

Political Economics, Institutions and Voting

SoSe 2016

Instructor:

Matthias Messner

Office: TBA

E-mail: TBA

Course outline, rules and requirements:

The objective of this course is to introduce students to some topics in the literature Political Economy, Institutions and Voting. While the larger part of the papers listed below are theoretical papers there will also be some empirical work that will be discussed.

The papers that are listed below have been divided into 23 subgroups. Each student is supposed to choose one of the 23 items and to prepare a concise written summary and critical evaluation of the main insights of the paper(s) listed under the item. The critical evaluation should also draw on other papers in the literature. Students will also have to prepare a presentation that is based on their written work.

Students who wish to propose their own topics/papers are most welcome to do so as long as the chosen topic fits into the general theme of the course. It goes without saying that any proposal is subject to the instructors approval. It should also be clear that the student should not recycle papers/topics from other courses.

Strategic voting I: Plurality Rule, Poisson Voting Games

A. DHILLON AND B. LOCKWOOD (2004): When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable? *Games and Economic Behavior*, 46(1), 55-75.

MYERSON, ROGER (2002): Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games, *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol 103, 219-251.

Strategic voting II: Runoff Rule

L. BOUTON (2012): A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections, *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.

M. MESSNER AND M. POLBORN (2010): Miscounts, Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis; Working Paper.

MYATT, DAVID (2007): On the Theory of Strategic Voting *Review of Economic Studies*, 74(1), pp. 255-281.

Strategic voting III: Sophisticated Voting and the top cycle set

D. AUSTEN-SMITH AND J. BANKS (2005): Positive Political Theory II: Collective Preference; Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

R.M. MYERSON (1996): Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory; *Working Paper*;

Strategic voting IV: Abstention and mandatory voting

S. KRASA AND M. POLBORN (2009): Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 66 (1), 275-291.

Strategic voting V: Empirics on Voting

TH. FUJIWARA (2011): A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duvergers Law. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6, 197-233.

S. ANAGOL AND TH. FUJIWARA (2014), The Runner-Up Effect. Working Paper.

Strategic voting VI: Empirics on Abstention

COATE, STEPHEN, MICHAEL CONLIN AND ANDREA MORO (2008): The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Models in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda, *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 582-596.

BATTAGLINI, M., REBECCA B. MORTON AND THOMAS R. PALFREY (2008): Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections, *American Economic Review* 98(2) (Papers and Proceedings); 194-200.

LEVINE, DAVID K. AND THOMAS R. PALFREY (2007): The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study, *American Political Science Review* 101(1): pp. 143-158.

Voting and Information I: Condorcet Jury Theorem A

T. FEDDERSEN AND W. PESENDORFER (1998): Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting; *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92(1), 23-35.

P. J. COUGHLAN (2000): In defense of unanimous jury verdicts: Mistrials, communication, and strategic voting, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, 375-393.

Voting and Information II: Condorcet Jury Theorem B

AUSTEN-SMITH AND BANKS (1996): Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem; *American Political Science Review* Vol. 90(1), 34-45.

T. FEDDERSEN AND W. PESENDORFER (1997): Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information; *Econometrica*, Vol. 65(5), 1029-1058.

Voting and Information III: The Swing Voter's Curse

T. FEDDERSEN AND W. PESENDORFER (1996): The Swing Voter's Curse; *American Economic Review* Vol. 86(3), 408-424.

M. BATTAGLINI, R. MORTON AND TH. PALFREY (2010): The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory, *Review of Economic Studies* 77, 61-89.

Dynamic Voting and Information I: Learning and Experimentation A

O. COMPTE AND PH. JEHIEL (2010): Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective; *Journal of Political Economy* Vol. 118(2), 189-221. J. ALBRECHT, A. ANDERSON AND S. VROMAN (2010): Search by Committee, *Journal of Economic Theory*.

Dynamic Voting and Information II: Learning, Experimentation B

M. MESSNER AND M. POLBORN(2012): The Option to Wait in Collective Decisions and Optimal Majority Rules; *Journal of Public Economics* Vol. 96, 524-540.

B. STRULOVICI (2010): Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation; *Econometrica* Vol. 78.

Dynamic Voting and Information III: Information acquisition

A. LIZZERI AND L YAARIV (2013): Sequential Deliberation; Working Paper.

Dynamic Voting and Information IV: Primary elections

T. PIKETTY (1995): Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110, 551-584.

Dynamic Voting and Information V: Primary elections

M. POLBORN, H. HERRERA AND G. DELTAS (2015): Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System, *Review of Economic Studies* forthcoming.

Choosing how to choose I:

M. MESSNER AND M. POLBORN(2004): Voting on Majority Rules; *Review of Economic Studies* Vol. 71, 115-132.

S. BARBERA AND M. JACKSON (2004): Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules; *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 1011-1048.

K. ROBERTS (1999) Dynamic Voting in Clubs; Working Paper.

Choosing how to choose II:

D. ACEMOGLU, G. EGOROV AND K. SONIN (2008): Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs; Working paper.

Choosing how to choose III:

G. MAGGI AND M. MORELLI (2006): Self-enforcing Voting in International Organizations; *American Economic Review*, 96(4): 1137-1158

Lobbying I: Information

V. KRISHNA AND J. MORGAN (2001): A Model of Expertise, 2001, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 747-775.

Lobbying II: Dynamic conflicts

M. POLBORN (2006): Investment under Uncertainty in Dynamic Conflicts; *Review of Economic Studies*, 73, 505-529.

Corruption I:

A. KHWAJA AND ATIF MIAN (2005): Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4), 1371-1411.

Corruption II:

R. BURGESS, M. HANSEN, B. OLKEN, P. POTAPOV, AND S. SIEBER (2012): The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(4), 1707-1754

Corruption III: Voter response

C. FERRAZ AND F. FINAN (2008): Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits and Electoral Outcomes, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 703-745.

Culture and Beliefs:

G. TABELLINI (2008): The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives, *QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS*, 123, 905-950.