha_A \in A^U_k\) can be closely approximated by setting poverty alleviation weights according to \(^{46}\), with the simple functional form \(q(c_j) = [(c_j - \bar{c})/c]^{\rho}(\alpha_p - \alpha_{np})\), given parameter values \(\bar{c} = 7.022\), \(\alpha_p = 1.05\), \(\alpha_{np} = 0.96\) and \(\rho = 1.6\).

More generally, the following proposition provides conditions under which, for an objective formalized by two numbers \(\bar{c}\), \(\alpha_p\) and a monotonically increasing function \(q : (\bar{c}, \infty) \rightarrow (0, \alpha_p]\), the resulting sequence \(\tilde{\alpha}\) of generalized weights is an element of the set \(A^U_k\).

**Proposition 8.** Fix three numbers \(k \in \{2, \ldots, n-1\}\), \(\alpha_p \in (1, \chi)\) and \(\bar{c} \in (c^lf_{k+1}^U, c^lf_{lf+1}^U)\). There exist a number \(m^k \geq k + 1\) and two vectors \((\phi_j^k)_{j=k+1}^n\) and \((\delta_j^k)_{j=k+1}^n\) with \(\phi_j^k \geq 1\), \(\phi_{m^k}^k > 1\) and \(\delta_j^k \in (\bar{\delta}, \delta)\) for all \(j \in \{k+1, \ldots, n\}\) such that, if

(i) \(\omega_{j+1}/\omega_j < \min \{a_j^k(\alpha_p), \ldots, a_{k-1}^k(\alpha_p)\}\) for all \(j \in \{1, \ldots, k-1\}\),

(ii) \(n \geq m^k\) and

(iii) \(\sum_{j=k+1}^n f_j G_j(\delta_j^k) \phi_j^k \geq 1\),

there exists a monotonically decreasing function \(q : (\bar{c}, \infty) \rightarrow (0, \alpha_p]\) for which \(\tilde{\alpha} \in A^U_k\).

Finally, consider the simple formalization of poverty alleviation goals suggested by Saez & Stantcheva (2016), where \(\tilde{\alpha}(c_j) = \alpha_{np}\) for any \(c_j > \bar{c}\). For this formalization, the relaxed problem’s solution would continue to satisfy the first condition in Definition 1, i.e., to violate the upward IC constraints among the first \(k - 1\) skill groups. However, if the skill set is sufficiently

\(^{84}\)As an alternative, Saez & Stantcheva (2016) suggest to formalize the criterion of poverty rate minimization by assigning positive weights to all agents with consumption exactly equal to \(\bar{c}\), and zero weights to all agents with lower or higher consumption. For these non-monotonic weights, the optimal marginal tax at the bottom can be negative, in line with the results by Choné & Laroque (2010) and Brett & Weymark (2017).
dense in this range, the second condition in Definition 1 will be violated, i.e., the relaxed problem’s solution will violate the downward IC constraints between all higher skill groups. In that case, it depends on the details of the joint type distribution, the effort cost function and the levels of $\alpha_p$, $\alpha_{np}$ and $\bar{c}$ whether or not the optimal allocation involves upwards distortions at the intensive margin. Given the similarity to the optimal tax problem studied by Brett & Weymark (2017), the optimal allocation can be expected to involve upwards distortions for a set of low-skill workers, downwards distortions for a set of high-skill workers and bunching for a non-empty set of intermediate skill types. In this case, an EITC would continue to be optimal.